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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

MR. ABBOTT:

Good morning.

Welcome to the

3

third day of a Joint FTC/DOJ Workshop on Merger

4

Enforcement.

5

Policy and Coordination in the FTC's Bureau of

6

Competition.

7

I'm Alden Abbott, Associate Director for

I am joined here by the co-moderator for our

8

panel, Dr. Mary Coleman, Deputy Director of the FTC's

9

Bureau of Economics.

10

Thus far, workshop panels have focused on

11

discrete parts of the Guidelines:

12

concentration, competitive effects and entry.

13

commentators, however, have noted that it would be a

14

mistake to view individual Guidelines provisions in

15

isolation.

16

Market definition,
Several

However, the implications of such statements

17

that the Guidelines provisions should be viewed

18

holistically, to use the New Age term, with simultaneous

19

consideration of different factors that enter into a

20

Guidelines analysis, have not been developed.

21

The aim of this morning's panel, entitled

22

Efficiencies, Dynamic Analysis and Integrated Analysis,

23

is to explore what it means to carry out such a holistic

24

or integrated analysis.

25

efficiencies and dynamic considerations, with particular

The panel will also focus on
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1

attention to their role in the overall competitive

2

assessment of a proposed merger.

3

We are fortunate to have a true all star cast

4

assigned to assist us in carrying out our daunting task.

5

Their academic and professional laurels are so

6

impressive, we could take up the entire morning

7

recounting them.

8

will refrain from doing so.

9

affiliations.

Given the time constraints, however, I
But I will note their key

10

Our first speaker will be Dr. David Scheffman,

11

who is a recidivist, already having served on the panel,

12

former Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition,

13

currently a director at LECG and Adjunct Professor at the

14

Owen Graduate School of Management at Vanderbilt

15

University.

16

Dave, I hope, will tell us what this integrated

17

approach is all about and help dispel the fog and give us

18

a clear sky.

19

Simons, former Director of the FTC's Bureau of

20

Competition, and currently co-chair of the Antitrust

21

Group at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.

22

Dave will be followed in order by Joe

Joe will be followed, again in order, by Mark

23

Gidley, co-head of White & Case's antitrust group, and a

24

former Acting Assistant Attorney General and Deputy

25

Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
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1

Mark will be followed by Ilene Gotts, a partner

2

at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, who has held various

3

ABA Antitrust Section leadership positions, including

4

membership on the section counsel currently.

5

Bill Kolasky, co-chair of Wilmer, Cutler &

6

Pickering's antitrust and competition practice group, and

7

a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for antitrust,

8

will follow Ilene.

9

Then we're saving our superstar for near the

10

end, the Honorable Robert Pitofsky, former FTC Chairman

11

and Dean of Georgetown Law School, currently a professor

12

at Georgetown and of counsel at Arnold & Porter.

13

will give us the big picture to put everything together

14

for us, we hope.

15

And he

And then our panel will end on an international

16

comparative note with a presentation by Dr. Vincent

17

Verouden, who has been an economist at the European

18

Commission's DG competition since 2000, and Dr. Verouden

19

has already spoken, and we're delighted to have his

20

comparative perspective.

21

enlighten us on EC Merger Guidelines issues.

22

And he will undoubtedly

After our seven panelists have spoken, we will

23

have a brief 10-minute break followed by a discussion and

24

question-and-answer session among the presenters and

25

moderators.

Given the fact that at least some of these
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1

speakers I know are not shy, Mary and I look forward to a

2

lively and thought provoking session.

3

So, Dave, will you lead off, please?

4

DR. SCHEFFMAN:

Yes.

I'll try and be a little

5

thought provoking or obnoxious as I usually am, rather

6

than just talk -- and I will talk about integrated

7

analysis, but I'm going to first talk about efficiencies

8

-- can we get this slide up so everyone can see?

9

I thought we'd give a report card since I left

10

the agency not that long ago and talk about how I think

11

the agencies are doing -- obviously, I have much more

12

experience at the FTC -- with respect to efficiencies.

13

It's hard to tell, because you don't see many

14

tough cases with efficiencies compared, say, to the '80s.

15

I think that's because the outside believes that

16

efficiencies aren't given much weight and they advise

17

their clients not to try them.

18

well-known problem.

19

That's well known and a

With all respect to Chairman Pitofsky, who I

20

have the highest regard for, baby foods was not a helpful

21

development, and I'm sure he will respond.

22

involved in the case, and maybe I misunderstood the

23

facts, but it's not surprising that it's not most

24

economists' favorite case.

25

in favor of efficiencies, I don't think, although I can't

I wasn't

Nor is it a favorite of those
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1

say that, because Bob did promulgate, you know, was an

2

instigator of the '97 revision and does believe in

3

efficiencies.

4

say.

5

So I'd be interested in what he has to

There are some good things about baby food, I

6

think, such as it's good to have a clear decision that

7

when three to two is a real three to two.

8

high hurdle, and I think most economists in the

9

mainstream would agree that that's where the really high

It is a very

10

hurdle should be.

11

said, and he worked on baby food, his concern with baby

12

food was that it wasn't really three to two.

13

really like one to two or 3.1 to two, 2.1 to two.

14

I think as Chairman Muris has often

It was

What I've heard from the parties, but I don't

15

know a lot about this, is the ex poste story is not a

16

pretty one.

17

retrospectives on hospitals.

18

some of these cases where efficiencies were a significant

19

issue and look at what happens.

20

I know the FTC is engaged in various
I urged them to look at

My favorite case, one in which I was an expert

21

soon after leaving the FTC and was one of the FTC's and

22

Ann Malester's best cases, was the tank ammo case.

23

was the two to one defense merger case, a big victory for

24

the FTC.

25

exactly opposite from what the FTC said it would.

This

Everyone has known after that it turned out
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1

I think my view of the track record, from anecdotal

2

evidence, on how the agencies have treated cases that had

3

serious efficiency claims is not good.

4

the research has yet to be done.

5

But, you know,

However, the record is not as bad on

6

efficiencies as all that.

Efficiencies are important.

7

They're more important than people and counselors think

8

they are, but not in the Guideline’s sense.

9

that much more the case now than it was in the '80s, is

One thing is

10

that the agencies rely on customer opinions.

11

industrial mergers in which you have a relatively small

12

number of sophisticated customers, even in a pretty

13

concentrated merger, if the customers say we're not

14

concerned, it's unusual that the agencies will challenge.

15

That has locked into it efficiencies and other

16

considerations.

17

quite comfortable the agencies almost always get right.

18

And so in

I think those are the mergers which I'm

So in those cases I'm not so worried about the

19

efficiencies.

20

suppliers can't convince the customers of the

21

efficiencies when they have big, sophisticated customers,

22

then they haven't fulfilled their burden and the merger

23

is likely to be challenged and it probably should be.

24

The real problems are in the cases, all the

25

Another way you could say it, if the

cases where you don't have a relatively small number of
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1

sophisticated representative customers -- the oil

2

industry, branded products mergers, supermarkets, et

3

cetera.

4

of customers, where you don't really have sophisticated

5

customers to speak for the benefits or potential costs of

6

the deal.

7

think what we've done in oil for 20 years, and it's been

8

going on a long time, in the way efficiencies have been

9

treated has really been quite counterproductive.

Those are cases where you have middlemen or lots

I think that's where the real problem is.

I

I think

10

everyone, including FTC staff, believes that there have

11

been substantial efficiencies gained from a lot of the

12

oil mergers.

13

not given much weight in oil merger enforcement.

14

still, as it has been for 20 years, largely a structural

15

enforcement policy.

16

Nonetheless, the efficiencies are usually
It's

I will say, the other way that efficiencies

17

count is that, it affects remedies, which I don’t think

18

is really recognized.

19

that, well, actually this is a good deal, in a general

20

sense not in specific Guideline sense, and are crafting

21

remedies that may impact the achievement of the benefits

22

in the deal, you'll see in lots of consents kind of

23

exotic, flexible consents at the agencies.

24

cases, my view of that of what's going on is the agencies

25

are crafting things to alleviate the competitive problems

When staff and the agencies think

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

In some

11
1

but in a way that allows the potential benefits of the

2

deals to go forward.

3

But efficiencies can be very important.

4

Efficiencies sometimes, are part of the reason why you

5

don't get a second request.

6

in which it's really just a structural case where you

7

could go forward because it’s a five to four merger, but

8

where you don't have complaining customers.

9

got a good story about why the merger is taking place,

And in close cases, in cases

If you've

10

that can be part of the reason why either you don't get a

11

second request or why a case is closed.

12

example of an interesting case on efficiencies is drug

13

wholesalers II, which was an interesting situation where

14

the Commission had a prima facie case to be able to block

15

the merger that came back second time, and for lots of

16

complicated reasons which I don't fully understand and I

17

was there near the end –- the Commission did not block

18

it.

19

Commission staff that there were benefits of the mergers,

20

that just having two mergers in that industry going from

21

four to two in the case that was litigated was a no go

22

proposition.

23

part of the reason why drug wholesalers II matter was

24

cleared.

25

And a good

But certainly part of it was a belief within the

The efficiencies were clearly a significant

And I'll get to the integrated analysis, along
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1

with the argument and belief that the merger really

2

wasn't going to be anticompetitive anyway, in part

3

because it was going to be efficient.

4

strengthen the smaller competitor.

5

Okay.

It was going to

How do the agencies actually do things?

6

Well, they do it really the way the Guidelines say, which

7

is part of the problem.

8

in which if you've got a case where the staff has a

9

pretty strong belief that the matter is anticompetitive,

There really is a sliding scale

10

there's no efficiency is going to turn that round.

11

really has to do with the stronger the belief by the

12

staff, and their decisions are usually ratified, and

13

obviously the belief by the ultimate decision maker about

14

the likely anticompetitive effects of the deal, the less

15

weight efficiencies get.

16

It

So efficiencies really are in play in the gray

17

area where you've got a case where there isn't a strong

18

belief and basis for believing the merger is

19

anticompetitive.

20

This is the reason why we need to get more

21

integrated analysis because the way the efficiencies

22

actually get treated in the more difficult cases, it's

23

not really the proper way.

24

reasons why the merger might not be anticompetitive is

25

because it's efficient.

That is, you know, one of the

Talk about that in a minute.
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1

What's happened with the Merger Guidelines, I

2

think it's probably more at the FTC, because the FTC has

3

litigated the efficiencies provisions probably more than

4

DOJ, is unfortunately is the staff builds a prima facie

5

case that the parties can't win on the Merger Guidelines

6

efficiencies checklist.

7

merger-specific, it's not variable cost.

8

leads that effort for the financial analysts, and he does

9

a very good job on that, that's his job in a way for the

It's not cognizable, it's not
Gabe Dagen

10

client.

11

to show that, you know, they're not going to be able to

12

get through the Guidelines efficiencies checklist.

13

But if we have to go to court we have to be able

The problem with that is that gets the focus on

14

the efficiencies on litigation and disproving the

15

efficiencies.

16

at whether there are some real efficiencies here, folks?

17

And that was something I tried to do at the FTC, with

18

mixed success.

The question is, is anyone really looking

19

There aren't procedures and incentives really

20

to look for real efficiencies, at least within the FTC.

21

I don't know about the DOJ.

22

happen, but it happens sort of depending on which

23

staffers you get on a case.

24

what the staff is mainly looking, and that's partly on

25

the basis for the client, to be able to show that you can

I don't say it doesn't

Because otherwise, again,
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1

disprove the efficiency claims of the parties if you have

2

to go to court.

3

And with the emphasis on disproving

4

efficiencies, not surprisingly, there's not a lot of

5

emphasis on finding efficiencies.

6

good merger?

7

efficiencies under the Guidelines test, is this really a

8

good deal, okay?

9

But is this really a

Even if we maybe could disprove the

And we are proud of transparency, and this is a

10

real benefit of the transparency that we tried to

11

increase, the Commission tried to increase.

12

the part where it's been least successful.

13

experience, there's the least communication between the

14

parties and the staff about the efficiencies claim.

15

happens is, and I don't think the outside understands

16

this, the staff looks at the documents, deposes the

17

people, gets enough so that they think they could

18

disprove the efficiencies claim under the Guidelines.

19

And there's usually nothing comes back over the net from

20

the parties.

21

what's happened, right?

22

facie case that your efficiencies don't count.

23

But this is
In my

What

It's like the other side doesn't even know
Your opponent has made a prima

Now, what we found in a couple of instances

24

where we actually required some transparency between the

25

staff and the parties, is that the staff didn't always
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1

have it right, particularly on whether the efficiency was

2

merger-specific or what would happen but for the merger.

3

But the efficiency arguments, often really don't get

4

tested.

5

It's a fault of the staff in not always being open, but

6

the parties have to push.

7

And that's a fault of the parties, in part.

They really have to be serious -- they have to

8

say, okay, what is your basis for thinking that this is

9

not merger specific, that something's going to happen

10

independent of the merger, et cetera.

11

to test that to understand what the basis of the staff's

12

opinion is in order to come back with and answer.

13

is the one situation in which the parties actually have

14

information that the staff doesn’t, which is usually not

15

the case on competitive effects.

16

get this information.

17

to engage the staff and to the extent they can, request,

18

demand transparency.

19

conclusion this efficiency isn't merger specific, et

20

cetera?

21

that the basis isn't there, even though the staff has

22

good reason to believe what they believe, they might not

23

have the facts right.

24
25

The parties have

This

But the staff doesn't

So the parties really have

What is staff’s real basis for it’s

Because when you press on it, you might find

Okay.
roundtable.

We learned a lot from the efficiencies

I don't know that it's had any effect, but I
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1

think we learned, you know, the merger consulting

2

companies have certainly not helped the consideration of

3

efficiencies with all the articles arguing that the

4

typical merger is not, quote, "successful."

5

think -- I don't know that it came through in the

6

roundtable, but Paul Pautler has a good paper on that

7

issue, and I've looked at lots of literature, and it's

8

important to understand what that literature means.

9

think that literature is right, but you have to be

Well, I

I

10

careful about what you think it means for what we do in

11

antitrust.

12

That is, clearly the leading reason why mergers

13

aren't successful is because the acquirer pays too much.

14

That's not an antitrust issue.

15

efficient merger.

16

winner's curse sort of thing.

17

why mergers are not “successful.”

18

reason.

19

You can have a perfectly

They may have paid too much.

It's the

That's the primary reason
That's the main

But another important reason, which is related

20

to what we actually do, has been recognized in recent

21

years. Another important reason why mergers are not

22

successful is that the mergers lose revenue that they

23

didn't expect.

24

business.

25

it might be because it's anticompetitive or could be

That is, they lose customers and

In a horizontal merger, why?
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1

anticompetitive, but it could be because the customers

2

actually react adversely to the merger for other reasons.

3

That's related to reliance on customer opinions and

4

things like that, so that reason is important.

5

fit with what we do.

6

reemphasizes how important sophisticated customer

7

opinions are.

8
9

It does

It does indicate how -- it

The roundtable clearly indicates, other things
equal, that horizontal mergers are more likely to be

10

successful and efficient, you know, if there is “fit” --

11

all the stuff about fit and being in a similar business,

12

da, da, da.

13

been on that, and that goes back to the Scherer and

14

Ravenscraft papers.

15

The literature is very clear and always has

The other thing which is true, if you listen

16

carefully, and it's that straightforward cost savings are

17

generally realized.

18

to the shareholders, what they report to the 10-K, what

19

they report to the street, you know, they say we're going

20

to reach these cost reductions.

21

much more than on average these days, they do, if those

22

are costs savings which aren't pie in the sky but

23

standard sort of consolidation savings.

24

savings that we worry about, cost reductions we worry

25

about, in horizontal mergers, they're, you know, you need

If you look at what companies report

And on average, in fact,
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1

a basis for believing that they're there, obviously, and

2

how they're going to achieve them.

3

do so -- you can have pretty high confidence if you have

4

some basis that they're going to actually be realized.

5

But they're going to

The other thing from the efficiencies

6

roundtable is that planning and implementation is really

7

important.

That's a leading reason why mergers aren't

8

successful.

That has something to do with what we do.

9

Gun jumping is a problem despite -- I don't think that

10

the efficiencies roundtable was successful in explicating

11

that issue.

12

significant issue.

13

planning as probably even they could do if they didn't

14

have such conservative counseling.

15

what the agencies should be looking at in terms of some

16

evidence of serious planning of how the merger is going

17

to be implemented to believe that the efficiencies are

18

going to be realized.

19

Gun jumping I continue to believe is a

Okay.

It is why companies can't do as much

And it also indicates

How do efficiencies fit into the

20

analysis?

This gets to the integrated approach.

21

Efficiencies are related to -- a merger that's in a five

22

to four industry without unilateral effects is

23

significant -- one point of the merger is to become

24

significantly more efficient, and not dominant.

25

almost a prima facie case for economists.
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This is

Why isn't the

19
1

industry going to be more competitive?

I mean, it might

2

not be.

3

not.

4

analysis.

5

a merger through, where both staffs at both agencies,

6

lawyers and economists, say, well, yes, that's a pretty

7

good efficiency story is where you've got a manufacturing

8

merger with a combination of batch and continuous

9

production processes, so you can do lots of interesting

But you need a pretty convincing story about why

So efficiencies obviously impact the competitive
The ideal case, and one I think, that will get

10

things in terms of getting more output out of the same

11

facilities, et cetera.

12

it's an industry where there is not a viable theory that

13

you're going to significantly reduce capacity utilization

14

because the costs of reduced capacity utilization are too

15

small, or too large.

16

that's not batch and continuous.

17

You can get higher capacity if

This is like the oil industry, but

Then you've got, well, how is the merger going

18

to be anticompetitive?

19

more almost surely as a result of the merger.

20

to say you might not have other reasons to believe that

21

the merger is problematic, but you should have some

22

strong reasons to believe, say, in a five to four merger

23

why this merger is going to be problematic.

24

efficiencies are important.

25

The party is going to produce
That's not

So

Let me begin with the integrated analysis.
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1

First what we have to remember -- and this is not the way

2

the law works at all, and it's not the way the

3

enforcement agencies really work in practice, is that we

4

define markets in antitrust and then we do the analysis

5

after that.

6

Well, not all markets are alike, and the real

7

basis of the market is not equally strong.

8

recognized.

9

clearly.

This is not

The markets are taken as given to us

This is the way the courts decide, although

10

sometimes the reason why the courts reject cases based on

11

market definition is for squishy reasons that probably

12

don't have to do with market definition.

13

things are all related.

14

market definition will usually spill over into

15

competitive effects.

16

example, and Joe will talk about this more in a minute.

But these

In particular, weaknesses in

That was true in cruises, for

17

All these things have to fit together.

The

18

weaknesses in market definition are important in

19

competitive effects analysis.

20

outside don't understand is that you're never going to

21

win an argument with the staff on market definition in a

22

hard case.

23

will start talking about, well, if this is your market,

24

given the defects in that market definition, this is why

25

the competitive effects that you're worried about are not

I think what people on the

It's not that you should give it up, but you
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going to occur.

2

Okay.

What efficiencies should count?

I have

3

long believed –- going back to the '80s and the papers

4

that were written at the FTC, like Fred Johnson's paper -

5

- that this whole idea of passthrough incremental costs

6

and passthrough is a whole red herring.

7

should be important in how the agencies think about

8

things -- it's of some relevance, but it's not the key

9

issue.

10

I don't think it

The key issue in the way the agencies look at

efficiencies is really the sliding scale.

11

Joe Simons is going to talk more about a more

12

sophisticated, in my view sensible approach.

13

fixed costs count?

14

about that.

15

efficiencies roundtable about exactly why anyone who

16

works with real world companies and looks at their pro

17

formas include fixed costs.

18

lots of companies, do they count their fixed costs in

19

their pro formas and in their decisions?

20

do.

21

that, and other people will talk more about that.

24
25

Bill Kolasky will talk

Dave Painter has a nice presentation at the

I teach MBAs and work with

Of course they

There are good economic, sound economic reasons for

22
23

Of course.

Should

Joe Simons will talk more about the integrated
approach.
Let me finally talk about dynamic competition,
which hasn't been so prominent lately.
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important issue, and it's going to come back.

2

it's very interesting to look at what happened to

3

dot.com.

4

dot.com mergers that, you know, if the agencies wouldn't

5

have been so busy when the mergers happened, they would

6

have stopped them.

7

three to two mergers that looked, you know,

8

problematic based on the way the agencies look at things.

9

I think

There were all sorts of consolidations in

There were a lot of two to one and
pretty

They were let go just because the mergers were

10

small and the agencies were very busy.

11

present dynamic competition issues.

12

these issues in Monster/Hot Jobs, which I think was

13

probably a good case but presented some very difficult

14

issues.

15

competition issues, because the industry is based on IP

16

and in dynamic economy.

17

these, and the agencies really don't know how to analyze

18

them, in my opinion.

19

time.

20

Those mergers

The Commission faced

We'll see other deals involving these dynamic

We're going to see more of

And I've more than used my

Thank you.
MR. ABBOTT:

Thank you, Dave.

You've certainly

21

given us a lot of food for thought and digestion.

22

now Joe Simons will tell us -- give us a chart which will

23

explain all future efficiency analyses and solve our

24

problems, we hope.

25

MR. SIMONS:

And

Well, that's a little ambitious, I
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think.

2

putting this panel together.

3

hard work, and I just want to thank them for that and for

4

inviting me to appear here today.

5

First, I just want to thank Alden and Mary for
I know they put in a lot of

What I'm going to do, what I have in mind

6

really is to present what I think is actually a fairly

7

simple and straightforward way of doing an integrated

8

approach to analysis of anticompetitive effects and

9

efficiencies in mergers.

10

And here's what I have in mind.

Let me be very specific about the first

11

principle applied.

I think that's really important.

If

12

you don't know what it is you're looking for, it's kind

13

of hard to find it.

14

important, and it is prohibiting mergers that reduce

15

consumer welfare.

16

competitive effects and efficiencies.

17

exercise basically is to make a judgment or prediction

18

about the overall effects of a merger over a reasonably

19

foreseeable period of time, two, three, five, years

20

something like that.

So the first principle is really

That principle applies equally to
And the ultimate

21

Now, you know, based on what Dave said just a

22

few minutes ago, obviously this is not an easy thing to

23

do in practice.

24

you're moving in and you know where you're supposed to be

25

going, then you have a better chance of getting there.

But at least if you know what direction
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Even if you can't get really close with the

2

tools at hand that you have today, it's better to create

3

a framework and to develop the tools over time.

4

that has really been shown to work with respect to the

5

Guidelines that were issued in 1982.

6

who are old enough to remember, when those Guidelines

7

first came out, there was a hue and cry that those

8

Guidelines were way too theoretic, particularly the

9

market definition paradigm, too theoretic, completely

10
11

I think

For those of you

nonoperational.
Today, with the advancements that we've seen in

12

merger analysis, I would say that the market definition

13

paradigm is probably the most practical tool in all of

14

antitrust, and when it started out, it was nothing.

15

the only improvement area is fairly theoretical, but I

16

think it can be used in practice, at least as a tool is a

17

type of a sensitivity analysis to see how things fit in

18

and the relative importance.

19

So

So purely from a theoretical point of view

20

then, the way to determine whether the overall effect of

21

a merger is to reduce competition, or reduce consumer

22

welfare, is to perform what I refer to as a risk-

23

adjusted, net present value calculation.

24

what we do is we estimate the magnitude of any price

25

effect, and by "price effect," I'm including qualityFor The Record, Inc.
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1

adjusted price, innovation, et cetera.

2

magnitude of that price effect, the probability that it's

3

going to be realized, its timing and its duration, and

4

you do the same for efficiencies.

5

estimate the magnitude of the efficiencies, their likely

6

effect on price, the likelihood that those efficiencies

7

are going to be realized, their timing, and their

8

duration.

9

the expected benefits to consumers are over time, and you

10
11

You estimate the

So that is, you

And then you see what the expected costs and

make a net present value calculation.
So whether the merger is challenged or not

12

depends on whether the NPV is positive or negative for

13

the consumers.

14

that's used every day in the business world.

15

an illustration if we can put that slide up.

It's fairly straightforward.

16

(Slide.)

17

Okay.

It's a tool
And I have

This is just a spreadsheet, and it

18

involves the following example.

19

with a potential merger of to widget producers and we

20

conclude as follows.

21

witnesses, documents, third parties, everybody, we

22

conclude that the market is widgets with an 80 percent

23

probability.

24
25

Suppose we are presented

After a lengthy investigation of

We conclude that entry will not occur for two
years, also with an 80 percent probability, and we
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conclude that the anticompetitive effects given the

2

market definition and the entry conclusions, are that

3

we're expecting a 10 percent rise in price for the first

4

two years, and we expect that within 80 percent

5

probability.

6

On the efficiency side, we are expecting that

7

marginal costs will decline and impact price by 2

8

percent.

9

probability and that begins in year two and continues

10

We're expecting that with a 70 percent

through year 5.

11

We concluded that pecuniary costs would decline

12

and impact price by 1 percent, with a 70 percent

13

probability beginning in year one and continuing through

14

year 5.

15

decline and impact price by 1 percent with a 70 percent

16

probability, that beginning in year three, and continuing

17

through year 5.

18

Then we also concluded that fixed costs would

All right.

So these assumptions are all

19

summarized on the spreadsheet, which performs the net

20

present value calculation for that flow of positive and

21

negative benefits to the consumer that result from this

22

hypothetical transaction.

23

It shows that even though the merger is

24

projected to raise price by 10 percent for two years, the

25

net projected effect on consumers is actually positive.
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So we'll just through this.

If you look on the left-hand

2

side, you see we have competitive effects, market

3

definition, entry, anticompetitive effects, all with

4

probabilities of .8.

5

so the probabilities add up, and the total probability is

6

51 percent.

7

that by the probability and you get an expected harm to

8

the consumer of 5.1 percent, and that appears over the

9

first two years so you see the columns on the right, year

Those are determined by each other,

The potential harm is 10 percent.

Multiply

10

one has a negative 5.1 and year two has a negative 5.1,

11

and then years three, four, and five shows zeroes.

12

In efficiencies the same thing.

The marginal

13

cost probability is 70 percent.

14

benefit and the same for fixed cost.

15

2 percent from marginal costs and pecuniary benefits is 1

16

and fixed costs is two, and then the expected value of

17

those benefits given the risk, and then the columns to

18

the right show how those play out over time, given the

19

assumptions in the hypothetical.

20

The same for pecuniary
The expect harm is

And then just adding up the total effects down

21

the columns for year one, two, three, four, 5, you see

22

that the expected effect in year one is a 4.4 percent

23

increase in price; for year two is a 3 percent increase

24

in price; and then years three, four and 5, the benefits

25

are to the consumers 3.5 percent each year.
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And when you do a net present value

2

calculation, you see at the bottom there in the lower

3

left-hand corner, if you can see that, it's positively

4

slightly about 1 percent, or .68.

5

One thing more, I took a discount rate of 10

6

-- I basically just picked that out of the air.

7

Obviously that has a significant impact on whether the

8

result is positive or negative.

9

hard about, you know, what the discount should be, except

I haven't thought real

10

for the fact that it probably relates to the market in

11

question and who the consumers are.

12

are going to have different discount rates applicable to

13

them probably.

14

Different consumers

I don't mean by putting this chart up here and

15

having, you know, somewhat precise numbers like 5.1, to

16

suggest that, you know, we should do a calculation with a

17

great degree of mathematical precision.

18

have the tools to do that, at least not yet.

19

We don't really

On the other hand, what I think this allows you

20

to do is to see in a broad way what's going on, to be

21

cognizant of the ultimate purpose of this exercise, and

22

perhaps most importantly, be transparent about the

23

assumptions that we're making in the analysis.

24

being transparent, I think we can expose some

25

inconsistencies in what we may be doing and not realizing
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some flaws, and I think we can also provide incentives to

2

develop new techniques that will make this kind of

3

framework more practical.

4

Among other things, I think what this approach

5

does or this structure does is help to define what

6

efficiencies are cognizable, how to evaluate them, and

7

more significantly, how to weigh them, which I think is

8

something that's seriously missing now.

9

And just as importantly, it does the same thing

10

for competitive effects.

11

antitrust community about, well, what's the standard for

12

proving efficiencies?

13

to, well, what's the standard for proving competitive

14

effects?

15

And if you look at this type of analysis, you'll see that

16

they directly relate to each other.

17

There's been this debate in the

But we've never really tied that

And do the two relate to each other at all?

So it's not only the size of the competitive

18

effect that's significant, it's the likelihood that it's

19

going to occur and the duration.

20

how long, how high, how much passthrough does there have

21

to be to make the efficiencies offset those perceived

22

harms?

23

That then impacts well,

So I think what this type of analysis

24

demonstrates really is the larger, the more likely, and

25

the longer the adverse competitive effect is, the larger,
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the more likely, and the longer must be the offsetting

2

efficiency effects, and the weighting is then determined

3

by the NPV calculation.

4

One of the things that is demonstrated by this

5

type of example is fixed costs.

6

costs, you see that they're occurring by assumption here

7

in years three through 5, and what it shows is they

8

really can be determinative, and they shouldn't be

9

ignored or treated with the back of the hand, which I

10

If you look at the fixed

think is the tendency now.

11

I mean, basically, what would happen is, people

12

would say yeah, we got these big fixed cost savings, and

13

the agency folks will say, yeah, that's really nice and

14

maybe you do, but, you know, those really get little

15

weight.

16

There's really no mechanism to kind of figure out how

17

important they are.

18

with that.

19

Well, you know, how much weight should they get?

And so, I think this really helps

And the other thing that this kind of focuses

20

your attention on -- and Dave made a reference to this --

21

is the probabilities of the anticompetitive effect,

22

particularly if you're talking about analysis that's kind

23

of like compartmentalized.

24
25

So we do a market definition, then we do a
competitive effects analysis, assuming that market
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definition, and there's some risk associated with each of

2

those, and I think that kind of tends to get lost, that

3

once we conclude the market is X, we're making kind of

4

like a subconscious assumption that it's X with 100

5

percent probability, and that's really not the case.

6

So I think this type of analysis kind of helps

7

to expose what's really being assumed, and then the

8

magnitude of the effects versus the efficiencies. And I

9

think something like this would really help get us over

10

the hump that we find ourselves at now.

11

today basically is when somebody comes in with a merger,

12

they do their efficiencies analysis, the parties do, and

13

as Dave said, it goes over the net to the staff, and it

14

really never comes back.

15

really pitch it that much, and I think that's true for

16

the following reason.

17

What happens

And I think the parties don't

I think they intuitively understand that it's

18

not going to save an otherwise anticompetitive merger.

19

By the same token, they don’t understand that if the

20

staff has some serious doubts about the confidence of,

21

you know, their projection of an anticompetitive effect,

22

the fact that the merger has efficiencies associated with

23

it will make the staff feel more comfortable about not

24

challenging the merger.

25

that kind of a circumstance to go back and forth over the

And so there's really no need in
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2

net.
The problem, though, is that the efficiencies

3

really are playing a very little role in the merger

4

investigation, and I think that's something that needs to

5

be rectified.

6

know, can provide some context in which to do that.

And hopefully, this type of structure, you

7

Thanks.

8

MR. ABBOTT:

9

presentation.

Thank you, Joe, for that succinct

And it's the first time I've seen such an

10

effort, as I say, to rank the probabilities of the

11

different factors going into net consumer welfare

12

analysis in sort of a simple manner.

13

that inspires some of our speakers.

14

So we'll see if

Now we turn to Mark Gidley, who is borrowing

15

from Voltaire and Professor Pangloss.

I know he has a

16

paper for distribution you may want to pick up outside at

17

the entrance entitled "Misuse of the `Merger-Specific'

18

Requirement:

19

Best of All Possible Worlds."

Merger Analysis is Not the Search for the

20

Mark, on that literary note, please proceed.

21

MR. GIDLEY:

Thank you very much, Alden.

And

22

let me say, first it's good to be amongst you.

I see a

23

lot of old friends.

24

five merger cases since I left the DOJ, with some success

25

and with some failure, and I may acknowledge that as I go

I've had the pleasure of litigating
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2

through my remarks.
I would also say that I come down on the side

3

of Spinoza on the issue posed by Candide, but I won't

4

expound on that today.

5

I do turn out to be an optimist.

My main point in citing Professor Pangloss's

6

oft-attributed comment is that I don't contend, and I

7

don't think most people contend, but unfortunately I

8

think this is the way it plays out sometimes in the

9

conference rooms of both agencies, that merger analysis

10

is the search for the best sort of Platonic ideal

11

transaction that the parties could ever enter into.

12

Human beings will never get there, and I think that I

13

really come down on the side of an analysis that's very

14

similar to what Joe is proposing:

15

the pro and anticompetitive effects with a serious

16

consideration of efficiency.

17

A net assessment of

Segueing into what I'd like to address for a

18

few minutes today, I want to talk about the 1997

19

Guidelines and the emphasis on merger specificity, which

20

is really to my mind one of the new hallmarks of the 1997

21

Section four.

22

And I was struck a little bit by our earlier

23

panelist, David Scheffman. In my own experience and maybe

24

in my own conference rooms as we prepare for meetings

25

with the government, we've tended to see Section four of
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the 1997 Guidelines as something of an obstacle course

2

out of the Marine Corps.

3

argument and your beautiful spreadsheet that actually

4

analyzed the merger on going out five or 7 years, the

5

nail has to go through the rope that's hanging over the

6

net, and it's got to go over the 30-foot wall of merger

7

specificity.

8

that to become cognizable.

9

they're just efficiencies, and they're either likely or

You know, your efficiency

It's got to go meet this, it's got to meet
And in the real world,

10

they're unlikely.

11

to time bring to the agencies efficiencies that aren't

12

real world or that they don't tell their businesspeople

13

or that they didn't get board approval for, and all of

14

that is relevant.

15

And undoubtedly, people will from time

But what I'd like to focus today on is the

16

language of merger specificity, and in my own work on

17

this paper, I found that the actual language of the 1997

18

Guidelines is not the way we practitioners or the

19

government officials use the phrase "merger-specific."

20

In general, the phrase "merger-specific" is

21

really used as an epithet.

You might have very good

22

efficiencies that your deal really will cause, that will

23

really cause these efficiencies.

24

well, they're not merger-specific.

25

with the back of the hand, that invocation phrase,

But somebody will say,
And that's it.
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oftentimes even private practitioners back-off bona fide

2

efficiencies.

3

ourselves today in the discussion.

4

I hope to back-off of that phrase

I start by acknowledging my own sinfulness in

5

words.

6

1992 Guidelines, and I think we really punted on

7

efficiencies.

8

evidence, but we really didn't analyze efficiencies.

9

of our efforts and brainpower -- and there was a lot of

10

brainpower applied -- was on competitive effects, and I

11

think that was probably all the bandwidth the human

12

beings at the agencies had in 1992.

13

have the bandwidth to take on efficiencies.

14

I sat at the Justice Department when we did the

We took on our clear and convincing
All

We really didn't

So my compliments to Chairman Pitofsky and

15

others for in 1997 trying to explicate what efficiencies

16

we're going to recognize.

17

1997 Guidelines were a good evolution, but I think

18

they're a stopping point on the journey.

19

seven years of experience, particularly with merger-

20

specificity, we can really say what's worked and what's

21

not worked.

22

So I think to that extent, the

And now, with

I have a slide that's just the language, Alden,

23

of paragraph three from Section four of the Guidelines

24

that I thought I would just put up.

25

Because as I prepared my remarks, I actually
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

36
1

found language in there that I haven't been using as a

2

private practitioner.

3

may start doing so.

And I'll warn the agencies that I

4

(Slide.)

5

It's up.

6

believe in an oral tradition.

I'll read it for those of you who
Paragraph three says:

7

The Agency will consider only those

8

efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the

9

proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished

10

in the absence of either the proposed merger or

11

another means having comparable anticompetitive

12

effects. These are termed merger-specific

13

efficiencies.

14

practical in the business situation faced by

15

the merging firms will be considered in making

16

this determination; the Agency will not insist

17

upon a less restrictive alternative that is

18

merely theoretical.

Only alternatives that are

19

And if you just take a look at this first sentence, it

20

seems to me, just doing a little bit of jurisprudence on

21

the first sentence, there are really two elements.

22

is that the efficiency that we're going to talk about in

23

Section four is caused by the merger.

24

that "merger-caused efficiencies".

25

So I would call

But there appears to be a subset of
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efficiencies that are merger-intrinsic or not merger-

2

intrinsic.

3

unique to the merger, we'll ignore it.

4

in that sense that most of the time when people say with

5

the back of the hand, well your efficiencies are not

6

merger-specific, you could go buy another company and get

7

the same purchasing efficiencies.

8

that I think has devolved into a violation of the last

9

sentence, which is that the agency will not insist on a

10

In other words, if the efficiency is not
And I think it's

And it's that element

less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.

11

In my experience in the last seven years,

12

oftentimes people in a conference room will posit a

13

theoretical alternative and no one will debate whether

14

it's practical or not, or whether the managements could

15

ever really go there, or the time difference between

16

abandoning this merger and the time cost of trying to do

17

something else.

18

say do a production joint venture, and there are a lot of

19

reasons for why a 50-50 production joint venture starting

20

today from the time that we're talking in the conference

21

room, could be three to five years away from realizing a

22

fraction of the same synergies and cost savings that a

23

merger can efficiently realize maybe in a matter of

24

months or weeks, depending on the closing date.

25

For instance, in a merger people will

So there's a distinction that I draw on in the
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paper between merger-caused efficiencies and merger-

2

intrinsic efficiencies.

3

hopefully clear, I reject the merger-intrinsic concept.

4

I don't see it as necessarily a useful concept, because I

5

think in practice, what happens is, you wind up battling

6

against theoretical alternatives, and that that last

7

sentence in the Guidlines, which is a good, laudable

8

sentence in practice has not materialized in the

9

conference rooms at either agency.

10

And just so I'm provocative and

It's also interesting to me that the sentence

11

that reads, “only alternatives that are practical in the

12

business situation faced by the merging parties.”

13

phrase has not been quoted by any of the cases decided

14

since 1997 that have dealt with efficiencies.

15

don't discuss it, and there is no clear allocation of

16

who's got the burden.

17

That

The courts

In other words, if the merging parties can

18

demonstrate likely efficiencies, shouldn't the agency

19

have to say there exists a practical alternative, and

20

it's X, and actually produce some evidence about a

21

practical alternative?

22

But that's not what's done today.

Now where did we get this notion of a less

23

restrictive alternative?

It's imported from joint

24

venture law where we're trying to figure out what

25

restraints are reasonable.

But the courts in joint
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venture law, in a decision that I like very much, the

2

American Motor Inns case, have really discredited the

3

notion of trying to find the least restrictive

4

alternative, and I go through that in the paper.

5

I think that the problem with the way merger

6

specificity gets interpreted today in the conference room

7

of the agencies is that it really does devolve into,

8

well, that's just not merger-specific.

9

of-the-hand kind of statement rather than a real debate

And it's a back-

10

over any practical alternative that someone would

11

propose.

12

Let me turn to, I think, what is the typical

13

back-of-the-hand speculation, which is why don’t you do a

14

production joint venture?

15

panelists that have worked in the private sector with

16

parties that have done 50-50 joint ventures could

17

probably tell you, maybe but for the attorney-client

18

privilege, about the horror stories of trying to advise

19

clients on 50-50 joint ventures.

20

highlight what I think in general led to the skepticism

21

of them.

22

And probably any of the

And I'll just try to

I think the first is, typically joint ventures

23

that are set up 50-50 between two competitors have the

24

problem of being orphans.

25

of the management of the joint venture, the joint venture

Because there's a 50-50 split
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is really an orphan.

2

by one firm.

3

experience, they have these large meetings that really

4

become management-by-committee, rather than a straight

5

linear model.

6

conceive of, well, they could come up with all kinds of

7

tie-breaking mechanisms, but in the real world, that's an

8

issue.

9

It's not really owned or dominated

They wind up having, at least in my

That may seem trivial, and we might all

The second is, I think, the formation of 50-50

10

joint ventures takes two, three, four times what it takes

11

to put together a merger.

12

simple, very direct, very linear.

13

I know there are complications.

14

target actually takes over the acquirer in the long run,

15

but in general, they don't suffer from the lack of a

16

pyramidal structure.

17

of the parties to the joint venture are over time going

18

to have to contribute intellectual capital and real

19

capital to the joint venture.

20

reluctance to do that if it's a 50-50 joint venture.

21

Mergers in general are very
I own you.

That's it.

I know sometimes the

And third, in a joint venture, both

And there tends to be a

Now I'm mindful that you could have a 60-40

22

joint venture and other ways that might somehow get

23

around this, but I think that those are real world

24

issues.

25

agencies, oftentimes the time difference between the

Sitting in the conference room at one of the
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merger that you have today, the bird in the hand, versus

2

two in the bush, can be quite extreme.

3

Now one thing that I will fault the merging

4

parties and their lawyers for is, I don't think we make

5

good enough use of the Guidelines' 1997 language about

6

timing, and we've got that on the next slide.

7

Just the next page, David.

8

(Slide.)

9

Footnote 35 says "If a merger affects not

10

whether but only when an efficiency would be achieved,

11

only the timing advantage is a merger-specific

12

efficiency."

13

I think most of the time, practitioners and the

14

staffs at the agencies trying to build a case only see

15

the word "only" and they kind of blow by the fact that

16

the 1997 revision at least acknowledges the very

17

important element of time, and I think it relates to a

18

lot of what Joe Simons was saying earlier.

19

There are huge timing advantages, maybe of two,

20

three and four years, and those time advantages can add

21

up to in some mergers tens of millions or hundreds of

22

millions of dollars in difference between cost savings

23

between different practical alternatives.

24
25

I'll also credit the current Commission for the
Novazyme decision, which is a recent decision where
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Chairman Muris in his statement made a very good and

2

reasoned decision of LRA analysis, Less Restrictive

3

Alternative analysis, and stressed the efficiencies that

4

were the bird in the hand rather than going for two in

5

the bush.

6

I would like to talk briefly about some of the

7

decisional case law, only some of which I have the scars

8

from.

9

talk a minute about Staples.

I will, simply because Chairman Pitofsky is here,
Staples is a good

10

illustration of a really flat out war between the merging

11

parties and the agency with the judge giving us the

12

benefit of his courtroom for a week.

13

wonderful thing.

14

It was really a

And Staples probably had one of the biggest

15

battles over efficiency.

I think there really were

16

serious efficiencies, and the staffs that I've talked to

17

over the last seven years -- I can't believe it's been

18

seven years since Staples -- have acknowledged that the

19

efficiency arguments in Staples were very serious, very

20

compelling and kept people up late at night.

21

fact, the 1997 Guidelines came out during some of the

22

agency consideration of Staples.

And in

23

One thing I would point out, and again, maybe

24

the fault comes back to me for not focusing on footnote

25

35, one of the arguments that appears in Judge Hogan's
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opinion is, well, Staples and Office Depot are going to

2

continue to grow organically, and the agencies told us in

3

their deliberations, well, Staples will double over the

4

next seven years.

5

But the argument we made, but we didn't make it

6

forcefully enough for Judge Hogan, is, yeah, but you get

7

the merger efficiencies today.

8

seven years.

9

to very, very large numbers.

You don't have to wait

And seven years times these numbers add up
And it's interesting.

10

probably should have beaten more on footnote 35.

11

we were just shocked that Guidelines that came out in

12

April would be used by a judge in June.

13

of the learning experiences of Staples.

We

I think

But that was one

14

Staples is an important decision on

15

efficiencies simply because it really, I think, creates

16

the modern era where efficiencies are serious.

17

that's one of the good things from the 1997 Guidelines,

18

is the agencies are really taking on efficiencies and

19

saying, at least in the text of the Guidelines, they're

20

important, and certain efficiencies we'll credit.

21

I think

My criticism is that we're putting the

22

efficiencies through too much of an obstacle course and

23

not comparing the likely post-merger world with the

24

likely world without the merger.

25

Tenet Health is another case where the case was
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reversed on efficiencies.

2

about in the paper, and I'll let you read the paper, is I

3

have a brief discussion of the Heinz baby food decision.

4

I think it's quite possible that this case ultimately

5

will live in antitrust infamy, maybe much more so than

6

any other case that I've seen.

7

The other case that I talk

The production efficiencies were quite

8

considerable.

The competitive effects, I think, might

9

have been very questionable.

I will hasten to add, I

10

reviewed none of the evidence.

I wasn't the decision

11

maker, so I won't put myself in the shoes of the decision

12

maker.

13

seems that the Circuit opinion is very cavalier about the

14

efficiencies.

15

efficiency improvement in total variable manufacturing

16

cost, which would be stunning, is considered a

17

triviality.

18

notion that you could have a 2,200 basis point

19

improvement in manufacturing efficiency, and that that

20

would just be cast aside as, well, that's not that

21

significant, or that's not merger-specific, you can do

22

something else is stunning.

But just analyzing the D.C. Circuit's opinion, it

And, for instance, a 22.3 percent

I think, to any business executive, the

23

There's another passage on distribution and

24

logistics where the point is made by the court, well,

25

Heinz has very efficient distribution.
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Nut have very efficient distribution?

2

evidence produced by the opponents of the merger as to

3

what practical steps could have been done Beech-Nut to

4

improve the efficiency.

5

have been on the staff and on the Commission to do that.

6

But there's no

And I think that the onus should

And there have been decisions that have been

7

very favorable to what I call merger-caused efficiencies.

8

I'll let you read those in the paper.

9

which predates the 1997 Guidelines revisions.

University Health,

10

Butterworth, and a 1990 case with the DOJ, the Country

11

Lake Foods case.

12

In those decisions, what I liked from those

13

decisions is that the court really seems to get down to

14

the bottom line, just the effect of the merger versus the

15

nonmerger world, rather than using hypothetical

16

alternatives in a less restrictive alternative way, which

17

is, I think, what the phrase "merger-specific" has

18

devolved into.

19

Now where do we go from here?

It seems to me

20

that where we are today is that we really are doing less

21

restrictive alternative analysis even though we say that

22

we're not.

23

sometimes work that if somebody postulates a theoretical

24

alternative, that's really the end of the discussion, or

25

at least the end of the discussion that you experience.

Really, in the conference rooms, it can
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A couple of practical things that I would do.

2

First, I think that I would put the onus on the staff to

3

come up with practical alternatives.

4

investment bankers out there.

5

business gurus out there.

6

solid, practical alternative, let's get testimony about

7

it.

8

That has not occurred in any merger case that I've been

9

involved in, and certainly not in any merger trial that

10

There are

There are management and

If there really is such a

Let's test that hypothesis with actual evidence.

I've seen.

11

I think second, ultimately we are going to in

12

the next revision of the Guidelines or the next step in

13

the evolution of considering efficiencies, I think we'll

14

move more away from whether or not an efficiency is

15

merger-intrinsic, and we'll really look at whether the

16

merger causes the efficiency, and we'll especially look

17

for whether that merger-caused efficiency feeds back into

18

competitive effects.

19

The net assessment of the merger comes in

20

Section two, and those efficiencies that directly improve

21

competitives and rivalry in the industry should already

22

be considered today in the Section two analysis.

23

Let me just conclude with a couple of where we

24

go from here observations.

I think the first is, we

25

private practitioners who are on the outside, I think
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need to push efficiencies.

2

taken criticism that the treatment in the conference

3

rooms of efficiencies has led attorneys to focus much

4

less on the real world efficiencies and synergies and

5

styles of management.

6

I think it's a very well

I think a second observation I would have is,

7

that our economy continues to move to a service and

8

virtual economy.

9

like Dell, really are virtual companies.

Even the companies that sell products
They acquire

10

and really excel at production logistics and distribution

11

rather than physical manufacture of products.

12

think that has certain implications for merger-

13

specificity.

14

And I

For instance, the 1997 Guidelines take a dim

15

view of certain logistics and purchasing synergies.

16

think that's unwarranted in today's economy.

17

economy that's dominated by firms like Wal-Mart, I think

18

the Wal-Marts of the world need to be challenged by

19

smaller firms that may actually get themselves larger by

20

combining.

21
22
23

I

In an

And so those are some of my observations, and I
leave to you my paper and Voltaire and Spinoza.
MR. ABBOTT:

Okay.

Thank you for that literary

24

and philosophical set of insights, Mark.

25

going from literary and philosophical approach to a very,
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very meaty paper by Ilene Gotts.

2

her slides.

3

number of issues raised by Section four of the

4

guidelines.

5

Efficiencies in Integrated Merger Analysis."

6

although there's a lot to be covered, as Ilene was

7

reminding me, she's a New Yorker, and she can talk fast.

8

Ilene?

9
slides.

11

here.

12

And she's going to give us insight on a

Her slides are entitled "The Role of

MS. GOTTS:

10

I've been going through

And

And I'm going to trust Dave with my

We're going to test his technical capabilities

I will handle this very fast.

And there's also

13

a paper that I worked on.

14

business downturn last year was it allowed me to take

15

some time to read some of the legal, economic and

16

business literature that was out there to get a sense on

17

how the rest of the world is viewing efficiencies and

18

then I compared it a little bit to the Merger Guidelines.

19

One of the advantages of the

The Merger Guidelines state that certain types

20

of efficiencies are more likely to be cognizable and

21

substantial than others.

22

towards production efficiencies, that these are thought

23

to be cognizable and substantial.

24
25

There's a real clear bias

Innovation efficiencies are thought to be
substantial, but less verifiable.

And when you get into
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things like procurement, management and capital cost

2

efficiencies, these are thought to be less likely to be

3

merger-specific or substantial, which as you'll see as I

4

go through this, is almost directly opposite the business

5

literature that's out there.

6

When you look at why deals are announced,

7

they're very much in this last category of procurement,

8

management and capital cost efficiencies.

9

some of the presumptions that we build in throughout to

And indeed,

10

be skeptical about these efficiencies seem to be contrary

11

to the obligations that directors and management have

12

under Sarbanes-Oxley.

13

careful about what they publicly announce as

14

efficiencies, because if they're wrong at the end of the

15

day, they lose their jobs.

16

They have the other liability and problems.

17
18
19

If anything, they have to be very

They have shareholder suits.

So, you know, that's just the backdrop from
which I come from as I look at this.
What kind of efficiencies should be recognized?

20

Although the agencies might have more experience dealing

21

with certain types of efficiencies, such as when we look

22

at productive efficiencies, other types of efficiencies

23

should not be excluded or handicapped on a generic basis.

24

And I think some of what we've seen develop in

25

our understanding has actually come to fruition when you
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look at the EU Guidelines, which don't seem to draw as

2

much of a distinction -- we'll probably hear a little bit

3

more about this from Vincent -- in that it says that you

4

consider any substantiated efficiency claim in the

5

overall analysis of the merger.

6

Productive efficiencies, as we said, are the

7

least controversial.

One aspect that remains

8

controversial is, I think it should include fixed costs,

9

not just variable cost.

Because at some point in time,

10

especially when you start talking about distressed

11

industries where the whole industry is not producing

12

well, these efficiencies are very important.

13

have an effect by just increasing cashflow, making it

14

more possible to get significant nonprice benefits to

15

consumers, such as to fund innovation.

They can

16

And in marketplaces that are changing, either

17

they're distressed and you need to realize it, or where

18

market definition is changing, convergence markets, high

19

technology markets, these fixed cost savings are just

20

critical to the bottom line and to whether or not the

21

great new products of the future will be realized.

22

Also, distribution and promotional

23

efficiencies.

The 1997 revisions are silent on these.

24

The global staff report, which is 1995 -- which is

25

wonderful to read, by the way.

It is just full of
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information -- unfortunately find that these types of

2

efficiencies are less likely to be substantial and often

3

likely to be difficult to assess.

4

Just because distribution and promotional

5

efficiencies are less likely to be substantial and might

6

be hard to assess doesn't mean that they don't count.

7

should try to, wherever we can, to factor it in.

8
9

We

Dave mentioned that when you look at the
quirkier remedies -- I think that would be the way I

10

would phrase what you were saying, and hopefully I'm not

11

mischaracterizing it -- when they carve out various

12

things that are novel, that's because there's been an

13

effort to save efficiencies.

14

I would make one other note about when I look

15

at remedies.

16

what I've seen from Exxon/Mobil or even in the General

17

Mills/Pillsbury thing, I have found that the staff is

18

thinking about distributional efficiencies in what

19

they're demanding I'd make sure is in the divestiture

20

package.

21

in that case they think it's for real, why isn't it for

22

real when as a merger party I assert it?

23

should be consistent in the approach we take and we

24

should recognize these.

25

When I've been in here on Nestle/Dryers or

So if it's something that I have to put in, and

To me, we

Dynamic or innovative efficiencies.
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revisions indicate that claims relating to research and

2

development are potentially substantial but are generally

3

less susceptible to verification and may be the result of

4

anticompetitive output reductions.

5

also acknowledges that they may be -- innovation

6

efficiencies may make a particularly powerful

7

contribution to competitive dynamics.

8
9

The global report

At the same time, when you come in, you get hit
over the head by the staff saying verify them.

We should

10

consider dynamic efficiencies in the integrated merger

11

analysis, as Joe has noted in his talk, he's tried to

12

factor it in.

13

talking about mathematical precision in any of what we

14

do.

15

a range of assumptions, and in your gut get a sense

16

whether they're for real or not, whether they're

17

powerful, and whether they're something we should

18

therefore use to allow the deal to go through.

These are harder to quantify.

We're not

But you can build on whatever assumptions you want,

19

Transactional efficiencies, the elimination of

20

the middleman and the double marginalization.

21

important.

22

then can flow through and allow for there to be new

23

products to be offered.

24

definitely be included in the integrated merger analysis.

25

These are

These are really bottom line numbers which

And, therefore, they should

And then my favorite area, which is the
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procurement management and capital costs.

2

are very, very resistant to recognizing these.

3

in every deal I've had just about, procurement savings,

4

reducing the number of suppliers, going to best

5

practices, coming up with a way to reduce costs are

6

always a factor for why businesspeople are doing a deal.

7

Managerial savings.

1997 revisions
And yet,

The merger specificity

8

part of this.

The reality is, it is very hard when you

9

have an entrenched management because of not only the

10

fact that they're there, but because of labor law,

11

because of tax law, to just say you're out.

12

provides a perfect excuse for doing what you might

13

otherwise want to do.

14

it and say we're not going to recognize it.

15

A merger

And, therefore, we shouldn't tilt

Capital cost savings.

The G.E./Honeywell

16

decision from what I can see in the EU seems to view this

17

as a negative.

18

huge difference if you can somehow improve the balance

19

sheet a larger amount and borrow money at a lesser

20

amount, if you've got an industry that's going through

21

change or is distressed, these are very important to the

22

ongoing competitiveness of the company and should not be

23

at all thrown out as not recognized.

24
25

The reality is, again, this can make a

This gets me then to what burden of proof
should be imposed upon the parties.

Let's look quickly
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at what is currently the case.

2

Merger Guidelines and the case law, you see efficiency

3

claims will not be considered if they are vague or

4

speculative or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable

5

means.

6

When you look at the

You see statements in there about a sliding

7

scale that Dave was mentioning.

8

concentration or the greater the concerns of more burden

9

that's put on the parties.

10

The greater the

As Joe noted, and this is very important, we're

11

making guesses as well for market definitions and other

12

things.

13

guess or put a probability on one side it becomes the

14

case.

15

the burden shifts.

16

I don't quite understand why once you make a

It's per se.

It's presumptive.

And then all of

When we look at concentration analysis, there's

17

a lot now in the literature to suggest that there aren't

18

these bright lines in the rules.

19

industry as far as when the concentration is too much and

20

how competitive it's really operating.

21

huge presumptions on parties and tilting the sliding

22

scale, changing the playing field on the basis on these

23

sorts of things, suggests a precision with respect to the

24

anticompetitive effects that is unfair and can lead to

25

really bad Type II decisions.

It depends on the
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The case law.

Heinz is going to be great.

We

2

might have lost the battle, but we might win the war

3

because of that case.

4

understand it, Heinz now is pretty much -- one of the

5

companies is not in the business.

6

effect we thought of didn't happen because, you know, of

7

the fact that the merger didn't go through.

8

company doesn't exist anymore.

9

a huge burden and thrown out of consideration huge,

10

That is a bad case.

As I

The anticompetitive

But, the

And to have imposed such

substantial efficiencies just was wrong.

11

When we look at the EU Guidelines, again, we

12

see some learning in many areas, but we still see this

13

tendency to say that efficiencies must be substantial

14

enough to counteract a merger's potential harm.

15

again, this suggests that there's some precision

16

mathematically that I don't think exists.

17

model goes a long way in helping us to start thinking

18

about how you look at this, and especially in building in

19

the probabilities, but the math is not there.

20

And

I think Joe's

So I would really suggest as a result that we

21

really step back and we really stop putting in so many

22

presumptions and tilting the balance so strongly and

23

maybe look at this like we do in other areas, like

24

Section I.

25

has to show there's some possibility of an

Initially you start out where the plaintiff
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anticompetitive harm.

2

there's some legitimate purpose for it, i.e., like

3

efficiencies, and then it shifts back to the plaintiff

4

again to show why that's not the case.

5
6

Per se rules and presumptions built in where
they can't come back is just really wrong.

7
8

Then the parties have to show

To save some time, I would like to skip up to
slide 12, if you wouldn't mind, Dave.

9

(Slide.)

10

And basically remind everyone that when we're

11

talking about Clayton Section 7, we're talking about

12

probabilities, not possibilities, and that's really what

13

the standard should be here, and that when we look at

14

this, the other problem I have is, I find the agencies

15

are wonderful.

16

about efficiencies, and in close cases, I think they go

17

the right way.

18

shouldn't block.

19

You can come in and you can talk to them

Their gut says, okay, this is a deal we

But when they go to court, it's like all bars

20

are off.

The agency all of a sudden goes back to Brown

21

Shoe and Vons or anything else they can dig up with these

22

horrible presumptions to concentration, because they're

23

out to win the case.

24

And when you look at what the role of an agency

25

is, I love this seminal case, the Berger v. United States
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Government.

2

impartially.

3

win a case but that justice shall be done.

4

justice is not done by going to a bunch of legalistic

5

presumptions and tilting the case so that Type II errors

6

are made, but by applying the same standards at the

7

agency and then going forth to the court with the exact

8

same standards and letting a judge weighing the evidence

9

and decide where the probabilities really stand.

10

The government is supposed to govern
Criminal prosecution is not that it shall
And to me,

When we weigh efficiencies effects in declining

11

industries, this is what I'm up at night thinking about

12

these days, because I really do want to try to get it

13

right.

14

today that seem to recognize that declining industries,

15

these are industries where the price is really below

16

average total cost.

17

covering the variable costs, but no one is investing in

18

the future.

19

really declining and dead for a long time.

20

To me, there are certain things in the Guidelines

So we're basically -- price might be

This is an industry that is going to be

In my heart, there's some need in that sort of

21

market to look at being more receptive to arguments about

22

potential dynamic or innovation efficiencies, to really

23

be more willing to accept the fixed cost sort of

24

arguments, because the end of it all is, yeah, maybe in

25

the short term you might be limiting some competition
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that is there, but in the long term, the potential harm

2

to the industry from ignoring two efficiencies and

3

whether consumers actually benefit consumers from

4

efficiencies being realized by new products being

5

transitioned is really great.

6

So I would really like to see something more

7

explicit in the Guidelines to recognize declining

8

industries and how we might look at it.

9

stage where I even feel I could draft what that should

10

I'm not at the

be, but something should be done on this.

11

In conclusion, I think the Guidelines should

12

clarify that the competition authorities will consider

13

all types of efficiencies as long as they are verifiable,

14

substantial and likely to be realized.

15

this idea that some count more than others.

16

We should stop

Efficiencies should be subject to the same

17

standard of proof, and that should be as clear as

18

evidence relating to a likelihood of anticompetitive

19

effects, both during the agency review and then in the

20

court challenge.

21

merger in a failing industry that we'll be even more

22

receptive and we'll give more weight to potential dynamic

23

or innovation efficiencies that could help to sustain the

24

industry or to transition it into the new products and

25

services that it needs to offer.

Then finally, that when considering a
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1

I stayed within my time.

2

MR. ABBOTT:

Thank you, Ilene.

You certainly

3

did, and very provocative remarks.

And you hit a lot of

4

topics.

5

I know has given speeches and written on efficiencies,

6

and I'm particularly interested in hearing what he might

7

have to say about how lessening of competition in one

8

market might be justified by efficiencies in other

9

markets, sort of another aspect of Section IV of the

And now I'm pleased to turn to Bill Kolasky, who

10

guidelines that perhaps has not received all that much

11

attention, at least until Bill started to emphasize it.

12

Bill?

13

MR. KOLASKY:

Thank you very much, Alden.

I'm

14

going to focus on three main issues.

15

what is a cognizable efficiency?

16

extent should "fixed cost" -- and I put that in quotation

17

marks -- savings that do not reduce marginal

18

taken into account?

19

one that Alden alluded to, and that is, to what extent

20

should efficiencies in other markets be found to justify

21

a merger that reduces competition in a particular market?

22

The first one is

The second is, to what

costs be

And then the final subject is the

In my comments, I want to make it clear that

23

I'm not offering fully formed views, much less

24

recommendations.

25

discussion and debate.

What I'm trying to do is stimulate some
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1

I'm going to start out by turning the criticism

2

not on the agencies but on us practitioners.

3

year and a half at the Justice Department, I think it's

4

fair to say that there is more serious and critical

5

thinking going on within the agencies about the role of

6

efficiencies in merger analysis than there is in the bar

7

at large.

8
9

Based on my

I think one of the problems is that the
agencies do not hear enough well thought out and well

10

presented efficiencies arguments.

11

they can be criticized for not taking efficiencies

12

sufficiently in account in their merger review, the fault

13

lies in us, the practitioner, not in the agencies.

14

I'm hoping my remarks will start us down the road of

15

trying to address that problem.

16

So to the extent that

And

Focusing first on what is a cognizable

17

efficiency?

While I think that the basic analytical

18

framework in the 1997 revisions is sound, as Ilene's

19

summary of it, I think, reflects, that framework is to

20

some extent mired in the old economy, smoke stack

21

industry paradigm, and I think our thinking about

22

efficiencies is likewise mired in that paradigm.

23

We try to put them cubbyholes like productive

24

efficiencies, innovative efficiencies, procurement,

25

management, purchasing.

As a very good article, in fact,
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1

one of the best articles on efficiencies that I think has

2

appeared, by Joe Farrell and Carl Shapiro in the

3

Antitrust Law Journal shows, the most important

4

efficiencies are not production cost savings and other

5

forms of cost savings, but rather the synergies that come

6

from combining complementary assets, complementary

7

strengths.

8

To some extent, you may be able to quantify those

9

efficiencies, but often you are not able to quantify

10

them, and you have to evaluate them more qualitatively.

11

Let me take four or five cases that I've been

12

involved in to illustrate what I mean and why I think we

13

need to change our thinking about this.

14

The first one, interestingly, was a case way

15

back in 1983, shortly after Bill Baxter took over as head

16

of the Antitrust Division, involving two companies that

17

make rechargeable nickel cadmium batteries.

18

Interestingly, the market structure in that case was

19

virtually identical to the market structure in the baby

20

food merger case.

21

with about a 65 percent share.

22

with about a 20 percent share, and you had a new entrant

23

with maybe between a 3 and 5 percent share, which was a

24

foreign manufacturer, and then you had a declining, you

25

know, fourth company that clearly was not going to be in

You had one dominant supplier, G.E.,
You had a second company
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1

the business very long.

2

We hired George Stigler to work with us on this

3

merger, and with Stigler's help, we persuaded Bill Baxter

4

to allow a merger of the foreign producer, and it was the

5

leading producer in the world of these rechargeable

6

batteries, to merge with the number two company in the

7

United States.

8

The efficiencies that we saw from that deal had little to

9

do with production cost savings, but were simply that the

10

foreign producer had the best technology and this number

11

two company in the United States had a well established

12

distribution network in the United States, so that the

13

combined firm would be able to go head-to-head with the

14

leading producer, G.E., much more effectively than either

15

firm could do separately.

16

A second case, interestingly the same vintage,

17

1979, was the Ford/Mazda merger.

This was a case where

18

Ford bought a 35 percent interest in the Japanese company

19

that makes Mazda.

20

Don Turner and Oliver Williamson.

21

The reason for that merger was that Ford was moving

22

toward front wheel drive cars, had very little experience

23

making those cars, and it was acquiring the transaxle for

24

those vehicles from Mazda.

25

about the possibility of opportunistic behavior on

Working with us on that merger were

And it was very concerned
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1

Mazda's part.

2

protect themselves from that opportunistic behavior.

3

So they wanted an equity stake in Mazda to

In addition, that was an era when the Japanese

4

car manufacturers had more modern management techniques

5

than the U.S. companies, and Ford believed, and I think

6

correctly, that the only way the Japanese manufacturers

7

would share that knowledge with them is if they were

8

going to benefit from sharing that knowledge because of

9

this equity relationship.

Again, these are not things

10

that are easy to quantify, but the illustrate the

11

importance of synergies from combining complementary

12

assets.

13

Fast forwarding to the late 1990s, a merger

14

that was reviewed by the Justice Department under Joel

15

Klein and was approved was the merger of the Fox and ABC

16

affiliates in Columbus, Ohio.

17

merger.

18

a four to three merger in the television industry.

19

did they allow this merger?

20

reasons was that we were able to persuade them that it

21

would provide an incentive to the companies to do more

22

complementary programming.

23

Survivor type shows going head to head, competing for the

24

same audience, which is what they would do as long as

25

they were independent, if they were commonly owned, they

This was a four to three

The Justice Department had never before allowed
Why

Well, one of the principal

Rather than having two
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1

would have one Survivor type show and a new show, and

2

together, that would actually increase output and allow

3

them to sell more advertising.

4

the incentive to do that kind of complementary program

5

unless they were commonly owned.

But they wouldn't have

6

And in the final case which came out the other

7

way is the Direct TV/Echo Star merger which was reviewed

8

by Justice about a year ago.

9

argument that was being made by the parties had nothing

There too the efficiency

10

to do with cost savings.

11

these two direct broadcast satellite companies would

12

allow them to offer local into local program, which

13

neither of them would have sufficient channel capacity to

14

do independently.

15

It was that the combination of

The reason the Justice Department rejected that

16

efficiency was because they ultimately found that it was

17

not merger-specific, that because of advances in

18

technology, there would be sufficient channel capacity

19

within the next two years to offer local into local

20

program without the merger, and that is in fact what has

21

happened.

22

The Heinz/Beech-Nut case, I agree with all the

23

negative things that have been said about that decision,

24

is probably going to become the Procter & Gamble/Clorox

25

of our generation.

And it's a good case that illustrates
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the importance of integrating efficiencies into your

2

competitive effects analysis.

3

At bottom, the reason the D.C. Circuit found that

4

merger unlawful was because they viewed it as a three to

5

two merger that was likely to lead to a greater

6

coordination and higher prices.

7

significant efficiencies, and again, there weren't just

8

the production cost savings that Mark referred to, but

9

there was also the importance of being able to combine

They pushed aside very

10

the strong Beech-Nut brand with the lower Heinz

11

production cost in order to compete more effectively

12

against the dominant Gerber.

13

The facts of that case in fact show that you

14

already had coordinated pricing going on, but there was

15

the leader-follower pricing, and Gerber basically was

16

able to price at a high level under the umbrella created

17

by the fact that its rivals were so much higher cost

18

producers.

19

have costs comparable to Gerber, there was every reason

20

to believe that even if they continued to coordinate as

21

they had been, prices would be lower, and consumers would

22

be better off.

23

that issue, or at least if they did, they didn't write

24

about it.

25

(AUDIO GAP) merger, because the rival would

The D.C. Circuit never even thought about

Let me move on quickly, because I have a
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limited amount of time, to my second issue.

2

what I've illustrated by this is that we need to get away

3

from thinking about efficiencies just in terms of cost

4

savings.

5

combining complementary assets and whether that is going

6

to allow the merged firm to produce a higher quality

7

product and/or increase its output.

8

thinking just in terms of price and cost.

9

But I hope

Think about them principally in terms of

Let's get away from

The second issue is how much weight should be

10

given to fixed-cost savings.

And here the text that I

11

begin with is footnote 37 to the Merger Guidelines, which

12

provides that while savings in marginal costs will

13

receive the greatest weight, the agencies will also,

14

quote, "consider the effects of cognizable efficiencies

15

that have no short-term direct effect on prices in the

16

relevant market,” such as fixed cost savings.

17

Again, the way that footnote is written, and that entire

18

section of the Guidelines, suffers from this problem of

19

the old smoke stack industry paradigm and sort of a

20

static price theory model.

21

that model to a more dynamic view of competitive forces,

22

you recognize that in fact cost savings and other

23

efficiencies that do not reduce marginal costs

24

nevertheless are likely to benefit consumers not just in

25

the long term but even in the medium and short term.

As soon as you move away from
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A good book, I think, on this subject is

2

William Baumol's book, The Free Market Innovation

3

Machine.

4

tried to extend this argument in an article that's going

5

to be published shortly in the Antitrust Bulletin

6

entitled "What is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and

7

European Perspectives."

8

basically building on the intuitions of Joseph Schumpeter

9

is that in most new economy industries, competitive

And based on the arguments in that book, I've

And what that all shows

10

behavior is driven primarily by innovation, not by cost.

11

And where that's the case, firms need to incur basically

12

recurring R&D expenditures.

13

improving and innovating in order to remain competitive.

14

That creates what Baumol calls a "Red Queen Game" in

15

which the firm needs to run as fast as it can just to

16

stand still.

17

They need to invest in

In these markets, not surprisingly, you find

18

very high price/cost margins, and that's because the

19

firms are investing heavily, and they need to be able to

20

charge prices above marginal costs in order to recoup

21

that investment, in order to justify it.

22

Nevertheless, these are industries in which innovation

23

is rapid, and in fact price is often falling over time,

24

even as price cost margins remain high.

25

perhaps not surprisingly, since he created it along with
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Bobby Willig, that the model, the economic model that

2

should be used for evaluating competition in these

3

industries is not the traditional price theory model, but

4

rather the contestability model.

5

basically is that what determines price in these

6

industries is the level at which prices will attract new

7

entry, and firms, even though they charge prices that are

8

above marginal costs, nevertheless do not have any market

9

power because their prices are constrained by the threat

Because what he argues

10

of entry, and because they are earning only a minimal

11

return on capital, i.e., on their investment.

12

In these industries, obviously, efficiencies

13

that help to reduce the cost of R&D and other recurring

14

common costs will help to drive down price over time and

15

lead to greater innovation and improved products, i.e.,

16

dynamic efficiencies, and those need to be taken into

17

account.

18

Finally, and I apologize for rushing, but there

19

is a lot to cover here, and I want to make sure to save

20

time for the discussion, to what extent can a lessening

21

of competition in one market be justified by efficiencies

22

in other markets?

23

Joe, I think, referred to the fact that back in

24

1982, everyone was skeptical as to whether the

25

hypothetical monopolist approach to market definition
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would work.

2

experience with that approach over the last 20 years. I

3

think as a practitioner, that one of the things that has

4

been most striking to me over the last five to seven

5

years is that as we have applied the hypothetical

6

monopolist market definition test more rigorously,

7

markets have come to be defined more and more narrowly.

8
9

Obviously, we've gained a great deal of

Second, as we've moved away from homogeneous
commodity-type products, more and more markets are

10

characterized by price discrimination.

11

characterized by price discrimination, you could, as a

12

theoretical matter, define virtually each customer as a

13

separate market.

14

at least, when they analyze mergers, that is in fact how

15

they look at them as they try to evaluate the likely

16

price effects of a merger.

17

And in markets

And in fact, at the Justice Department

They may not define the market that way when

18

they go to court.

I think that's Ilene's point.

But

19

even then, the market definitions are much narrower today

20

than they were a generation ago.

21

the Justice Department's complaint in the First

22

Data/Concord merger case where they defined the relevant

23

market as "processing PIN-debit cards at point-of-sale."

24

And certainly in the similarly narrow market definition

25

in the merger case where Mark was successful in beating

Look, for example, at

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

70
1

back a challenge, because the judge simply didn't

2

understand what role price discrimination plays in

3

defining the relevant market.

4

As we move to increasingly narrow market

5

definitions, it becomes more and more important that the

6

agencies take into account out-of-market efficiencies.

7

Andrew Dick and I have written an article that appeared

8

this past year in the Antitrust Law Journal and we

9

describe a particular merger case that was reviewed by

10

the FTC while Bob was there, which I think is a perfect

11

illustration of how important this is.

12

involving two natural gas gathering and processing

13

systems in West Texas, right next door to George Bush's

14

hometown of Midland.

15

production -- the fields were very mature.

16

was declining.

17

less than 50 percent of capacity, as a result of which

18

unit costs were rising sharply.

19

wells in this area that were close enough to both

20

gathering systems to benefit from competition between

21

them.

22

processing plants in these two counties.

23

one sense a merger-to- monopoly.

24

staff understood that there were literally only a handful

25

of wells, maybe a dozen or so, that benefitted from the

That was a merger

That was an area in which
Production

The processing plants were running at

There were very few

The remaining customers were gathering systems or
So this was in

And yet, when the FTC
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competition between these two systems, whereas there were

2

hundreds of wells that were going to benefit from the

3

cost savings resulting from consolidating the two

4

systems, they granted early termination of the second

5

waiting period.

6

The efficiencies were outside the relevant

7

market in which the anticompetitive effect would be felt,

8

and yet nevertheless, they were recognized as swamping

9

the potential anticompetitive effects, so the merger-to-

10

monopoly was allowed.

11

Another very good example of this, but a more

12

controversial one, is the Surface Transportation Board's

13

decision in the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger

14

case where I was one of the opponents.

15

a large number of routes from the Gulf Coast to the

16

Chicago-St. Louis area that were basically two -- or the

17

merger was a two to one merger.

18

monopoly.

19

convinced, however, that there were very substantial

20

efficiencies from combining the networks of the Southern

21

Pacific and Union Pacific roads that would benefit all of

22

their shippers on all of their lines.

23

order to remedy the anticompetitive problem, rather than

24

ordering divestitures, they structured a trackage rights

25

remedy that would give a third carrier the rights to use

There, there were

It was a merger-to-

The Surface Transportation Board was
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the UPSP tracks to service these customers.

And I think

2

that's a good illustration of how efficiencies factor

3

into the choice of remedy.

4

But, again, the point I'm making here is that

5

that was a case where the agency found that the out-of-

6

market efficiencies were inextricably intertwined with

7

the negative competitive effects, and therefore tried to

8

structure a remedy that would fix the competitive problem

9

without sacrificing the efficiencies.

10

I think one of the things that concerns me

11

about the new EU draft -- EU Notice on Horizontal Mergers

12

-- it's now final -- is that, at least as I read it, the

13

European Commission does not have the same flexibility

14

that our agencies have to take into account those out-of-

15

market efficiencies.

16

from Vincent on how the Commission would deal with cases

17

like the two that I've just discussed.

18

Thank you.

19

MR. ABBOTT:

And I'd be very interested to hear

Thank you, Bill.

Some more

20

provocative remarks.

21

overview to Chairman Pitofsky, who was around when

22

Section IV of the 97 -- Section IV of the Guidelines was

23

revised in 1997 to give us the current treatment of

24

efficiencies.

25

And now I turn for a magisterial

Chairman Pitofsky was also around, of course,
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for the Staples case and the Heinz/Beech-Nut case, which

2

a number of practitioners here have trashed.

3

sure that Chairman and Professor and Dean Pitofsky will

4

give us a magisterial overview and maybe some rebuttal as

5

well.

And I'm

Bob?

6

MR. PITOFSKY:

Thank you.

It's good to be back

7

here in this unfamiliar but familiar FTC.

8

is unfamiliar.

9

This building

You know, magisterial oversight is a little

10

different.

11

we have three or four speakers on one side saying the

12

Merger Guidelines should be expanded, two or three

13

speakers saying they should be left where they are or

14

contracted, and then I would stake out a middle ground.

15

I thought what we were going to have is that

That's not it.

Everybody who's spoken so far

16

has said the Merger Guidelines -- the efficiency defense

17

in the Merger Guidelines should be expanded, even made

18

primary.

19

It's interesting.

Historically, it was Bork,

20

Posner and Baxter who felt so strongly that the

21

efficiencies defense was a wrong idea.

22

think they'd have some influence today, but not on this

23

issue.

24

does have efficiency credentials, and shyly, myself, who

25

wrote that an efficiency defense has to be included in

And you would

And it was Areeda, Turner, Broadly, Muris, who
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the Merger Guidelines.

2

who introduced it formally into the statute.

3

And it was the Clinton enforcers

Let me just say a few general things and then

4

some specific things about the cases that were brought

5

up.

6

that are imposed to successfully assert an efficiency

7

defense are too narrow.

There is a general thread here that the conditions

8

Let me start at a different place.

It is not

9

my intention to defend every word and every concept in

10

these efficiency guidelines.

11

Ilene's notion that declining industry aspects should be

12

brought into your consideration of efficiencies.

13

Absolutely.

14

that fixed and variable are unnecessarily, treated

15

unnecessarily differently from the point of view of the

16

Guidelines, I agree with that.

17

the kind of distinction that theoretical economic

18

analysis does.

19

associate myself with him, that the staff does listen to

20

efficiency claims.

21

debunk the claim, that's not the agency I was at.

22

are there and they work hard on these things.

23

I heard a couple of things:

I think that's a good idea.

Bill's thought

Businesspeople don't make

And Bill's suggestion, I just want to

The idea that they're only there to

All right.

Narrow conditions.

It is true, the

24

conditions are narrow.

The efficiency must be

25

substantial, merger-specific, timely, clear and
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1

convincing evidence, can't reduce output, et cetera, et

2

cetera, but that's what was intended.

3

in a close case, efficiencies can be a tiebreaker.

4

idea was not that efficiencies ordinarily will allow you

5

to merge three to two, or two to one.

6

American antitrust is about.

7

statute, which says "tend to create a monopoly" is about.

8
9

The idea is that
The

That's not what

That's not what this

On producer surplus, I'm sort of agnostic.

If

the producer surplus were enormous and the

10

anticompetitive effect were tiny, I guess anybody would

11

take it into account as a matter of prosecutorial

12

discretion.

13

I'm pretty sure you would do that.

As to some of the proposals, exceptional

14

effort, thoughtful, creative.

15

be, Joe Simons and others, can we do it?

16

very fair point.

17

definition of relevant market.

18

to do it, and we can.

19

My question is going to
And you make a

A lot of people said that about the
And now we've learned how

But I'm worried about this one.

Antitrust is a

20

practical enterprise.

It's not the development of a

21

dissertation.

22

well, let me take as an example, the claim is that, yes,

23

the merger will lead to higher prices now, but down the

24

road, three years, four years, five years, the efficiency

25

will produce lower unit costs and perhaps, maybe even

And I just keep thinking to myself --
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probably, lower prices.

2

the subpoena look like that tries to get at the question

3

of whether or not five years down the road there will be

4

lower prices, that the efficiencies will kick in.

5

And I keep wondering, what will

Look at how many times people have claimed

6

efficiencies and they never kicked in.

What are you

7

going to do with the company five years later when it

8

turns out that prices are still higher and the

9

efficiencies haven't kicked in.

You can't break up the

10

company, not if it's a horizontal merger.

11

practical problems here.

12

So there are

There are also technical problems.

It's

13

contrary to the statute, which says in any line of

14

commerce.

15

and it produces the odd situation where one set of

16

consumers who buy today are financing lower prices for

17

another set of consumers who buy later.

18

concern is, could you possibly do it?

19

It's contrary to the spirit of the Guidelines,

But my main

Let me raise a question for all of you.

Do you

20

believe in British Oxygen?

Do you believe the court when

21

it said that it will not let the plaintiff get away with

22

coming in and making the anticompetitive case in some

23

speculative way?

24

there will be an anticompetitive effect now, but I can

25

tell you eventually there will be an anticompetitive

Well, judge, I can't tell you that
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effect, and you ought to strike down the merger.

2

what was it, the 2nd Circuit?

3

their ear on grounds that you can't come in here with

4

that kind of speculative talk and expect to block a

5

merger.

6

And

FTC. FTC got thrown out on

I agree with that decision.

I think the

7

plaintiff has a responsibility to show clearly by

8

convincing evidence that there will be an anticompetitive

9

effect in a timely manner.

But I think the same thing

10

for defenses.

11

to come in and say, well, judge, I don't know about

12

efficiencies right now.

13

up now.

14

the road, oh, then everybody's going to really be in

15

great shape.

16

I don't think that one should be allowed

Actually, prices are going to go

That's what makes the merger illegal.

But down

A little too speculative for me.

Ilene talked about hierarchy of efficiencies

17

and clearly said that, you know, maybe there are

18

differences, but you shouldn't disregard certain

19

efficiencies entirely.

I would disregard certain

20

efficiencies entirely.

Let me say, the best work on this

21

by far is about 70 or 80 pages in Areeda, in which goes

22

through efficiency by efficiency by efficiency and talks

23

about whether or not they should be taken into account to

24

the extent that they reverse the result in an otherwise

25

illegal merger.
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1

Reduce unit cost is the clearest case.

The

2

Guidelines picked it up.

3

Generally speaking, you can prove it.

4

reduced unit costs are there.

5

about R&D efficiencies.

6

quarrel, because I don't think Areeda thought so highly

7

of that.

8

of the country, the economy and consumers, that R&D

9

efficiencies should be cognizable.

10

The writers have picked it up.
You can know the

The Guidelines talked

I remember that as being quite a

But I think R&D is so important to the welfare

But then these other efficiencies are more or

11

less savaged by Areeda.

12

promotional efficiencies, capital cost efficiencies.

13

Let's just take managerial efficiencies.

14

being run poorly, and you should do something about it.

15

Well, there are two possibilities.

16

company that's being run well, or you can fire the bad

17

manager, and like George Steinbrenner in New York, you

18

can hire a better third baseman.

19

to bring in a first rate leader or a consultant to a

20

second rate leader, that sort of thing.

21

Managerial efficiencies,

The company is

You can merge with a

You can pay the money

It seems to me that managerial efficiencies are

22

vague, hard to measure.

How do you measure what a really

23

good CEO, president, sales manager brings to a company?

24

What questions do you ask about that?

25

what a managerial efficiency is.

Hard to define

And the tradeoff
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1

between managerial efficiencies and anticompetitive

2

effect is going to be hard to manage.

3

up, what are you saying?

4

will bring the prices down?

5

speculative and eventuality, which British Oxygen said we

6

ought not do.

7

If the prices go

But this manager eventually
Well then we're back to

And finally, there's a less restrictive

8

alternative.

I don't think there's a shortage of capable

9

managers in this country.

And I don't think the only way

10

to get a capable manager is to merge with your competitor

11

or your customer or your supplier, something like that.

12

Let's see.

Merger-to-monopoly justified by

13

efficiency.

I guess I've already said.

14

statute.

15

understand that a company that expands internally can

16

point to its own superior skill, foresight and industry.

17

But this isn't expansion.

18

question is whether or not you would allow a merger-to-

19

monopoly and say, but, judge, we're so efficient.

20

we'll lower costs.

It's not our Guidelines.

It's not our

It's speculative.

These are mergers.

I

And the

And

21

First of all, why would a monopolist do that?

22

If you're a monopolist and a profit maximizer, it seems

23

to me you wouldn't lower costs if there are high barriers

24

to entry.

25

stay in place, the agencies should take that into

If the Baumol theory is you're running hard to
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2

account.

That's fair enough.
Okay.

That's fair enough.

Now, let's see.

Shots at the

3

Commission.

Look, baby food you say will live in infamy.

4

It's a tough sell and similar mild comments.

5

Procter & Gamble of the new generation.

6

(Laughter.)

7

Let's put this into context.

It's the

A hundred and

8

fifteen years, and no court has ever approved a three to

9

two merger unless there were low barriers to entry and a

10

failing company assertion.

11

So it was hardly a departure.

12

affirmed what the Federal Trade Commission said.

13

A hundred and fifteen years.
Unanimous Court of Appeals

Now since the deal, I'm not even sure what's

14

happened, but I gather Gerber has grown and one of them

15

has gone out of business.

16

Heinz sold out.

17

MR. PITOFSKY:

They exited the market.
Okay.

I guess I have to think

18

about this one.

But, you know, you play the cards you're

19

dealt with.

20

two, the two, the two smaller ones were competing with

21

each other, fairly and vigorously, and it seemed to me

22

the case was justifiable.

23

somebody may make me eat these words -- I don't recall

24

either of the merging parties coming in and saying we're

25

going out of business.

At the time of the merger it was three to

And I don't recall -- and

They might say we will never be
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efficient and we'll curtail our activities.

2

remember anybody saying they would go out of business.

3

I don't

Now, does that mean the Commission will never

4

take a three to two, never allow a three to two?

5

think we've done it a fair number of times.

6

immediately of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas where we thought

7

it was two to two, because McDonnell Douglas such a weak

8

player.

9

No.

I

I think

Chairman Muris told me that there have been

10

several instances.

It's hard sometimes to make public

11

prosecutorial discretion decisions.

12

three to two mergers.

13

is allowing three to two mergers, and efficiencies are

14

the turning point.

15

Staples.

16

(Laughter.)

17

But there was clear evidence that prices went

But we have allowed

He is allowing -- his Commission

Efficiencies are the decisive factor.
It's been so long I forgot.

18

up in markets characterized by fewer superstores, and as

19

to the efficiencies -- don't hold me to any numbers.

20

This is very general.

21

board of the company was told when they were thinking

22

about a merger that the efficiencies would be X, 5X.

23

Then when they knew they were merging, the board was told

24

25X.

25

That hurt.

But my recollection is that the

And then when they went to court, they said 75X.
That hurt in terms of trying the case.
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1

And the other issue is much more complicated,

2

and that is whether or not purchasing efficiencies, that

3

is to say, you're bigger so you get better discounts from

4

the seller, ought to be taken into account, or is that

5

just transferring money from one businessperson's pocket

6

to another?

7
8
9

I grant that that is a very complicated
question.
Let me sum up by simply saying this.

I think

10

American antitrust is better off by the introduction of

11

an efficiency defense.

12

the people who said you put that efficiency defense in

13

our Guidelines and you will destroy the ability of the

14

government to enforce the antitrust laws, because people

15

will come in with phony efficiencies and you won't know

16

they're phony.

17

on forever.

18

worked out that way at all.

19

I was thinking last night of all

It will delay the matters.

It hasn't worked out that way.

Cases will go
It hasn't

Incidentally, there was a comment that courts

20

almost never say it's illegal, but because of the

21

efficiencies, I'll make it -- I'll call it legal.

22

believe the reason for that is the agency doesn't bring

23

cases that are barely illegal but with substantial

24

efficiencies.

25

shot at this, and I'm not sure they're going to get a

I

And therefore, the courts haven't had a
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1

shot very soon, because the agencies are very sensitive

2

to claims of efficiency.

3

I think some excellent deals have gone through

4

by emphasizing the efficiency.

I think that's

5

particularly true in the high tech R&D drug area, and the

6

country is better off for that.

7

competition is concerned, the efficiency section put the

8

spotlight where it belongs -- not on the size of the

9

competitor, but on the efficiency, its unit cost, the

And as far as global

10

quality of its product, the quality of its research.

11

I think for all those reasons, we're better off.

12

Thank you.

13

MR. ABBOTT:

And

Thank you, Bob, for a very good

14

overview and putting things in context, as you always do

15

so well.

16

Finally we're going to turn to Dr. Vincent

17

Verouden of the European Commission, DG Comp.

18

he has honored us with his presence earlier in the

19

workshop, and he will be focusing on the treatment of

20

efficiencies in the new European Merger Guidelines.

21

MR. VEROUDEN:

And again,

I would like to talk about

22

merger analysis and the role of efficiencies in the

23

European Union.

24
25

Before going to the specific topic of
efficiencies, it may be good to provide some background
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1

on what has been going on in recent months or years in

2

the EC merger control system.

3

As you may know, this merger control system,

4

which is in place since 1990, has been the subject of a

5

review process, a reform process you could say.

6

has resulted in a new merger regulation which was adopted

7

last month by the member states of the European Union.

8

It will be applicable as of the 1st of May, 2004, so in

9

three months' time.

10

And this

It has also produced Horizontal Merger

11

Guidelines which accompany this new merger regulation.

12

So much what I'm going to tell now or today is relating

13

to, you know, what will be the system in three months'

14

time.

15

There were a couple of issues that kind of

16

spurred this reform process.

17

issues, jurisdictional issues, but also substantive

18

issues.

19

debated in this reform process were first of all, what is

20

the scope of the existing dominance test that we have in

21

the European Union in Article II of the EC Merger

22

Regulation?

23

in merger analysis, what should be the proper role of

24

efficiency considerations in merger analysis?

25

There were procedural

The two main substantive issues that were being

And the second was the role of efficiencies

Just to say a few words about the test, because
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1

that's, of course, the main tool that we have to use in

2

the coming years, and it's difficult to speak about

3

efficiencies and integrated analysis without also knowing

4

what your substantive test for review is.

5

And it has often been put in terms of the

6

comparison of the dominance test versus SLC test,

7

Substantial Lessening of Competition.

8

difference?

9

with the dominance test -- by the way, I should read out

Is there a

And the question that arose in our context

10

what the dominance test is.

11

creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of

12

which effective competition would be significantly

13

impeded.

14

dominance test.

15

It's whether a merger

That's our current test, and it's called the

And the question was, well, does it cover all

16

mergers that produce anticompetitive effects?

17

deal with mergers that produce a company with significant

18

market power, but which only is, for example, number two

19

in the market, and, therefore, not, let's say, dominant

20

in the usual meaning of the word?

21

Does it

Anyway, this resulted after, well, quite a long

22

debate in a clarification of our test.

It's now called

23

the SIEC test.

24

course, and it's also, well, normal that it's pretty

25

similar.

It's quite similar to the SLC test, of

Namely, the test is now whether a merger leads
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1

to a Significant Impediment to Effective Competition.

2

that's the tool that we will work with in the coming

3

months -- in the coming years.

4

So

I must say, by the way, that the new test that

5

we have, SIEC, still singles out the notion of a dominant

6

position as a primary example of a merger that is leading

7

to a significant impediment to effective competition.

8
9

So, well, so far for the background on this new
test.

Let's turn to the role of efficiencies in the EC

10

merger control system.

11

the current situation, if you like, with the dominance

12

test, I think it's fair to say that efficiencies have not

13

received much emphasis in the past.

14

If we look at the past or even

That is quite clear.

It's probably outside the

15

scope of this workshop to really expand on this, and the

16

reasons why and so on.

17

thinking that we have gone through in the European Union

18

quite closely resembles, I think, the development that

19

you have seen here in the United States over the course

20

of the years where efficiencies were first viewed with

21

quite a bit of skepticism, of course, whether they could

22

overturn conclusions as to the anticompetitive or pro-

23

competitive effect of a merger.

24

to having a more open attitude to efficiency

25

considerations.

I think that development in

So starting from there
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1

And -- well, I've written down here what was

2

the conclusion of this internal reflection, well,

3

internal and external reflection process.

4

at some point that, well, there are compelling reasons to

5

give more explicit consideration to efficiencies in

6

merger control.

7

course, that efficiencies may bring more competition to

8

the market rather than less, if anything.

9

We really said

And this from the understanding, of

I've written a few reasons, maybe not necessary

10

to say a lot about that.

11

Efficiencies are a natural element, although not the

12

easiest in any competition analysis. If you want to

13

determine whether the merger will increase or reduce

14

competition in the market, it's kind of hard to do that

15

in an accurate or proper way without also looking at

16

efficiencies or possible efficiencies.

17

I think it's well understood.

And in this sense it's also in line with a more

18

effects-based or call it economics-based approach to

19

merger control.

20

(Slide.)

21

Now, the treatment of efficiencies in the new

22

merger regulation, I think it's good to start out by

23

saying that there was no need to change our test for the

24

sole purpose of looking at efficiencies.

25

the reasons in the small bullet points down there, first
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of all, we were always of the opinion that the existing

2

test in Article II of the merger regulation, even though

3

it had, you know, the dominance wording and so on, was a

4

pure competition test.

5

And so the moment you say that, yes,

6

efficiencies must be considered in merger analysis, well,

7

actually, they should be part of an integrated

8

competition analysis.

9

of have a separate sentence in Article II on

10
11

So there was no real need to kind

efficiencies.
I must say, by the way, that Article II

12

comprises a number of paragraphs, and so paragraph two

13

and three have this test that I just said.

14

of this article actually says all the factors that we

15

have to look at when looking at the likely impact of

16

mergers, and so it refers to entry barriers and buyer

17

power and so on, but also to the technical and economic

18

progress that is likely to be achieved through the

19

merger, provided it is to the consumer's advantage.

20

that is wording that has been in the test in Article II

21

since the very beginning.

22

emphasis, as I said before.

23

this is a sufficiently worded text for Article II.

24
25

Paragraph one

And

It hasn't received much
But we still believe that

And, however, to signal the change in emphasis
a little bit, I think there are two things that I can
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say.

2

focuses on, you know, whether there will be a significant

3

impediment to effective competition and does not put that

4

much emphasis anymore on the dominance aspect, probably

5

better allows for, you know, a proper inclusion of

6

efficiencies.

7

First, the new wording that we have that actually

It better expresses that our test is an

8

effects-based competition test so that instead of looking

9

in an almost static way to whether post-merger the new

10

entity will have a dominant position, which is a bit of a

11

snapshot analysis post-merger, the emphasis with the new

12

wording of the test is more towards what will change from

13

pre- to post-merger.

14

somewhat more natural place in the new wording of the

15

test.

16

So efficiencies maybe will find a

In addition, we have what we call recitals in

17

our legislation, and those are kind of sentences that

18

precede the operational part of the regulation, and they

19

kind of give the intent of the legislation, and you can

20

find here in the text that we have put, or that the

21

member states have put, I must say.

22

So, in order to determine the impact of a

23

concentration on competition, it's appropriate to take

24

account of any substantiated and likely efficiencies put

25

forward by the undertakings concerned.
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

90
1

It is possible that the efficiencies brought

2

about by the concentration counteract the effects on

3

competition, and, in particular, the potential harm to

4

consumers that it might otherwise have.

5

Let me turn to the treatment in the Guidelines.

6

The regulation, of course, is all at a rather general

7

level and so on, but the Guidelines, they kind of provide

8

the analytical approach that the Commission intends to

9

take in the analysis of individual cases.

10

As I said, the Guidelines were adopted a few

11

weeks ago, 30 January, and, well, if there is any

12

characterization, I guess, of the approach to

13

efficiencies in these Guidelines, I would say it's open

14

but cautious.

15

to that.

16

invites any substantiated efficiency claim.

17

Guidelines recognize that in whatever form, efficiencies

18

may make the new entity more competitive.

19

bias in that sense.

20

Open.

I think Ilene referred a little bit

It's open in the sense that it's, you know, it
So the

So there is no

On the other hand, of course, Guidelines must

21

give some guidance, so I will come to that in the next

22

slide.

23

At the same time, the approach is cautious.

24

that's also kind of natural.

25

conditions or the circumstances under which the

But the opening statement is open, so to speak.
I think

It's cautious in the
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Commission can take efficiencies into account.

2

to that on the next slide as well.

3

I'll come

But the focus lies on the ability and incentive

4

of the merged entity to act pro-competitively for the

5

benefit of consumers.

6

welfare objective, the Guidelines are rather explicit

7

about what is the relevant benchmark in the assessment of

8

efficiencies, and for that matter, in the assessment of

9

possible adverse effects of a merger.

10

So while this is a consumer

This consumer welfare objective actually

11

doesn't come falling out of the air.

12

our Article II that we have which refers to that we

13

should look at technical and economic progress, provided

14

that it is to the consumer's advantage.

15

in the regulation, and it was in the regulation already

16

10 years ago.

17

It's derived from

So it's already

It's also consistent, by the way, with other

18

articles or sections in our antitrust legislation.

19

example, Article 81, which also has this consumer

20

objective in the end.

21

For

I guess it's more for the discussion afterwards

22

whether the benchmark is the right one, of course, that

23

you can always discuss.

24

the Guidelines is that it spells out in a rather visible

25

way and, also, hopefully clear way what are the three

But a good thing, I guess, about

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

92
1

conditions for efficiencies to be taken into account in

2

order to clear a merger for the Commission.

3

So the first one -- actually, there are like

4

headings, and then the things are further developed.

5

first heading is Benefits to Consumers, and the relevant

6

benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that

7

consumers will not be worse off as a result of the

8

merger.

9

it's pretty clear.

10

The

This sentence is literally in the Guidelines and

In principle, this concerns consumers in the

11

relevant market.

12

here, and attentive readers can see that the "in

13

principle" was not in let's say in our draft notice, our

14

draft Guidelines.

15

what this means is that the focus is not entirely and

16

completely on consumers in the relevant market, but it's

17

in principle.

18

You will note that words "in principle"

It is in our final Guidelines.

So

I think this is also part of our open approach,

19

given that we have not spent so much emphasis on

20

efficiencies in the past, I think it's better to leave

21

things open while giving clear directions, but leave

22

things open.

23

in the Guidelines.

24
25

I think this is more or less the exercise

Efficiencies may take various forms.

Cost

savings leading to lower prices or synergies leading to
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new or improved products.

2

that variable costs are more likely to be relevant than

3

fixed costs, but this does not exclude anything.

4

that sense, it's open as well.

5

We say in terms of guidance,

So in

Then there are two things which are very

6

familiar to you.

7

expand a lot on this.

8

specific, which means that they are relevant when they

9

are a direct consequence of the notified merger.

10

There is maybe not much reason to
Efficiencies must be merger-

So it

must be a causation there.

11

And on, you know, the set of alternatives, so

12

to speak, that you look at, you know, are there less

13

restrictive alternatives and so on.

14

think what we did try to do in our Guidelines is to tie

15

very much the relevant comparison with, okay, this is

16

what the merger will produce and how would it likely be

17

in the relevant counter factual, so in the absence of the

18

merger?

19

two situations to compare.

20

constrained in that respect.

21

On that debate, I

So that in theory should give two things to -It's not -- it's a bit

Finally, verifiability.

Well, since most of

22

the information is in the hands of the merging parties,

23

when we speak of efficiencies, I mean, it's also

24

incumbent upon them to provide relevant information

25

demonstrating that the efficiencies are merger-specific
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and likely to be realized, and it's also upon them to

2

give a first shot or show to what extent consumers will

3

benefit.

4

I think I will just leave it here for the

5

moment and leave other points or questions to the

6

discussion afterwards.

7

MR. ABBOTT:

Thank you, Vincent, for that very

8

good overview and introduction for all of us to the new

9

European Guidelines.

10

I'd like to take a brief break to allow -- no

11

longer than 10 minutes.

We will be starting up again in

12

10 minutes time exactly.

13

already be going.

So if you're late, we'll

14

Thank you.

15

(A brief recess was taken.)

16

MR. ABBOTT:

If people could try and take their

17

seats, please.

18

and answer session to start out with, Mary Coleman.

19

Let me turn things over for the question

MS. COLEMAN:

Thank you, Alden.

I'll start off

20

asking a question, and I'm going to direct it towards Joe

21

but then more towards the panel generally and in part

22

working a bit off of what Chairman Pitofsky had said in

23

terms of this integrated approach and this sort of

24

formulaic approach.

25

You had said that, you know, it may be
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difficult to have mathematical precision in doing this,

2

but it's sort of an approach that could get people

3

thinking about weighing the different elements of the

4

case.

5

back-of-the-envelope sense, could the agency do this kind

6

of approach or the parties do this sort of approach?

7

do you come up with probabilities?

8

with reasonable discount rates to actually try and get

9

some numbers?

10

But to try and get to how practical, even in a

MR. SIMONS:

How

How do you come up

Well, I think in actual practice,

11

I think companies are doing this already, and the staff

12

is actually doing it already, but it's being done

13

subconsciously.

14

efficiency claims of one of the parties, that's what

15

you're doing.

16

the chances, how much do I believe this?

17

what happens, or I think probably what happens mostly is

18

it's kind of a -- people have in their minds like a

19

binary type of decision or a binary way of thinking.

20

It's either on or off.

21

reality it's something, you know, largely in-between.

22

Anytime you evaluate the claims, the

You are saying to yourself, okay, what are
And sometimes

It's either yes or no, when in

And so, I think, you know, subconsciously, this

23

is being done already and the only thing I'm really

24

suggesting we do is to kind of think about it more

25

consciously, more explicitly.

And the place where I say
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this coming in is kind of like in a sensitivity analysis.

2

You know, you don't have to know exactly what the chances

3

are that the efficiency is going to be realized or

4

exactly how big it's going to be.

5

kind of set the parameters.

6

analysis and see how much it makes a difference and in

7

what regard.

8
9
10

But, you know, you can

You can do a sensitivity

And I think people kind of do that
subconsciously already.

And I think if you just put it

down on paper, it just clarifies the thinking.

11

MR. PITOFSKY:

12

MS. COLEMAN:

13

MR. PITOFSKY:

Can I ask?
Sure.
Joe, you're right.

I think that

14

your spreadsheet approach and the integration approach is

15

very challenging and it makes a lot of sense.

16

your answer to my question?

17

side of the equation and say to the plaintiff, even if

18

the anticompetitive effects aren't immediate, if the

19

anticompetitive effects occurred down the road sometime,

20

that's good enough?

21

Oxygen which says that's not good enough?

22

But what's

Would you go to the other

Or would you stick with British

MR. SIMONS:

My interpretation of British

23

Oxygen would be that the anticompetitive effect there was

24

speculative.

25

into the future.

In other words, very, very unlikely and
If what you're talking about is
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something that is, you know, is going to occur with some

2

reasonable probability, maybe in two or three years or

3

four years even, then I think, yeah, you should factor

4

that into your analysis.

5

calculation, and if the efficiencies occur earlier than

6

the anticompetitive effect and there's a price drop,

7

yeah, earlier, then that gets more weight than the

8

anticompetitive effect.

9

you wouldn't consider it.

10

MR. PITOFSKY:

11

MR. SIMONS:

12

It should go into the whole

But I don't see any reason why

On both sides?
On both sides.

I don't see any

reason why it shouldn't be done equally.

13

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Let me say, can you do this?

14

Of course.

15

sophisticated and talented in what they do.

16

is the decision making is very ad hoc.

17

The FTC, both agencies are incredibly
The problem

Now, if you take an agency which has much less

18

talent, you know, top to bottom, like the EPA, and you

19

look at the -- and I'm not saying that if you look at

20

their actual decision making there's hot politics and all

21

sorts of complicated things involved -- but they're

22

dealing with weighty tradeoff issues of health versus

23

costs and other sort of things.

24
25

They have formal procedures like this to do it.
are well known procedures.

There

Government agencies do it.
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Businesses do it in much less complicated and -- much

2

more complicated and contentious situations than we're

3

dealing with in antitrust.

4

The problem is it's very ad hoc now.

5

really no common agreement within the antitrust agencies

6

and within the staff even what the standard is for

7

efficiencies and how they should be weighted.

8
9

There's

So it's true that something's going on in
different people's heads, but knowing makes them

10

accountable for it.

11

Joe is proposing, well, here is the particular analysis.

12

You have to have an agreement.

13

analysis?

14

up with programs?

15

can buy consultants.

16

and other agencies do that all the time.

17

So you can't just -- I don't think

Well, what is the

How are things going to work -- can you come
Absolutely.

You can buy programs, you

We'll tell you how to do that.

Is it science?

Is it hard science?

No.

18

less science than the way we make decisions now?

19

It's just making -- it makes a more transparent and

20

rigorous sort of approach.

21

MR. KOLASKY:

EPA

Is it

No.

If I can just add one comment on

22

this.

I think one case that's worth following, because

23

it's directly relevant to this, is the G.E./Honeywell

24

merger case, which is now pending in the Court of First

25

Instance in Europe.

Because that, of course, is, in
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fact, the central issue in that case where the, you know,

2

Commission's decision found that the merger would make

3

the combined firm more efficient, lead to lower prices,

4

but that would ultimately drive out rivals, after which

5

they would be able to raise prices.

6

And so it basically is the paradigm example of

7

this issue, and it's going to be very interesting to see

8

how the CFI deals with it.

9
10

MR. PITOFSKY:
MR. KOLASKY:

Good point.
And I'm sure Vincent will

11

probably disagree with my characterization about the

12

reliance on efficiencies, but.

13

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Let me pick up first, because I

14

don't -- I said something which was -- I didn't mean, and

15

I think was misinterpreted.

16

efficiencies very seriously.

17

you look at process-wise what happens, the only clear

18

guidance staff has is the case law.

19

The agencies take
I don't doubt that.

But if

The lawyers know they have to be prepared to

20

show your client you can rebut the efficiencies cases

21

that the parties will put forward, particularly in the

22

FTC where you never know whether you have a case for sure

23

until the Commissioners vote.

24

seriously because they've been very important in Staples

25

and Drug Wholesaling, et cetera.

They take it very

And so there's a lot of
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2

focus on that.
And because of the sliding scale, okay, there's

3

a lot less focus on, well, is the deal really good or

4

not, because in reality, it often doesn't count much.

5

counts a lot in a gray area.

6

matter in which the legal staff believes they've got a

7

strong case.

8
9

It doesn't count much in a

Even the economists in that case aren't going
to fight much about the efficiencies, because that's not

10

where the game is.

11

anticompetitive theory of the lawyers case if you

12

disagree with it.

13

still not going to win because of the sliding scale.

14

It

The game is whether you can rebut the

If you win on the efficiencies, you're

So that's the problem with the system.

That's

15

the process, and if you made the process less ad hoc and

16

provided more guidance to staff -- this is actually how

17

we're going to weigh things.

18

we have to think about the fact that none of these things

19

are certain, and don't send up a memo each time where

20

this is absolutely the market definition; that there

21

isn't any doubt about it, and it's just as good as the

22

one last week we sent up, et cetera.

23

rigor, reasonable rigor in the process, we'd get better

24

decision making.

25

MS. COLEMAN:

This is how you, you know,

If we have more

Vincent, did you want to?
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MR. VEROUDEN:

Yes.

Just to react on Bill's

2

comment, of course.

3

really say a lot about the GE/Honeywell case.

4

pending in front of the court.

5

was broader than whether, you know, the efficiencies

6

would allow the new entity to lower price and then as a

7

result of the efficiencies, the ultimate result would be

8

a negative one with the other firms exiting.

9

Well, I'm not here in a position to
It's also

But, certainly, the issue

I think if one could say one thing, the focus

10

of the investigation was whether the new entity would

11

have both the ability and the incentive to kind of embark

12

upon the strategy to marginalize in some way or the other

13

the rivals in the markets concerned.

14

broader than just giving it the label “efficiency

15

offense.”

16

stage.

17

is going to tell.

18

So it's a bit

That's the only thing I want to say at this

And let's just leave the debate for what the CFI
Thank you.

MS. COLEMAN:

Another question that was brought

19

up by some of what Chairman Pitofsky said and by Joe's

20

analysis, is the time horizon over which we are looking

21

at, both effects and efficiencies and the net effect of

22

the merger and what the panel thinks about what type of

23

time horizon should we be looking for.

24

two years, which some parts of the Guidelines sort of

25

suggest?

Should it be longer?

You know, is it

Should it be different
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for the effects versus efficiencies?

2

to the panel for people to comment on.

3

MR. GIDLEY:

And I'd open that

Well, let me field that first.

4

think, first of all, there is a certain amount of

5

inherent factual difference between industries and

6

between deals.

7

I

So some deals and some mergers, I think, truly

8

are permanent in the sense that, you know, you do --

9

Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the chance of somebody else

10

getting into commercial aircraft manufacturing on large-

11

scale jets is very small.

12

Douglas maybe was already out by the time of the deal.

13

On the other hand, McDonnell

So I think it depends a little bit on the

14

industry.

15

industries, I think there's a more dynamic process where,

16

you know, mail order and internet compete more and more

17

for dollars.

18

frame is, it depends, meaning it depends on the industry,

19

it depends on the product, it depends on the firms and

20

what's likely down the road.

21

I think in some service and retailing

So I think the first observation about time

I think the second thing, and frankly, I hadn't

22

focused on it as a practitioner, is, from the standpoint

23

of time frame on efficiencies, that footnote 35

24

explicitly says that timing matters, I think, is under-

25

emphasized by the merging parties in their defenses.
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1

so that's an example of good text that's in the 1997

2

Guidelines, and that again, Chairman Pitofsky, is

3

something where I credit the Clinton Administration for

4

improving on the '92 Guidelines.

5

There is some explicit recognition that timing

6

should matter.

7

and CEOs and management see spreadsheets that go out five

8

to 7 years as just being the normal horizon for

9

evaluating a merger, and I think that's a data point that

10

I think those of us who counsel Boards

we shouldn't explicitly just ignore in the analysis.

11

MR. SIMONS:

I was just going to say, it really

12

does depend, and there are some firms that do -- are very

13

acquisitive, and, you know, they have histories of having

14

achieved cost savings.

15

basically whatever you can prove.

16

it, you can't prove it.

17

going to occur, you know, six years out is kind of

18

irrelevant if you can't prove it.

19

-- you have to have good evidence.

20

evidence.

21

MS. GOTTS:

And for those, you know, it's
And if you can't prove

The fact that you think it's

You have to have some
You have to have

But your model, Joe, actually takes

22

into account the idea that it's a longer term and

23

appropriately discounts it, and that's the way it should

24

be done.

25

take a while to be able to integrate the two companies

They shouldn't be thrown out because it could
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and really realize those, and those are benefits to

2

society.

3

MR. SIMONS:

Right.

And the timing, the risk

4

adjustment should also take into account not only the

5

chances that -- well, I guess what's going to happen is

6

the longer out in time, just as a general rule, the

7

chances that the efficiency is going to be realized are

8

probably lesser.

9

into the calculus.

10

But, you know, you can just figure that

MR. ABBOTT:

Bill, you raised the issue as to

11

the tradeoff between producers and consumers’ surplus.

12

Do we have a true pure consumers’ surplus standard?

13

are there situations in which, say, a diminution of

14

consumers' surplus in one market can be traded off

15

against a countervailing gain in producers' surplus

16

that's so large, that swamps the loss in consumers'

17

surplus, and you would allow the merger to go ahead?

18

-- what standard would you apply, or is that consistent

19

with the case law?

20

Or

How

Can you apply such a standard?

MR. KOLASKY:

I think I'd give both a lawyer's

21

answer and maybe a prosecutor's or economist's answer.

22

Certainly, under the statute, as Bob correctly points

23

out, the standard is whether the merger is likely to

24

substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce

25

in any section of the country.
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And so what you are looking at is what is the

2

impact going to be on consumer welfare?

3

going to lead to higher prices and lower output, and if

4

it is, then it should be found anticompetitive.

5

in making that determination, obviously you have to take

6

into account efficiencies, including those, as we've been

7

saying that will kick in over the long term and outweigh

8

any immediate impact on short-term prices.

9

Is this merger

I think

The harder question is, and I think producer

10

surplus is relevant there because, to the extent the

11

merger increases producer surplus, that is likely to make

12

this market one which, you know, may be more attractive

13

to entry from others because it's now suddenly a more

14

profitable market.

15

long term stimulate competition and stimulate entry.

16

therefore, you know, I think that's the point that was

17

being made by footnote 37.

18

And so this may actually over the
And

I think it's also very important as we think

19

about this to have a very clear understanding of what we

20

mean by "competition."

21

Many mergers that we might characterize as a merger-to-

22

monopoly because it's a two to one merger or near

23

monopoly because it's three to two, do not in fact lessen

24

competition in an economic sense.

25

And this goes to Bob's point.

They may reduce the number of rivals.
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Baumol makes very clear, you can have a very competitive

2

market with two rivals, or actually in some cases even

3

with one rival, where that rival has to constantly

4

improve its product and innovate in order to get people

5

to abandon the product they bought in the past and buy

6

their new product.

7

you've got software that lasts forever and you don't

8

improve it so that you give people an incentive to buy

9

the latest version of it.

10
11

Your revenues are going to go away if

And we have to take into

account that kind of competition with the installed base.
The other point, though, is even if you have

12

pure producer surplus that is not going to inure to the

13

benefit of consumers, why wouldn't you take that into

14

account in exercising your prosecutorial discretion as to

15

whether or not you're going to bring a close case?

16

the potential anticompetitive effect seems to be quite

17

minor, if the probabilities are in doubt, as Joe was

18

pointing out, but you know there are going to be very

19

substantial producer's surplus created by the merger,

20

maybe that's one that you ought to just take a pass on as

21

a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
Yes.

If

22

MR. PITOFSKY:

A couple of reactions.

23

the last point, absolutely right.

24

little barriers to entry, there's no market power, and

25

therefore you don't have to worry about anticompetitive

If there are no or
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effects.

2

that's the case, absolutely right.

3

It's not common, but when it's there, when

On out-of-cross-market efficiencies, let me

4

tell you, with the privilege of someone who was there at

5

the drafting.

6

merge, prices will go up here but we'll be better

7

competitors in Europe or better in Florida, or better in

8

California.

9

interpreting the statute don't allow that.

You couldn't say, look, if you let us

The statue doesn't allow that, and the cases

10

On the other hand, as a matter of prosecutorial

11

discretion, we kept thinking to ourselves, suppose the

12

advantage of one market is enormous and the disadvantage

13

in the other market is slight.

14

with a very felicitous phrase, something about

15

inextricably interwoven, which nobody has a clue what we

16

meant there.

So we stuck in a line

17

(Laughter.)

18

We said rarely -- I think we used the word

19

"rarely" twice.

It's just a question of leaving some

20

discretion to the Commission in the most extreme of

21

cases.

22

Now, one might say, well, if you're going to

23

trade off anticompetitive effects in New York for pro-

24

competitive effects in Florida, why won't you trade off

25

anticompetitive effects now for pro-competitive effects
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four years from now?

2

question.

3

It's a close call, and it's a good

But I think when we're doing New York versus

4

Florida, it's right in front of us.

5

predictions, by the way.

6

analysis is prediction.

7

confident production, New York/California, as of the time

8

of filing the suit or letting the deal go, than you can

9

higher prices now, but, oh, four or five years from now,

10

This is all

Everything about merger
But I think you can make a more

prices will be lower.

11

That's my definition of speculative, uncertain,

12

clearly not allowed by the statute, not by the

13

Guidelines.

14

an elaboration of an efficiencies defense, and I'm still

15

there.

16

enough different that I think it throws you into a kind

17

of a never neverland of speculation.

18

The Guidelines never thought of that being

It's true, it's close to cross-market, but it's

MR. SIMONS:

Let me just respond for a second.

19

I could make the argument that the cross-market thing, as

20

you've said basically, does not -- is not permitted by

21

the statute.

22

the statute says substantial lessening of competition in

23

any market in any part of the country.

24

about time frame.

25

But that the temporal tradeoff is, because

It says nothing

So, I don't know, I could come out the other
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2

way.
MR. ABBOTT:

One issue that underlies some of

3

the discussion is burden.

4

parties have to meet to prove up their efficiencies?

5

mean, we know they must be merger-specific, cognizable,

6

the buzz words, but as we've heard some critics have

7

talked about a chicken-and-egg problem; the fact that

8

poor efficiency arguments are made or developed because

9

parties don't think staff will treat them seriously, or

10

alternatively, staff doesn't spend as much time on them

11

because they're not well made and documented.

12

What is it?

What burden should the merging

And as practitioners, what

13

standard do you think should apply?

14

guidance be given by the agencies as to what degree of

15

specificity needs to be met or proven by the parties?

16

MS. GOTTS:

I

Should better

Actually, during the break, Marius

17

and I were talking a little bit about not only that, but

18

one other aspect of it, which Dave Scheffman in an

19

article touched upon.

20

Unfortunately, when we do deals, when you start

21

out a lot of times the group that is able to be in the

22

know about the possibility of the deal is very limited,

23

to a CEO, maybe a chairman of the board.

24

might be why, before the deal is announced, you get two X

25

in efficiencies that are alleged.
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After the deal is published -- out there in the

2

public domain -- you can do a little bit more work, but

3

there are still limitations which we impose as antitrust

4

lawyers in how much the companies can get together and

5

really drill down in understanding how much the

6

efficiencies will be from a deal.

7

And as you get closer and closer to the deal, maybe we

8

loosen up a little bit, but we still are concerned,

9

especially in deals where they're among competitors.

10

And so this really adds to the difficulty in

11

saying the parties should have some real strong burden of

12

proof and that somehow it should be that you give less

13

credibility to the efficiencies that are discovered by

14

the parties after the deal is announced than what the

15

board considered as you went forward in doing it.

16

So this makes it more complex than even just

17

who has the burden of proof in front of the agencies.

18

It's also a timing issue and a difficulty issue.

19

One other thing.

Both the Guidelines, and the

20

agencies are always saying, well, the parties are in

21

better control of the documents and the evidence to

22

support it.

23

you have subpoena power.

24

deals in the industry, what other third parties have

25

achieved in the way of efficiencies that we don't have

That's not always the case.

Sometimes --

You can find out what other
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access to.

2

So it really has to be not so much the burdens

3

of proof, but we're all trying to get to an answer here,

4

a sense of whether or not this deal is going to be good

5

or bad to consumers, and you as the agency should be

6

using whatever power you can, the parties should, as much

7

as they can within the confines of antitrust

8

restrictions, be trying to get you the information you

9

need.

10

MR. KOLASKY:

If I can add just one thought to

11

that, and this comes back to the title of this panel, and

12

again, this is based both in my private practice

13

experience and my time at the agency, and that is that I

14

think the private bar needs to understand better that

15

efficiencies really have now been integrated into the

16

merger analysis that they are not just a quote/unquote

17

"defense."

18

may be used to rebut inferences of anticompetitive effect

19

arising from other factors.

20

In fact, they're not a defense at all.

They

But my experience now is that, as the agencies

21

have focused more attention on efficiencies, if you don't

22

have any efficiencies but you've got a horizontal merger

23

between major competitors, that is actually a major

24

negative now.

25

back to that, one of the arguments that Gerte Strauss and

And in fact, in G.E./Honeywell, coming
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others have made is that in that case, the parties didn't

2

argue any efficiencies, and that was held against them.

3

I think that the message that the agencies

4

should be sending through speeches and otherwise is, if

5

you have a horizontal merger between two major

6

competitors, you'd better have some efficiencies to talk

7

about.

8

skeptical as to whether or not your real motive is to

9

gain market power and increase price.

Because if you don't, we're going to be very

10

MR. SIMONS:

Can I say something on the burden?

11

MR. ABBOTT:

Sure.

12

MR. SIMONS:

When you raised the question about

13

the burden, who should have the burden of doing what, the

14

following example occurs to me.

15

a really nifty article.

16

old now, in which he shows, he says, okay, if you think

17

what's going on here is unilateral behavior a la

18

Bertrand, here's the cost savings, the marginal cost

19

savings that have to be realized in order to offset the

20

price effect.

21

It's by margin, and it varies by diversion ratio.

22

Greg Werden actually has

It's like seven or eight years

And he does it by -- you've got a table.

And suppose you had a situation in which, okay,

23

the staff thought that was the type of model that was

24

applicable, and the parties came in and showed, yes,

25

here's the marginal cost reduction that's going to take
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place, and there's no effect, all right?

2

presented that to a court.

3

there.

4

me the court would have to conclude there was no effect.

5

And you

And that's all that was

What would the court do?

Well, it would seem to

And so the burden would seem to be on the

6

government to come back and say, yes, but this effect

7

could be achieved a different way, and here's the way in

8

which it would be achieved and here's the time period

9

over which it would be achieved.

10

So in terms of what would happen in court, I'm

11

just visualizing that kind of circumstance, it seems the

12

burden really has to be on the government.

13

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Let me mention the burden, and

14

I've written on this.

15

100-page single-spaced memoranda analyzing things.

16

that's not to say the government should take things, you

17

know, whatever is proffered.

18

think there is, some amount of sophistication,

19

particularly by the financial analysts, about what you

20

should expect to see in a deal.

21

People in business don't write
Now,

But there has to be, and I

We tend to think that there's things there and

22

you push buttons and things happen, and that's the way

23

business works.

24

consolidation merger say we're going to get $50 million

25

in cost savings.

That's not true.

So you might in a

Where does that come from?
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1

it comes from some sort of analysis or explanation, but

2

what it is, is a goal that some manager has to meet.

3

least that's what it better be, or we shouldn't pay

4

attention to it.

5

At

And as Ilene said from Sarbanes-Oxley, if you

6

say it to the Street, you are going to be accountable.

7

So one of the management tools is saying we understand

8

this much about the other company.

9

Go achieve it.

This is your target.

They're not going to get down into

10

micromanagement of how you do it.

11

consolidations are a savings or not, you shouldn't expect

12

to see a lot of detailed analysis of them.

13

get to the more sophisticated stuff, which I agree might

14

be much more important, I think you have to be able --

15

you know, it's reasonable for the agencies to require

16

more.

17

So whether cost

Now, when you

And that may be difficult to prove.
But I do think that a very important source of

18

evidence is to ask, you know, show me where you've done

19

this before.

20

Have you done some other deal before?

21

you did in a similar circumstance.

22

important evidence.

23

including most decision makers.

24

situation should be analogous.

25

that, we had some of that at the FTC, if we did more of

Have you done something like this before?
Or show me what

I think that's very

I think it's credible to anyone
It hopefully the
And if we did more of
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that, I think the agencies would understand the way

2

businesspeople make decisions and how they make things

3

happen and why they may work and why they don't.

4
5

MR. ABBOTT:

Well, thank you, Dave.

Anyone

have any additional insights to add on that topic?

6

(No response.)

7

Well, if not, we're close on the noon hour, and

8

believe it or not -- yes?

9

MR. KOLASKY:

Just one quick thing.

I want to

10

come back to the title of this panel and really emphasize

11

this point about integrating efficiencies into the

12

analysis.

13

response to some of the criticism of Heinz/Beech-Nut, and

14

it's a very important point.

15

And that is, you know, Bob said that Beech-Nut and Heinz

16

were competing like crazy.

17

competing like crazy in order to get on the shelves of

18

supermarkets.

19

doing is bidding up their distribution cost.

20

actually, that competition wasn't benefitting consumers.

21

That was competition that was raising their costs

22

relative to the incumbent dominant firm, Gerber.

23

And this goes back to one of Bob's comments in

And that's true.

They were

And as a result of that, what they were
So

And what that points up is the importance that

24

as you think about these issues, you think about

25

efficiencies, you also think very clearly about what you
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mean by competition.

2
3

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Let me just say, I have to

attack Bob.

4

(Laughter.)

5

He said something that just drives

6

businesspeople and a management professor crazy.

7

If there's one thing that's clear about the evidence and

8

research, it is by far the most important reason for a

9

company's success is organizational excellence, not

10

leadership, not CEO, which can be pretty important.

11

you got Jack Welch as the head of K-Mart seven years ago,

12

it would be better off.

13

business.

14

it, it would be very different.

15

If

It might still be out of

I guarantee you, if Wal-Mart would have bought

It's not just about changing the leader.

It's

16

about changing the culture and the middle management, the

17

whole system.

18

can show they did it before in similar circumstances and

19

it worked, that should be very compelling evidence.

20

it's quite undeniable as a matter of research in

21

management that that's probably the realest sort of

22

efficiency and the realest basis for competitive

23

excellence is organizational excellence, and the hardest

24

thing by far to create.

25

MR. PITOFSKY:

You can't take that on spec.

But if you

I respectfully dissent.
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1

(Laughter.)

2

MR. ABBOTT:

On that happy note, we've got

3

alternative views of efficiency, competition, and enough

4

to keep us here for an additional week.

5

close down.

6

a great discussion and provocative and excellent papers,

7

which will be posted on the FTC's web site very shortly.

8

Yes, shortly.

9

- we're not predicting the exact date.

10

I want to thank all of our panelists for our

Time horizon is important.

We must keep -

And this afternoon, of course, we have a great

11

treat.

12

be moderating a final roundtable.

We have Assistant Attorney General Hew Pate will

13
14

But we have to

So thank you again for attending, and have a
good day.

15

(Applause.)

16

(Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., a luncheon recess

17

was taken.)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2

AFTERNOON SESSION
MR. PATE:

Good afternoon.

I'd like to welcome

3

everyone to the Attorney and Economists Roundtable

4

session of the Joint FTC/DOJ Merger Workshop that's been

5

occurring over the last three days.

6

Tim Muris and I, in talking about the

7

arrangements for this panel, thought that it might be a

8

good idea for he and I jointly to moderate this last

9

session, and we were set to do that until his travel

10

schedule took him out of Washington, so you've been

11

pretty bitterly shortchanged on the moderator, but you've

12

been left with an excellent panel.

13

I'm going to introduce them briefly and then

14

we'll move into questions and discussions -- what I hope

15

will be a very lively exchange on the topic of merger

16

enforcement.

17

three o'clock and then maybe take a brief break and

18

resume say around 3:15.

19

I expect that we'll go until right about

I want to welcome and thank all the people

20

here, both people from the agencies and outside parties

21

who are interested in this topic and also welcome our FTC

22

colleagues who are listening on the web, and those who

23

joined us on the dial-in number for today's session.

24

I think for anyone who cares enough about any

25

of this to turn up on as beautiful an afternoon as this
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1

knows who all the people are on the panel.

Nonetheless,

2

I'll go through and give a brief introduction in

3

alphabetical order.

4

responsibility for the seating order.

5

this much expertise and ego, it would be very dangerous

6

to take credit for doing that.

I'll also disclaim any
On a panel with

7

(Laughter.)

8

And so I have no idea how it's been done, but

9

I'm sure it was after extensive and thoughtful study.

10

Alphabetically, Bill Baer is the head of the antitrust

11

practice in Arnold & Porter and served as director of the

12

FTC Bureau of Competition from 1995 to 2000 and held

13

other positions prior to that at the Trade Commission.

14

He is a frequent advocate before the agencies

15

and in court.

16

least as quote/unquote "the best" antitrust lawyer in the

17

United States and has appeared on two American Lawyer

18

covers.

19

He has been rated by one publication at

Going next alphabetically, Jonathan Baker is a

20

professor of law at American University.

He was director

21

of the FTC Bureau of Economics from 1995 to '98, was a

22

senior economist at the President's Council of Economic

23

Advisers from 1993 to '95.

24

articles on topics pertinent to today's program,

25

particularly entry and empirical analysis in the

He's the author of numerous
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1

evaluation of mergers.

2

Dennis Carlton is also with us, who is a

3

professor at the University of Chicago, professor of

4

economics, previously taught at MIT and is well known to

5

many of us through his work at Lexicon in analyzing a

6

number of very significant transactions that have

7

appeared before the enforcement agencies.

8
9
10

He is the author of numerous academic papers,
two books, and has won a lengthy list of academic prizes,
and we're very fortunate to have him here today.

11

Dale Collins is an antitrust partner at Sherman

12

& Sterling.

He's also someone to whom I am indebted for

13

having sent two of the best young lawyers I've had the

14

opportunity to work for to the antitrust division as

15

counsel, Dave Wales and Jim O'Connell.

16

to send you the folks who are really not quite the best

17

ones in their practice, and Dale actually had the

18

goodness of heart to send us some terrific people, and

19

I'm going to be grateful for that for a long time.

Most people try

20

He was a White House Fellow, was a Deputy in

21

the Division under Bill Baxter, has taught at Yale and

22

has appeared in a very large number of major transactions

23

at the agencies as well.

24
25

Next to dale is Jim Loftis, of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher.

His 25-year career has included a stint as
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1

head of the ABA Antitrust Section.

He has truly been

2

involved in all aspects of antitrust litigation and

3

counseling from mergers to criminal antitrust

4

enforcement.

5

over 20 publications, and is also a professional race car

6

driver, which is certainly the most interesting thing I

7

can say about anybody on the panel.

He's a frequent lecturer, a contributor to

8

(Laughter.)

9

Jim Rill, of course, is a predecessor of mine.

10

He served as Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust

11

Division and also has previously served as chair of the

12

ABA Antitrust Section.

13

Simon's leading antitrust practice.

14

served on numerous committees dedicated to advancing the

15

thoughtful enforcement of antitrust, including serving as

16

co-chair of the so-called ICPAC Commission, which has had

17

great effect in terms of the international spread of

18

antitrust enforcement and increasing the rigor and the

19

soundness hopefully of that enterprise.

20

in numerous cases both here and abroad before antitrust

21

enforcement agencies.

He now is co-chair of Howrey &
He has

He has appeared

22

Dan Rubinfeld is a Robert L. Bridges professor

23

of law and economics at Balt Hall, where he's been since

24

1983.

25

has served as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the

He taught at Michigan prior to that.
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2

Antitrust Division in charge of our EAG shop.
He has served in numerous capacities as well,

3

including with the Council of Economic Advisers, the

4

National Academy of Sciences, the National Bureau of

5

Economic Research, is the author of a number of books and

6

numerous articles on a wide range, not just of antitrust,

7

subjects, but also other public policy issues.

8
9

And last but certainly not least for today's
topic, Bobby Willig is a professor of economics and

10

public affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton.

11

He is the former supervisor of economic research at Bell

12

Laboratories, has authored a number of significant works,

13

including welfare analysis of policies affecting prices

14

and products, contestable markets and the theory of

15

industrial structure, and he is the co-editor of the

16

Handbook of Industrial Organization.

17

Bobby likewise served as the economics Deputy

18

at the Division from 1989 to '91, and he too is the

19

author of numerous articles and has been a participant on

20

numerous policy task forces.

21

So suffice it to say, you've got a terrifically

22

qualified panel.

The format that I think we'll follow is

23

for me to pose a number of questions and try to excite

24

some comment from the panelists and maybe even provoke

25

some exchange among the panelists.
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And what I want to do first is throw out a very

2

general question which I would put this way.

3

interested in knowing what single change the panelists

4

would most like to see in terms of merger enforcement in

5

the next decade, and that could include either suggesting

6

that the agencies should do something differently than

7

we're doing now, that we could be more transparent about

8

the fact that we're doing something that we're already

9

doing, or literally anything that you think would be

10

I'm

responsive to that question.

11

And with that, I hope maybe I could get a brief

12

reaction to that question from each of the panelists, and

13

then we'll move on to some other questions after that.

14

Does anyone want to take a first stab at it, or should we

15

go back to the alphabet?

16

VOICE:

Reverse order.

17

MR. PATE:

18

(Laughter.)

19

MR. PATE:

20

MR. WILLIG:

Reverse order.

Bobby, do you want the first word?
Absolutely.

I thank you for that.

21

Because I can't tell you how often it is that chairpeople

22

of important panels cite alphabetical order as the

23

natural way to order participants without underscoring

24

the assumption that alphabetical order starts at the

25

beginning of the alphabet.

That is completely arbitrary
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1

and unfair.

But never mind.

2

(Laughter.)

3

I think the biggest change, and this is a setup

4

for the question about the next set of changes over the

5

next decade, but the biggest change in the analytic

6

framework used for merger enforcement has been the advent

7

of simulation analysis.

8
9

And as you all know, that's the systematic use
of analytic methods to actually try to quantify the

10

impact of a proposed merger where the simulation machine

11

is based on economic logic and also on some calibration

12

of the parameters either derived econometrically or

13

through other sources of information.

14

That's been the biggest change, and the change

15

that I'd like to see most going forward is first a

16

continuation of that trend, but more major progress on

17

our capabilities of using those tools well and reliably

18

for public policy purposes.

19

An important part of that for the agency is to

20

try to be within the bounds of confidentiality, try to be

21

more interactive with the parties in terms of sharing the

22

analytics, because they are in such an evolutionary phase

23

of their development.

24
25

They're so uncertain.

There is so much analytic R&D that it's of
exceptionally great importance that the parties share
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their work with the staff and the agency and vice versa,

2

that the agency share with outsiders exactly what their

3

own work is producing, how it's evolving, so that there

4

can be a meeting of the minds in terms of the most

5

reliable set of methods to use.

6

The other thing I want to throw out, and I

7

won't say much about it to take the time now, but I would

8

love to see in the coming years more organized capability

9

in the community for handling R&D or innovation issues

10

and some appendage to the Guidelines that I think I hear

11

you're going to show us about 3:30 today, you promised.

12

(Laughter.)

13

The new R&D innovation markets Guidelines.

14

should we really handle those concerns?

15

also blend in the possibility of efficiencies in

16

innovation markets, more efficient R&D perhaps as a

17

result of the deal, and how can that all be blended

18

together in the sense of Guidelines for handling those

19

issues?

20

MR. PATE:

Okay.

21

MR. RUBINFELD:

Thanks.

How

How should we

Dan?

I agree with most of what Bobby

22

said, so I can't start a fight just yet, so I'd like to

23

start on a different subject.

24
25

One of the things I know the agencies debate a
lot internally in merger cases is whether they should use
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a consumer interest standard or a broader social welfare

2

standard.

3

me that most of the time ultimately, partly because of

4

the law and partly because of internal policy decisions,

5

the consumer standard wins out.

6

And while there's a lot of debate, it strikes

And I would like to see more thinking about

7

taking a broader social welfare perspective in looking at

8

mergers.

9

only the easiest case, would be in cases that involve

The easiest case to make for that, but it's

10

possible increases in monopsony power, where arguably the

11

effect of the merger could be to lead to lower prices or

12

inputs to production.

13

particular case it's easy to argue that we ought to

14

balance the benefits of those lower costs to producers

15

with possible higher costs down the road.

16

in thinking through how to do that tradeoff and make it

17

practical I think would be a nice change.

And it seems to me in that

18

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Thanks.

19

MR. RILL:

Thank you.

And more work

Jim Rill?

I think perhaps the most

20

significant evolutionary change since the '92 Guidelines,

21

one that was well underway since the 1968 Guidelines, and

22

punctuated dramatically in the 1982 Guidelines, is the

23

trend away from reliance on structural formulations for

24

merger decisions.

25

And I think that with the '92 Guidelines and
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the developments since the '92 Guidelines and the

2

increasing willingness of the courts to go beyond

3

structural analysis, we're getting into a full blown and

4

healthy analysis -- quasi rule of reason analysis -- of

5

horizontal merger decision making.

6

Having said that, I don't think it's time to

7

change the Guidelines' numbers, because I don't think the

8

numbers mean a hell of a lot anyway, other than perhaps a

9

trigger towards further analysis.

But I do think perhaps

10

it's time to consider whether or not the presumption

11

itself is a realistic presumption and whether structural

12

analysis should only be a gateway to further analysis

13

without the incubus of a presumption it still has an

14

opportunity to cause mischief in some cases, not so much

15

looking at the outcome, for example, but the rationale of

16

cases such as Swedish Match, in which I hasten to add I

17

wasn't involved.

18

I do want to address for a second Bobby's

19

comment on the trend toward simulation analysis, which is

20

certainly there and a recognizable trend.

21

that an early and overly romantic grasp through

22

simulation analysis in the absence of strong empirical

23

evidence that supports the analysis, or which in fact I

24

would prefer to see the analysis support, could lead to

25

false conclusions based on a false recognition of
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1

quantitative accuracy, which I don't think necessarily

2

would be borne out if we have the full, rich empirical

3

basis that would support that kind of an analysis.

4

Finally, just a quick pitch for the ICPAC.

It

5

seems to me that one of the salutary developments that's

6

taking place as a result, I think, of the U.S. Guidelines

7

and outreach effort has been greater convergence of

8

antitrust merger analysis recently, for example,

9

evidenced by the EC's merger regulation and guideline

10

revisions, which I won't say it is attributable in

11

measure to the U.S. effort, but certainly reflects a

12

convergence of the analysis between the jurisdictions.

13

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Well, there's a lot in there,

14

and it's all very polite, but maybe the makings of at

15

least some pointed discussion later.

16

don't we move to Jim Loftis.

17

MR. LOFTIS:

Let's see.

Why

Well, let me touch on what others

18

have identified as subjects of interest.

19

I think that to the legal community, simulations are not

20

well understood and tend to be viewed as unreliable.

21

I would very much agree with Bobby's observation that

22

that is an area that needs additional work, additional

23

exploration, and considerably more than just refinement

24

before it's going to be well accepted, at least in the

25

legal community.
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

On simulations,

So

129
1

I would very much agree with the observation

2

that R&D markets are not well understood.

They're not

3

well handled under the existing Guidelines in times where

4

there's not a plethora of transactions going on.

5

seeing transactions in high tech markets and we're seeing

6

lots of transactions in the defense industry where

7

concentration is high and R&D on new products is

8

critical.

We are

9

So there's a lot of action in that area, and

10

the guidance that's being given is largely transaction

11

specific and therefore invisible to the community.

12

Monopsony is an intriguing problem that doesn't

13

get much attention because there aren't many cases.

14

People just don't have the occasion to give it very much

15

thought.

16

of resources to worrying about it, but I certainly would

17

agree that it is an area that's poorly understood.

18

And so I'm not sure that I would devote a lot

And on Jim's comment about the trend away from

19

structural analysis, I would certainly agree that that is

20

a trend, but I would question whether it has had as

21

widespread an impact as I think we all would hope.

22

certainly would identify as one of the, at least my top

23

10 favorite faux pas, the agency, which will go unnamed,

24

briefed to the court that an HHI of 510 should

25

presumptively entitle it to relief.
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And with that, I'll pass.

2

MR. PATE:

3

MR. COLLINS:

Okay.

Dale?

Well, I think as far as the

4

biggest change is concerned, and you have to recall or

5

remember, I'm from the outside sort of looking in.

6

haven't been on the inside in a long time.

7

if we go back to around 1992, the years before that, and

8

you look what's happened since then, I think around 1992,

9

the Guidelines actually did provide a fairly accurate

I

But I think

10

description of the analytical paradigm that the agencies

11

went through when they were analyzing cases.

12

I think today it provides no description of

13

what the agencies actually do in coming to the

14

prosecutorial decision.

15

them to explain what they've done.

16

outside and you're looking in, one of the things you'd

17

like to have is you'd like to have a good predictor,

18

okay, to be able to test whether or not a particular deal

19

that you're thinking about, that your clients are

20

thinking about doing, how it's going to be analyzed at

21

the agencies.

22

anybody wants to.

It does provide a vehicle for
But if you're on the

And I'm happy to discuss this at length if

23

I don't think that the Guidelines are a good

24

predictor at all, and I don't think descriptively they

25

actually convey what is going on in the agency.
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2

that's what I think the biggest change has been.
Now as far as what I would like to see, first

3

of all, I'm not going to say what I'd like to see is a

4

rewrite of Guidelines.

5

open mind on that, because as I say, I think the

6

Guidelines provide a very good analytical tool for

7

explaining decisions that have already been made.

8

does force some discipline into the explanations.

9

I still have an open, quite an

And it

So the question of whether or not you have to

10

have Guidelines that both describe the decision making

11

process as well as, if you will, the rationalization of

12

the decision, I'm not sure the two have to be the same.

13

The thing I would love to see, which I beat up

14

on Joel Klein to do, Joel, you'll remember, when he first

15

came in said there's this big divergence between what the

16

courts have to say about merger law, about antitrust law

17

generally, but about merger law in particular, and what

18

the agencies are actually doing.

19

like to do is bring more cases in mergers so we could get

20

more convergence.

21

contingent consent degrees.

22

And he says what I'd

I said I've got the tool for you.

Do

That's what I'd like to see.

A contingent consent decree is a consent decree

23

where the parties agree on relief but the relief is

24

entered only on the condition that the court finds

25

there's liability.

And I can tell you from some personal
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1

experience that if the agencies were willing to do

2

contingent consent decrees, they would find themselves in

3

court more often than they do today.

4

(Laughter.)

5

MR. PATE:

6

MR. CARLTON:

Dennis?
Well, I agree with a lot of

7

what's been said, but I also disagree a bit with some of

8

it.

9

with Dan that there should be more thinking about what

So let me just briefly summarize.

I think I agree

10

the goal is, whether it's a total efficiency standard or

11

a consumer welfare standard.

12

In the United States, I don't know if it would

13

make that big a difference, but certainly in other

14

countries it will.

15

as a prototype for antitrust laws around the world.

16

it's a big question, especially in small countries that

17

rely on international trade.

18

And the United States is being used

And it goes even beyond antitrust.

And

The

19

question is whether an antitrust authority should be the

20

protector of property rights for consumers.

21

have a property right in competition?

22

good question.

23

and perhaps corruption.

24

would be helpful.

25

Do consumers

I think that's a

It goes to the efficiency of government
And thinking on that question

More specifically related to the United States,
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1

there has been a body of work that I really think needs

2

more attention in the application of antitrust, and it's

3

work by -- and the reason I know is I just revised my

4

textbook again, and when you revise your textbook, you

5

always try and put in what you think are the most

6

important developments.

7

Sutton is very important.

8

points that I think are related to some previous

9

comments.

And I think the work of John
And let me just illustrate two

10

Sutton shows that there are some industries in

11

which competition is naturally vigorous, all else equal.

12

They're just naturally more competitive for whatever

13

reason.

14

competitive game.

In game theory terms, they're playing a more

15

In those industries, there is an inverse

16

relationship between, or can be, between concentration

17

and price.

18

price and concentration.

19

industry, the lower the price.

20

It completely reverses our usual notions of
The more concentrated the

Second, he emphasizes that in some industries

21

there is another dimension to the product -- R&D,

22

advertising, quality -- and you get exactly the wrong

23

intuition if you ignore that other dimension.

24

is related to the earlier comments about better

25

understanding dynamic efficiency, better understanding
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1
2

the incentives for technological change.
It's a hard question.

Economists don't know as

3

much as we should about that question, but I'm always

4

worried when you're analyzing a dynamically changing

5

industry with static tools that you're going to get the

6

wrong answer.

7

findings in Sutton's research is that as markets get

8

bigger, you don't see more firms.

9

same number of firms, but they invest more and more, so

10

And indeed, one of the interesting

You may see just the

they get higher quality products.

11

That's something I've not seen really absorbed

12

yet by the agencies. I think that innovation markets are

13

a very bad way to go in terms of analyzing mergers. I was

14

involved in one of the early cases with innovation

15

markets, and it's easy to show that they're

16

unpredictable.

17

five years ago, who did I think would make major

18

innovations, you're invariably wrong when you ever test

19

your intuition, or how well you were doing.

20

If you ever do a retrospective asking

As far as merger simulation, this has been an

21

innovation in practical enforcement.

22

be very careful here.

23

there are big red flags.

24

do a merger simulation, there are two things that are

25

done that are dangerous.

I like it.

I think we have to

On the other hand,

Let me explain why.

You start out with an
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1

econometric estimation.

2

that.

3

There are possible problems with

If you get the form right and work hard enough,

4

that's very informative.

5

estimate costs.

6

invert the equilibrium condition based on some assumption

7

of how competitive the industry is.

8

assumption come from?

9

you're estimating cost from demand information and a

How do you estimate costs?

You kind of

Where does that

Usually out of thin air.

10

guess about competition.

11

errors.

12

And then what you do is, you

So

That could lead to great

But then the next thing you do is you simulate.

13

You simulate what happens when two firms merge.

14

going to happen?

15

competition that's current and that will occur after the

16

merger.

17

is exactly what we mean by coordinated effects.

18

these merger simulations always take that as constant,

19

okay.

20

What's

You must make an assumption about

But competition that will occur after the merger

So I think it's very dangerous.

And

I think it's a

21

helpful way of interpreting demand econometric

22

estimation.

23

what's going to happen.

24

that that it's not useful.

25

academia for the use of what's called structural -- and

It can be a dangerous way of predicting
And I don't mean to state by
But there is a trend in
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1

it's not the same way Jim has used the term --

2

estimation, in which you estimate demand parameters and

3

supply parameters in great detail and then simulate.

4

I want to point out, the question an antitrust

5

authority wants to ask is, what happens to price if two

6

firms merge?

7

question.

8

simulation.

9

see price in one area with fewer firms versus price in

That is what economists call a reduced-form

You can indirectly answer that by a merger
But if you ever have an experiment where you

10

another area with more firms, as long as you can control

11

for the reasons why you have more firms in one area than

12

another, that is the direct question an antitrust

13

authority wants to answer.

14

there's a trend away from such analysis.

15

MR. PATE:

16

MR. BAKER:

Okay.

And I have been worried that

Jonathan?

Well, there's been so much going on

17

here in this conversation that I don't know where to

18

start, and I certainly am not going to try and comment on

19

every little piece that we've talked about.

20

So I'll start out by observing that I think the

21

most interesting change, or greatest change in merger

22

enforcement since '92 Guidelines has been the revival of

23

coordinated effects analysis, which was very healthy, but

24

that the problem with it is that some people seem to take

25

the view this is an excuse for not paying attention to
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1

unilateral effects.

2

And my concern for the future is to revive

3

unilateral effects, particularly the loss of localized

4

competition analysis among sellers of differentiated

5

products.

6

know, accepts that the theory makes sense and that it was

7

an appropriate addition to the merger Guidelines in 1992,

8

and a host of legitimate technical issues have been

9

raised about the application of some of the tools,

Every serious antitrust enforcer, as far as I

10

particularly during the current administration, including

11

discussions of simulation models which I'll get to in a

12

moment.

13

But Greg Werden and Luke Froeb and others have

14

responded appropriately by working to improve the tools

15

and develop ways of testing their robustness to potential

16

problems.

17

is not a reason for skepticism about the theory.

18

And a healthy debate about methods of analysis

So if you ask where in the Guidelines would I

19

want to tinker, perhaps it's that 35 percent market share

20

safe harbor for unilateral effects when it applies -- to

21

the extent it applies -- to the loss of localized

22

competition.

23

There's a dispute as to whether the words

24

actually do apply there, although it certainly was the

25

intention of Jim Rill, as I understand it, to do so.
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1

the problem is that unilateral effects having nothing to

2

do really with market share.

3

percent safe harbor, you risk failing to challenge

4

potentially anticompetitive mergers, but you also put

5

pressure on the agencies to be defining narrow markets in

6

unilateral cases because of how they have to prove the

7

case with the 35 percent safe harbor, which could be

8

troublesome as quantitative effects becomes revitalized,

9

and you're looking at how the agencies define markets for

10
11

So when you have this 35

unilateral effects purposes.
But I agree with those on the panel who have

12

said that simulation models are a good avenue to pursue

13

in trying to do better at understanding mergers.

14

Particularly, I think they've been useful in unilateral

15

effects areas.

16

most successfully to date.

17

That's really where they've been applied

Because at a minimum, and I'm just saying

18

something a different way than Dennis said -- simulation

19

models can provide a useful metric for understanding what

20

the demand elasticities mean.

21

Now if you want to go farther and start

22

thinking about how seriously do we take the predicted

23

prices, some of the cautions that Dennis and Bobby raised

24

I think are appropriate.

25

recognize that most simulation results depend on a host

To be convincing, we need to
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1

of assumptions, and we have to defend the assumptions

2

with evidentiary support.

3

could be econometric, but it could also be documents and

4

testimony.

5

It doesn't have to be -- it

And we also have to employ robustness tests and

6

understand which of these assumptions really matter to

7

the outcome, to which is it sensitive to and which are

8

the results not, and then work harder when we find that

9

there's some assumption that's really important to make

10

sure we really believe it.

11

But with those kinds of caveats, this is a

12

potentially very useful tool and has been so so far and

13

is worth pursuing going forward.

14
15
16

MR. PATE:
alphabet.

Okay.

Back to the end of the

Bill Baer.
MR. BAER:

I should say as a preliminary matter

17

that as a product of the Catholic elementary education

18

system where the nuns sat us and called upon us

19

alphabetically, I used to go to bed at night praying my

20

name started with a W.

21

(Laughter.)

22

It's nice to be able to go last for a change.

23

VOICE:

24

(Laughter.)

25

MR. BAER:

Was your prayer rewarded?

No.

Just today.
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1

I'd make is -- we're going to talk more about modeling

2

merger simulations, and in terms of looking forward as to

3

whether we should be changing our approach to analysis,

4

this is obviously going to be an incremental, gradual

5

process as the lawyers become more familiar with the

6

concepts, as the enforcers test out their systems or not.

7

It is not something that I think anybody on

8

this panel is suggesting is a breakthrough that ought to

9

radically alter the way enforcement ought to be taken

10
11

going forward.
I'll leave that and go to a couple of process

12

things that I think actually the agencies ought to be

13

focusing on in the next couple of years.

14

chronic problem of the burdensomeness of second requests.

15

I would love to see some of the wonderful energy that's

16

been put into developing the joint concentration studies

17

that were released in December in terms of merger

18

challenges and the FTC data put out two weeks ago on what

19

seemed to influence decision to take a enforcement action

20

or not, into looking at what value comes from the volume

21

of production that is associated with the typical large

22

second request.

23

One is the

I'd like to know the percentage of boxes that

24

are never opened, much less read.

And I say this as one

25

who failed to get control of the process when I was in an
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1

enforcement role at the FTC.

2

burdensome.

3

of the volume of materials coming in is in any way

4

materially improving the quality of merger analysis.

5

But it is costly.

It is

I don't think this process actually in terms

I had a little study done shortly before I left

6

the FTC of the 10 most recent big deals and where the

7

good documents came from, the important documents that

8

were cited in the memo that made an impact, and they come

9

from the same files.

They come from the strategic plans.

10

They don't come from the e-mails.

11

the seller invoices.

12

quantitative work, we need to find a way to get our hands

13

on data, but that's a separate point.

14

They don't come from

Obviously, if we're going to do

So that's one process issue that I think is

15

really important.

16

down that otherwise ought to be speeded up.

17

It does tax mergers -- slow things

The whole problem with clearance remains an

18

issue.

Hew and Charles and Tim did a great job in terms

19

of trying to come up with a system.

20

because of some concerns, arguably legitimate, about

21

whether the allocation was right, but finding a way to

22

make more productive use of that first 30-day period

23

continues to be a challenge for the agencies.

24

they could come up with a system two years ago that got

25

the average clearance time down to a day and a half, they

It fell apart
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1

ought to be able to come up with something that reduces

2

it from its currently 10, 12, 13 business days.

3

And then a final point that I'd just throw out

4

is, if you look at divergence between the agencies in

5

terms of enforcement, probably the most significant one

6

is with respect to approach to merger remedies and the

7

FTC's insistence, in which I was a major part in terms of

8

advocating, on finding buyers up front before the deal

9

closes, and the Antitrust Division's significant

10

reluctance to pursuing that approach.

11

You have right now as big a divergence in terms

12

of approach to merger remedies as I've ever seen.

13

would be, I think, helpful and productive for the

14

agencies to focus on that going forward and see if they

15

couldn't come up with a more consistent, coherent

16

approach.

17

potentially are today as merging parties by that kind of

18

divergence in approach.

19

And it

You should not be as affected as you

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Good.

A lot of themes. I'd

20

like to follow up.

21

maybe was the most frequently mentioned topic, so why

22

don't we stick with that for a while and let me invite

23

anyone who has a follow-up, having heard the other

24

comments.

25

It seemed that simulation analysis

Bobby?
MR. WILLIG:

Thank you.

Two kinds of reactions
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1

to what's been said.

It is true that to do a simulation

2

analysis requires an enormously long list of assumptions,

3

and it's true that for an economist seeking to be true

4

colleagues with our lawyerly counterparts and teammates,

5

it takes a really long time to explain all this.

6

It also takes a long time to explain it to each

7

other, but we've got the benefit of some common textbooks

8

like Dennis's to fall back on, with a lot of shorthand.

9

But if you go back to how long it took us to establish

10

that language, productively or not, there really is a

11

whole lot of communication necessary to work through the

12

meaning of the particular framework of simulation.

13

But the very, very important point, and if I

14

was in the mood to slam the table, I would on this, is

15

that every assumption, every one of that long list that

16

matters for the simulation is one that in less formal

17

analysis is being made in a less aware and even more

18

arbitrary way.

19

There's no shortcut around those assumptions.

20

There's only whether you're using a framework that brings

21

it clearly to mind what it is that we need to assume.

22

It's a horrifying thought that implicitly, even in the

23

world's greatest Guidelines, all of those assumptions are

24

in essence being made in part based on convention, in

25

part based on experience, but those very same areas that
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1

need assumptions are the very same areas that come in

2

simulation where it matters.

3

from it.

4

There's no getting away

Dennis, back to you on the question of whether

5

other forms of empirical studies should have equal or

6

even greater validity where they are informative.

7

these areas of the country where there's three stores,

8

prices are lower than other areas of the country where

9

there are only two stores, Office Depot and so forth,

In

10

that's not exactly a simulation study, and it's a very

11

clear way to organize the data.

12

But at the end of the day, someone is going to

13

pop out of the woodwork and in some halfway credible

14

sense, going to point to some efficiencies that go along

15

with the accumulation of office superstores in different

16

areas.

17

enables an integrated approach to the assessment of

18

direct price effects together with the other effects of

19

the deal, purported efficiencies, to say nothing of R&D

20

and dynamics, things that Dennis and I try to talk about

21

in our own way, the only framework that begins to permit

22

the integration of those different sides of the analysis

23

is some sort of simulation.

24
25

And the only form of analysis that we know that

So those are the two huge benefits of the
simulation approach, and that's why I'm rooting for it
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

145
1

going forward.

2

to confront the assumptions that we need to be making in

3

one form or another anyway.

4
5

It allows integration, and it forces us

MR. PATE:

Dennis, I know you wanted to

respond.

6

MR. CARLTON:

I just have two points.

First, I

7

think Bobby is exactly right.

If you read the Guidelines

8

and you apply market definition and HHI analysis, you are

9

doing a crude merger simulation.

You are assuming a

10

particular type of behavior Cournot and with constant

11

returns to scale, and we probably all know that's not a

12

very good assumption for many industries.

13

So the notion that you can define markets

14

precisely and then do a better analysis than a merger

15

simulation, I agree.

16

therefore, merger simulation should be viewed as a more

17

sophisticated way of doing the Guidelines.

18

it avoids drawing market definitions that we all know are

19

just very, very crude and actually very hard to

20

implement.

21

That's entirely wrong.

And

And in fact,

Having said that, the danger of merger

22

simulation is that it, although I agree it can allow you

23

to calculate efficiencies, it enables you to predict

24

price increases only indirectly based on a lot of

25

assumptions, and a more direct test, to take Bobby's
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example, three stores versus two, can precisely answer

2

the question you're worried about.

3

Now it doesn't answer the question about

4

efficiencies.

5

that question?

6

think it's going to be hard in any event, and if you had

7

a total efficiency standard, I think you would have

8

enforcement difficulties trying to figure out what are

9

the real efficiencies that are likely to occur.

10

So then the question is, how do you answer
And that's a hard question, I agree.

And we know from people who

have studied

11

mergers that it's pretty hard to predict.

12

back and ask those -- based on the predictions of the

13

expected efficiencies, how many are achieved, you are

14

really speculating.

15

suppose on the other hand it raises issues about

16

enforcement.

17

I

And if you go

Now, I don't mind speculation, I

But if you're using merger simulation to

18

calculate efficiencies, that is the part of the merger

19

simulation that is most in need of improvement.

20

errors you make when you estimate cost, marginal cost, by

21

inverting a demand elasticity, is premised on the

22

assumption you're making about competition.

23

that's all the information you're using and you're not

24

using any cost information, which people don't usually

25

use, you're likely to get a very misleading estimate of
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efficiencies.

2

So I'm just afraid that the most direct way of

3

answering the question, is price going to go up, is

4

something I don't want to discard.

5

can help us, and I think it's a useful tool.

6

worried I see it getting pushed out, pushing out these

7

what I would call sometimes natural experiments that

8

often allow you to precisely answer the question what

9

happens if I have one less competitor.

I agree simulation
I'm just

10

MR. PATE:

11

MR. COLLINS:

12

what Dennis just said.

13

of all, let me say that I think that simulation in the

14

way it's been described here, I mean, what Dennis is

15

talking about when he's talking about simulation,

16

including the econometric estimation of the demand cross

17

elasticities, I think this is a great tool, but it's a

18

tool sort of still being promised as opposed to being

19

delivered.

20

Dale?
I'd like to echo a little bit
I mean, as a practitioner, first

And I think if you ask yourself the question,

21

what do you do with it today?

22

have any impact at the margin in prosecutorial decision

23

making?

24

no.

25

Okay, and does it really

I think the answer to that question is largely

You can think of several things you could do
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with merger simulation today.

2

predict just qualitatively whether or not the prices are

3

likely to up.

4

not particularly interesting to ask of simulation

5

modeling generally.

6

One is you could use it to

My guess is that that's a question that's

You probably already have a pretty good idea,

7

you know, from other tools whether or not you think that

8

the prices are going to go up.

9

don't know this, that the number of times in which you

And I suspect, although I

10

sort of change your mind as a decision maker in a

11

prosecutorial setting from either they weren't going up

12

and now you've seen the simulation model and you decided

13

they are, or they were going up and now you've seen the

14

simulation model and you decide they're not going up, I

15

think those cases are almost nonexistent, okay, at least

16

today.

17

think it's true today.

18

It may not have been true a while ago, but I

So then the next question, if you don't need it

19

to predict what the direction of the prices are, also

20

recognizing to some extent if you're not packing the

21

efficiencies into the model, I believe the models almost

22

always predict that there will be a price increase, so

23

you've got to worry about that a little bit.

24
25

So, what do you use it for?

If it's not

qualitative, then it goes in the direction that Dennis
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was just talking about.

2

quantitative.

3

prediction about whether the prices are going up and by

4

how much.

5

trade it off against efficiencies.

6

Now, you're making it more

You want to make a more quantitative

And indeed, what you'd really like to do is

And I think there, too, the models right now,

7

sort of the development of the science, if you will, and

8

the informational requirements that have to be met in

9

order to do actually pretty good modeling, are just so

10

demanding.

11

results.

12

change prosecutorial decision maker's minds about what's

13

going on.

14

other bases.

15

Because you usually don't get very good
And "very good" in the sense that it doesn't

They're actually making their decision on

They're getting some comfort from the fact that

16

the simulation model is coming out the same way, but the

17

thing is, my point is, I don't believe that the decision

18

making would change if you just eliminated simulation,

19

you know, from the investigation today.

20

Now, I think it might change in the future, and

21

that's why I'm a big proponent in seeing a lot more work

22

done on this.

23

having much of an impact today.

But, as I said, I just don't think it's

24

MR. PATE:

Dan?

25

MR. RUBINFELD:

I'm not going to go over
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everything that was said before.

2

can add some new thoughts to what was said.

3

I'll just see whether I

First of all, compared to the work that's been

4

done in coordinated effects, I think the science of

5

unilateral effects is further along.

6

long way to go, as was suggested, and we certainly should

7

be careful about being too quick to dispense with it.

8

think we ought to pursue some of the kinds of problems

9

people have been talking about here today, and I think 10

It's still got a

10

years from now we'll see techniques for doing demand

11

estimation and simulation that are even more

12

sophisticated than what we're seeing now.

13

I

We'll see more and more people being aware and

14

sensitive to some of the problems we've talked about,

15

other problems, such as what to do when you're looking at

16

a wholesale merger but you're relying on retail data and

17

things of that sort.

18

But the fact is, we're doing well.

The other area I think interesting work is

19

going on, and I happen to be interested in it, responds

20

to Dennis's concern that we seem to rely heavily on

21

estimating costs from demand elasticities.

22

had the view that we ought to actually be going both

23

ways, so I've been actually working hard on thinking

24

about how to look at accounting data on cost and to use

25

that to infer elasticities and then to figure out what's
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going on when the two don't seem to gel, which is often

2

the case, as Dennis suggested.

3

ways.

So you really can go both

There's interesting work to do there.

4

The other thing is that my work has suggested

5

to me, perhaps surprisingly, that when markets are not

6

totally differentiated and they're not really unusually

7

situated products, that market share is actually a

8

reasonable predictor of the likely price effects.

9

may support what Dale is saying.

This

Maybe you need to go

10

through this exercise in certain kinds of markets because

11

the Herfendahls matter.

12

later when we talk about the value of concentration

13

numbers.

14

prediction even in unilateral effects cases.

15

I wonder if you remember that

I think they actually do give you a first-order

Furthermore, I think there's interesting work

16

to do in thinking about how merger simulation can be used

17

to think about the likely effect of divestitures, an area

18

where I think we have not done much work.

19

of potential.

20

framework to actually do hypothetical simulations as to

21

the likely effect of different divestitures, and that's

22

an area I think there's great promise in.

23
24
25

There's a lot

And it is possible with the simulation

But, the science has still got a long way to
go.
A couple of other quick points.
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to reiterate, I think, what Bobby said, or maybe it was

2

Dennis or both.

3

of this work has ever believed I don't think that this

4

stuff works on its own; that you should rely entirely on

5

a simulation.

6

have to couple it with information that comes from the

7

documents, from the record and make sure that the two

8

really make sense.

No one of us who does the technical side

It's a framework for analysis.

You really

9

And I would never want to testify myself about

10

a simulation unless I was convinced I had seen enough of

11

the record to make me believe this was something to rely

12

on.

13

and I wouldn't believe them just like everybody wouldn't

14

believe them.

15

I have seen a number of studies which don't do that,

And finally, I guess I wanted to point out that

16

we are in the process, and I think properly so of trying

17

to do a evaluation of the effectiveness of simulation

18

studies, and there were folks who have suggested, and we

19

assume the agencies are doing that now, that we ought to

20

go back and kind of look at some prior mergers and see

21

how well these techniques have worked in the past.

22

think that's excellent work.

23

creatively about how to do that.

24
25

I

We ought to think

But I do want to give a warning ahead of time,
because I see a possible problem down the road.
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you're doing forecasting generally, and I can tell you

2

about this, because I write about how to do it at least

3

more than I do it.

4

how to do things than it is to do things.

5

It's easier to explain as a professor

If you actually at -- if you look at, say, my

6

textbook on forecasting and you look at macro

7

forecasting, and you actually ask yourself, when errors

8

are made in forecasting, what's the source of the errors?

9

And the source can come from at least three different

10

components.

11

framework you're using -- is the wrong one.

12

come because of the inputs to the model, what we

13

economists call the exogenous or predictive variables,

14

turn out to be badly forecasted, or it could be just some

15

random event, act of God, whatever, 9/11, something like

16

that, that no one could possibly hope to explain.

17

It could come because the model -- the
It could

With macro models, if you really talk to the

18

people who do this and they look back, two-thirds roughly

19

of the errors that are made in forecasts come not from

20

the model itself but from these factors, the predictions

21

of what goes into the model and acts of God and so on.

22

We've been finding the same thing with merger

23

simulation.

No one expects merger simulation to be very

24

accurate in predicting all effects of a merger, because

25

too many other things are going to be going on at the
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2

same time.
So I encourage analysts when doing this

3

evaluation to be careful when the merger simulation

4

doesn't work well to tease out whether that's the

5

framework, whether it's because in fact we were assuming

6

Bertrand behavior and in fact the world turned into a

7

collusive world that we didn't predict, or is it the fact

8

that some of the inputs, some of the cost numbers turned

9

out to be wrong.

10

I think we're likely otherwise to be too

11

critical of merger simulation.

12

anything of these models beyond what a reasonable person

13

could expect.

14

MR. PATE:

Okay.

We shouldn't expect

Good.

I'd like to move to

15

what I think was the panelists' favorite question in the

16

little pre-meeting, which is this:

17

enforcement decisions -- and I'll include decisions to

18

challenge or decisions not to challenge a merger, and

19

include agency decisions and court cases, and I won't

20

limit this to present company -- which of these decisions

21

would you point out is the best or the worst of the past,

22

well, let's just say in recent years without defining it

23

any more specifically, and why do you think those were

24

particularly good or bad decisions?

25

take an opening shot at that?

What merger

Does anybody want to

Go ahead.
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MR. BAKER:

1
2

My favorite is Staples I think.

That's good.

3

(Laughter.)

4

Maybe, Greg, in your role, you have favorite

5

things that are bad.

But when I say "favorite" -- of

6

course, I worked on this, but, as Greg is essentially

7

pointing out, it reinforced unilateral effects analysis,

8

although the opinion reached the unilateral effects by

9

defining a submarket rather than directly through

10

competitive effects analysis, I understand it as

11

substantively the same thing as a unilateral effects

12

case, it emphasized the importance of empirical evidence

13

on pricing.

14

The court mainly relied really on the documents

15

about it, although there was extensive econometric

16

analysis confirming what the documents had said, that was

17

important in the agency decision making at the very

18

least.

19

entry and efficiencies.

20

the time to some extent at least, and this court came

21

through in a way that got everyone's attention to confirm

22

these various initiatives of the agencies about empirical

23

work, unilateral effects, the entry and efficiency

24

sections of the Guidelines.

25

It endorsed the Merger Guidelines approach to
So all of that was in play at

And it gave the FTC credibility at the time in
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litigating contested mergers.

2

you know, closely with, what did you call him, Hew?

3

best in America?

4

And plus I got to work,
The

What's not to like?

MR. PATE:

It sounds pretty good.

I never

5

dreamt anybody would start out with a favorite that they

6

thought was good, but that's one way to do it.

7

Jim?

8
9

MR. LOFTIS:
that.

Who else?

Well, I'll take the other side of

A favorite that I think was unhelpful would be the

10

baby foods case with the reemergence of interest in

11

concentration and what it really means.

12

have an example of the use of concentration, and

13

particularly I'll refer again to the agency brief that

14

argued that an HHI of 510 presumptively entitled it to an

15

injunction which, of course, would end most any

16

transaction.

There I think we

17

I think that that was a very --

18

MR. BAER:

19
20
21

You said this before.

Did you mean

the delta?
MR. LOFTIS:

The delta, yes.

I think that was

a decidedly unhelpful move, Bill.

22

MR. PATE:

Jim?

23

MR. RILL:

I'll go good and bad, but they'll be

24
25

different cases.
(Laughter.)
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I think some of the vertical cases that were

2

brought in the early part of the '90s were particularly

3

unhelpful, both from the standpoint of their rationale

4

and the standpoint of the relief, I think that the DOJ,

5

the Rube Goldberg kind of structures that followed

6

ATT/McCaw and BT/MCI were monstrously complex, and I

7

think just to be equal on the other side, some of the

8

firewall cases that came out of the FTC early on --

9

Merck, Medco and its predecessor, the PCS.

10

MR. COLLINS:

The only reason why I was shaking

11

my head was Merck/Medco actually came first and got

12

through without a --

13

MR. RILL:

Well, it got through without it, and

14

then they tagged on a firewall to Merck/Medco after the

15

PCS case, so Merck/Medco followed PCS in technique.

16

Good, I think I want to pick the cruise lines

17

decision for a variety of reasons -- for the

18

comprehensiveness of the analysis, for the competitive

19

effects review, for the relegation of structure in the

20

proper role.

21

I don't want to get too close into whether or

22

not airplanes or hotels were in the relevant market, but

23

they were certainly considered as part of competitive

24

effects, and I think that was an appropriate

25

consideration, and I think the transparency that the
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Commission majority exhibited in describing the basis for

2

that decision was a real step forward towards an

3

explanation of merger review.

4

MR. PATE:

Bill?

5

MR. BAER:

Dale, did you want to go --

6

MR. COLLINS:

7

MR. BAER:

No, that's fine.

The category of cases that I would

8

cite as failures, as bad outcomes, as favorite bad

9

things, is the inability of the government to win a

10

hospital merger case.

You know, I think at the end of

11

the day, some of the hospital consolidation we've seen

12

across the country has in fact had serious

13

anticompetitive effects, and the inability of the

14

government, both the Department of Justice and the FTC,

15

to convince local district court judges that in fact

16

there really are potentially bad outcomes here, has

17

basically almost created an exemption to the Section 7

18

for a major part of the health care industry, and I think

19

that's unfortunate.

20

MR. PATE:

21

MR. COLLINS:

Dale, you wanted to comment?
Yes.

I'm not -- my judgment on

22

what, if you will, a really good case was, unlike, I

23

think, what most people, you know, have said here, which

24

went to sort of what the outcome was or the analytical

25

tools that were employed in order to reach the outcome,
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I'm going to step back.

2

Hughes.

3

I think the case is Baker-

And the reason why I think it's Baker-Hughes is

4

Baker-Hughes made the analytical framework for merger

5

analysis really clear in the following sense.

6

that there was a presumption.

7

it before, but, it made clear that there was a

8

presumption -- that the plaintiff could basically on the

9

basis of market shares have a presumption that satisfied

10

It said

The Supreme Court had said

their burden of establishing a prima facie case.

11

It also put the burden then in that particular

12

case on the defendant to go forward with evidence in

13

rebuttal, and in that case, it happened to do with entry.

14

But it was only the burden of going forward.

15

Hughes makes absolutely clear that the burden of

16

persuasion on the question of whether or not there's an

17

anticompetitive effect on the deal always rests with the

18

plaintiff.

19

important things that's come out, you know, in modern

20

merger law, which I'll start with like 1974.

21

Baker-

And I think that that is one of the most

I think that a lot of the debates that we have

22

generally, I think a lot of the discussions on the panels

23

that have been up here over the last couple of days, if

24

we in effect join the issue much better on who bears the

25

burden of proof, and in particular, that the plaintiff
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always bears the burden of persuasion, it makes a lot of

2

this analysis a lot clearer.

3

It tells you, for example, if you're going to

4

have an entry defense, you know, who's got to go forward

5

with the evidence but who bears the burden of persuasion.

6

More importantly, if you're going on

7

efficiencies, I mean, it tells you a lot there too.

8

think it's a simple extension from the Baker-Hughes

9

analysis of the burdens on a quote "entry defense," which

10

is really a negative defense, not an affirmative defense,

11

into other things like efficiencies.

12

I

I think it was a great case as far as the

13

allocations of the burdens of proof are concerned, and

14

you just don't see it very much in the case law.

15

MR. PATE:

Well, you seem to have a lot of your

16

fellow panelists nodding with what you've had to say

17

about Baker-Hughes.

18

Bobby, go ahead.

19

MR. WILLIG:

Are there other cases?

All right,

A couple of my favorites from the

20

methodological point of view.

First, American Electric

21

Power buying CSW, Central and Southwest. Two big electric

22

utilities.

23

exciting.

24

something that we consumers really understand a little

25

bit, if you've been parenting.

You know, not front page stuff, not all that
Who cares?

This is not like baby food or
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But rather this was a case where the utilities

2

were quite separated geographically, but nevertheless

3

they were interconnected electrically.

4

was whether having the generation decisions were

5

coordinated between the two sets of sources of power

6

after the merger, would that yield new opportunities to

7

increase market power?

8

could just intuit that answer.

9

thought they could, but never in a persuasive way,

10
11

And the question

And there was no way anybody
Various technologists

certainly not to me and not to the agency either.
And so the agency and the parties worked

12

together over a long span of time, step by step, to lay

13

out an analytic framework using appropriate models of

14

simulation and the like, but always with a mutual

15

concurrence about the appropriateness of the tool, and

16

then marching along with new questions being raised, and

17

then working through the answers to those questions in a

18

complete bilaterally transparent way.

19

I liked it because I was working for the

20

parties and I came out for the deal.

21

ending as far as everybody was concerned, I think.

22

So it was a happy

But the process to me was a real role model for

23

other cases where the analytics of the econometrics or

24

the simulation are difficult, why can't we kind of work

25

together along the lines of that same example?
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Another case that I always just love to talk

2

about in class is Microsoft and Intuit.

3

Microsoft had Microsoft Money.

4

they sought to merge.

5

much, or so it appeared from the outside view, that, of

6

course, they weren't going to be allowed to merge with

7

anybody.

8

were enormously overlapping products.

9

Remember that?

Intuit has Quicken.

And

And the agency hated Microsoft so

That was sort of the body language.

And they

But right away Microsoft offered to divest the

10

Money code to some other major software house.

11

wasn't an overlap of code or of market share anymore.

12

What was left to the case was a very, very strong overlap

13

in what I like to call, and I think the government used

14

these words, platforms for competitive advantage in the

15

relevant market for personal financial software.

16

And so it

Intuit -- Quicken -- had a huge installed base

17

of happy users.

Microsoft had all the advantages that

18

one understands Microsoft to have in any area of software

19

dealing with the desktop, and the Department judged that

20

these were the two most important platforms for

21

competitive advantage in the relevant market.

22

should not be allowed to combine because of the market

23

power that it would create.

24

No counting of beans, how many lines of code had been

25

sold to whomever; just a direct assessment of competitive

They

No concentration measure.
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advantage.

2

And I'm not sure that was the right answer.

3

There's lots of other competing platforms for competitive

4

advantage in that space that have emerged since.

5

know if it was a good decision or not, but I love the

6

analytic framework, and I would recommend it.

7
8
9

MR. PATE:

I don't

Dale, I'm not sure you're buying all

of this.
MR. COLLINS:

That's not the only legal

10

framework, okay.

11

way the case is best explained, and certainly the way I

12

think that all the practitioners read it was, Microsoft

13

did a preemptive divestiture of Microsoft Money to a

14

company whose CEO said they weren't going to run it as a

15

product, okay.

16

killed the product that created the overlap.

17

what killed the deal.

18

At least from the outside.

I think the

So in effect what they did was they just
And that's

That coupled with, if you read the complaint,

19

there are just enormously great statements that if you

20

ever teach a class, you want to read to your students,

21

particularly if you teach MBA students, on how not to

22

write memos.

23

(Laughter.)

24

There are, as I said, they're just unbelievable

25

statements that the government could quote.
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that's the way the government inside, you know, viewed

2

Microsoft.

3

complicated theory on what was an extremely easy case on

4

the facts.

5

If it did, they created an extremely

MR. PATE:

Dennis, do you want to comment on

6

the best and worse case question?

7

MR. CARLTON:

Yes.

Let me just sort of echo

8

one thing Bobby said, and that is it actually fits into

9

an earlier question.

The transparency that's used at the

10

agencies now, I think, is really a credit to them.

11

I've been involved in several mergers in which the

12

concentration numbers looked terrible, but you present

13

them some data, you do some econometrics and give them

14

the data and then you collaborate actually in a process,

15

and if you're right, they'll recognize it, and they'll

16

understand the issue.

17

And

So, you know, there are smart guys at the

18

agencies, and when you can collaborate and get a merger

19

through, in particular I'm thinking of some mergers in

20

the movie industry, I think it works great.

21

their credit.

22

So that's to

I would say the one case that's always stuck in

23

my mind is a mistake in part because it introduced a new

24

concept was the GM/ZF case.

25

the early '90s.

That was a case brought in

There was a proposed merger between ZF,
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which is a German company, and General Motors

2

transmission business, and one of the allegations in that

3

case was that it would concentrate innovation markets.

4

believe this was one of the first times the concept of

5

innovation markets had been used.

6

I

I thought it was a bad concept then and

7

subsequently I've convinced myself it's a bad concept.

8

It's very hard to implement what you mean by the

9

resources that can be brought to bear to innovate in an

10

industry.

11

maybe in some industries like pharmaceuticals where

12

there's a pipeline and you can predict exactly what's

13

coming along over time, in most industries, it's very

14

hard to make predictions where technological innovations

15

are going to come from.

16

And as a general concept, I think, except

So as a general principle, I thought it was

17

bad.

As a specific example, I've stayed in contact with

18

General Motors.

19

business.

20

markets or I'm going to see either Steve Sunshine or Rich

21

Gilbert, who played a large role in developing the

22

concept, I call my friends at General Motors.

23

said, well, have you innovated like the Justice

24

Department was suggesting you would if there weren't a

25

transaction?

They still own this transmission

And anytime I'm going to talk about innovation

And the answer always is no.
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10 years later, about 10 years later, we haven't gotten

2

the benefits of innovation.

3

the efficiencies that I think many people recognized

4

would occur.

5

of cases that I wish hadn't been brought.

6

We've lost the benefits of

So I think that I would put high on my list

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Well, I'm going to follow up

7

on both transparency and innovation markets.

8

have a best and worst case you want to point out?

9

MR. RUBINFELD:

Dan, do you

It's not quite a best and worst

10

case.

11

sometimes a series of cases come along that create

12

frustration on one's part, whether you're inside or

13

outside.

14

about hospital mergers, and I think Bill's

15

characterization was right there.

16

But I realize in listening to the group that

And I had some of Bill's similar frustration

Another area that's similar to me is the area

17

of acquisitions involving journals.

18

time in the last 10 or 15 years, the prices of academic

19

journals have gone up on the order of 10 or 15 percent a

20

year.

21

for that has been the acquisitions that occurred, several

22

of which occurred on my watch.

23

If you look over

And my belief is that at least some explanation

The problem that we have in looking at these

24

kinds of acquisitions is, we tend in my view to

25

scrutinize it too much.

We want to go through the usual
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sort of market definition, competitive theory, and we end

2

up defining markets extremely narrowly.

3

or no journal competes with any other journal, and it's

4

very hard to conclude that any merger would be a problem.

5

Yet the fact is that there have been extremely high

6

increase in prices, and my belief personally is that it

7

has a lot to do with the fact that the major concentrated

8

ownership publishers have had really bargaining power

9

with respect to university libraries because demand for

10
11

No book competes

products are highly inelastic.
And none of that is really reflected as well as

12

I think it should be in the analysis.

13

while getting divestitures in some cases, I think have

14

not been nearly as aggressive as they should have been.

15

Sorry, Dale.

16

MR. COLLINS:

And the agencies,

What can I say?

I mean, I think

17

the best case -- I've talked about one -- but I think the

18

best cases are all the ones I got through.

19

(Laughter.)

20

MR. PATE:

Yeah, I think we're getting a little

21

of that around the panel.

Let me ask -- turn to

22

transparency and ask about that.

23

reactions about whether the agencies should be more

24

transparent about what they do and how.

25

for you, particularly in the businesses you're all in, to

I'd be curious to get
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say, yes, of course, you should be much more transparent.

2

But some of you have been in positions in these agencies

3

before, so I hope you'll give a thoughtful answer that

4

takes into account some of those interests.

5

And also, we could expand that maybe to talk

6

about the Guidelines question -- divergence of practice

7

from the Guidelines.

8

not a great use of agency resources to revise the

9

Guidelines.

Some folks have suggested that it's

It's very time consuming and that the people

10

who really do this know how it's really done, and there

11

isn't a lot of value.

12

in fact the agencies are obligated to try to make the

13

best expression they can about what really goes on.

14
15

There's a countervailing view that

And I'd be curious to get your thoughts on both
of those aspects of transparency, or others.

16

MR. RILL:

Thanks for the lead.

Jim?

Those of us

17

who have sat there who have not done nearly so well as

18

those of you who sit there now.

19

process.

20

It's a continuing

One of the things that concerned me going in

21

was the need to be more transparent, to explain more what

22

we did and what we refrained from doing.

23

I, and Judy Whalley and others attempted to work out ways

24

where we might do that.

25

the accounting merger, the non-challenge of the 8 to 6,

And Bobby and

You'll recall trying to explain
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and the non-challenge of the tire merger.

2

You run into a couple of problems in doing it

3

which I think are fairly obvious.

4

restrictions on information that can be divulged.

5

parties aren't thrilled about the notion even if they've

6

been given a pass about having their information spread

7

on the record.

8
9

One is confidentiality
The

The other is a reason with less rectitude, and
that is, I think, an institutional fear of being boxed

10

in.

We let this merger take a pass because of X.

11

next 10 parties coming into your office have an X merger.

12

(Laughter.)

13

Or at least one so labeled.

The

That's not a very

14

good reason not to be transparent.

15

Commission has made really good strides, starting with

16

some of the work that Bill Baer did, maybe before that,

17

but certainly starting with some of the work that Bill

18

Baer did in pharmaceuticals and in, I think, grass at one

19

time.

20

I think the

That's the stuff you grow on greens.
I would have to say the Division always sort of

21

had a not self-imposed, but extrinsically imposed leg up

22

because it had to do Toney Act statements in settlements

23

at least which had to pass muster sometimes with a rubber

24

stamp and sometimes not so much with a rubber stamp,

25

though.

And one never knew ex ante whether you were
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going to get a challenge or not and then had to explain

2

yourself pretty thoroughly.

3

I think in a nonmerger case, one of the most

4

thorough explanations of settlements I saw was in the

5

ATP, Airline Tariff Publishing settlement, which went

6

through a lot of explanation.

7

The work needs to go forward, I think.

8

a second question, though, and I'll comment on it

9

briefly, and that was?

10

MR. PATE:

11

it relates to the Guidelines.

12

MR. RILL:

You had

The Guidelines and transparency as

Yeah.

I think there may be a point

13

there.

14

that if I had to point to one issue the way I think that

15

it's somewhat highlighted by the recent FTC report, and

16

that may be an ex-guideline reliance on customer

17

complaints.

18

I'm not so emphatic about it as Dale is.

I think

Now, customer complaints, of course, can relate

19

to the Guidelines, but customer complaints can sometimes

20

relate to totally non-guideline concerns that customers

21

might raise -- customers, not competitors now --

22

customers might raise in challenging the merger.

23

only hopes that the agencies can take a look at those

24

statements and fit them into what's truly a competitive

25

analysis and not engage in a numbers count.
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say when you look at the FTC report, one hopes that the

2

word "serious complaints" and "substantial complaints"

3

really mean serious and substantial complaints.

4

MR. PATE:

5

MR. LOFTIS:

Jim Loftis?
We talk about transparency with

6

kind of an aura of apple pie and goodness to it, which

7

deservedly to an extent it has.

8

we are here are clients.

9

transparency as to their deals.

But largely the reason

And by and large, clients hate
They're interested in

10

transparency only as to other people's deals.

And the

11

only thing worse than transparency is the notion of a

12

look back.

13

(Laughter.)

14

So, you know, I think we've got it just about

15

right.

16

MR. PATE:

Okay.

17

MR. COLLINS:

Dale?

Two points on transparency.

And

18

both a little bit definitional.

I think there are two

19

kinds of transparency.

20

the after-the-fact transparency.

21

explaining what they did or, whether or not they're

22

actually really capturing everything they did is a

23

different point, but at least there's a coherent story

24

about why they made a prosecutorial decision that they

25

made.

The first one is, if you will,
The agency is

That's one kind.
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I think there's been great strides, again, as

2

Jim has pointed out, in that aspect.

3

record is a lot more mixed, and to me as practitioner,

4

this is pretty much what Jim was saying, too.

5

of us who represent clients, the transparency we're

6

interested in more than anything else is the transparency

7

that goes on in the course of an investigation.

8
9

I think where the

For those

And there are some people within the staff, and
this is true on both agencies, that are, if you will,

10

extremely transparent.

11

they'll say almost from the beginning, these are the

12

theories of anticompetitive harm we're testing. If you've

13

got an argument that says this theory is not a viable

14

theory, we want to hear it.

15

we may not, but we're going to keep in front of you what

16

our theories are and give you the opportunity to address

17

them.

18

They'll come up to you and

We may believe the argument,

I've got one case, for example.

I won't tell

19

you quite what the time frame is.

We've been in

20

investigation for two-and-a-half years.

21

know the theory of anticompetitive harm that the staff is

22

testing, okay.

23

didn't start to reveal what they were testing as far as

24

theories of anticompetitive harm in any explicit sense,

25

until what, five months after we complied with the second

We still don't

We've got another one where the staff
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request.

2

That was the first time we ever heard from them

3

what the theories they were testing.

4

sitting back doing everything we possibly can to cook up

5

what are the theories they could possibly be testing,

6

coming up with all sorts of theories, and tossing in

7

arguments about, you know, you can't be testing this

8

theory, because here are the five reasons why it's wrong.

9

Of course, we're

I think what really needs to be done on both

10

agencies' part is that the transparency in the course of

11

the investigation needs to be improved substantially.

12

think there's an obligation, and let me just real quick

13

on this -- it's an obligation that goes both ways.

14

it's in the following sense.

15

agency should be instructing the staff, they need to be

16

more transparent with the parties from the beginning on

17

the theories of anticompetitive harm they're testing.

18

That's one way.

19

I

And

The senior officials in the

The way that it goes back is, the senior

20

officials should tell the parties, do not come in here

21

and tell me what the staff was, in fact, telling you as

22

their sort of working hypothesis of anticompetitive harm

23

early in the investigation.

24

right.

25

being addressed at the end of the investigation.

I don't want to hear it, all

The only one I want to hear is the one that's
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1

think the parties have got to learn that lesson, that

2

they can't go to the front office and basically be

3

telling the front office, well, the staff was telling me

4

this, you know, at an early part in the investigation,

5

and now they've changed their mind and we've been

6

prejudiced.

7

MR. PATE:

Well, it seems like a bad idea for

8

me to follow up, but I'm going to do it anyway.

When

9

Charles James came in a couple of years ago, we began

10

working at the division on a merger process improvement

11

initiative.

12

The Trade Commission has been working at that,

13

so I'll give you a free shot.

14

improvements?

15

think it's been my observation at least that Charles'

16

comment that it takes two to tango has not been taken to

17

heart universally, and we certainly continue to see a

18

number of parties who don't reciprocate the staff's

19

willingness to say here's the theory.

20

provide the following information promptly to test it.

21

But with that defensive caveat, what's your experience?

22

Are we making any

And before you answer, I will say that I

MR. COLLINS:

We'd like you to

Let everybody else talk on this.

23

My experience is, I've seen no changes.

24

people who were pretty good before Charles made his

25

statements about being forthcoming on the theories of
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anticompetitive harm that they were testing -- they

2

continued to be good.

3

know, aren't good today.

4
5
6

The ones who weren't good, you

I think there are lots of institutional reasons
for that, but I think it is a serious problem.
As far as the parties are concerned, I couldn't

7

agree with you more.

I mean, I think that there are some

8

counsel who come in and say, look, what we want to do

9

from day one is join the issue.

Now, there are some of

10

us who believe that that's actually very much in our

11

advantage to do that.

12

There are other people who believe, and I've

13

had them to talk to me -- I sort of fall into the first

14

category, as you might imagine -- who come in and say --

15

and we have these huge fights in the beginning of a deal,

16

a joint defense of a deal.

17

want to talk to the agencies at all.

18

until we get to the deputies meeting is the first time

19

we're really going to make a defense of the transaction.

20
21
22
23

And they say, look:

We don't

We want to wait

I think that's crazy, personally.

But there

are people out there who believe that.
MR. PATE:

So you rely on Tony Soprano for

saying most business problems are people problems?

24

(Laughter.)

25

MR. PATE:

Other comments on transparency?
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Anybody else who's had experience recently?

2

MR. BAER:

Bill?

I think it is marginally better in

3

terms of that individual case process, and even the

4

people who tended to be very closed off are at least

5

trying, I think, to be a little more open.

6

is a widely varying experience one has in terms of the

7

quality and the detail and the timing, as Dale says.

8

But I want to go back to the first kind of

9

transparency.

But it still

The information that the agency put out in

10

December, the information that the FTC put out last week

11

or the week before, is extraordinarily helpful in terms

12

of counseling.

13

and provide clients some sense of what the odds are, that

14

if you properly define the market and your market shares

15

are X or Y, based on the FTC data.

16

documents, and if they suggest a view of the market

17

that's different than the one you need to win, that

18

that's going to hurt you, and if you really have some

19

doubts about whether the customers are going to line up

20

and support this deal, you can help people make more

21

informed front-end decisions about whether or not to go

22

forward.

23

businesses on where to go.

24
25

You can now take a look at these grids

You review the

And I think that's helpful to us in advising

To go just real quickly to your question about
merger Guidelines, it sounds like -- whether they need to
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be changed, updated -- I think those of us who endorse

2

transparency have to think long and hard about whether

3

supporting the retention of Guidelines that have

4

numerical standards in there that have no relation to

5

current enforcement postures is a good thing.

6

To have a document out there that is a stated

7

guideline as to merger enforcement that doesn't come

8

close to reflecting over the last 10 or 12 years merger

9

enforcement experience, is something that I think on

10

balance you ought not to support.

11

You could raise the safe harbor to 12 - 1400,

12

and get rid of the notion that 100 point increase above

13

1,800 is presumptively unlawful, that's just not right.

14

I mean, there are little changes you could make that

15

could make that document a little more current.

16

could also consider, and I know Jim and Bobby and Jon,

17

when they were there, ran out of time to do this, whether

18

or not we want to update guidance on vertical mergers as

19

well -- a tough analytical concept and maybe you bite

20

into more than you want to chew on that issue.

You

21

But I do think trying to get the numbers closer

22

to where enforcement posture really is, is probably a net

23

benefit and not a hard thing to do.

24

MR. PATE:

25

MR. BAKER:

Jonathan?
I have an observation on this in
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1

terms of the analytic framework question, which is the

2

Guidelines point.

3

are still useful in helping explain the theory, the

4

analytic process the agency goes through, the theories

5

that they pursue, the kind of evidence that might be

6

relevant.

7

On the whole, I think the Guidelines

It's, of course, important for good government

8

reasons for agencies to advise all of those on the

9

outside about various sorts of twists and turns and how

10

they're thinking about matters.

11

what I think it was Jim who was pointing out, customer

12

complaints or competitor complaints and how that's being

13

thought of today.

14

seems to me, by agency heads.

15

For example, some of

That's appropriate for speeches, it

Revising the Guidelines is a big deal.

16

hard.

17

really careful about how you say everything, and I don't

18

object to good government improvements, but if you

19

actually look back at the history of Guidelines

20

revisions, it's largely not been good government

21

improvements as the motive for revising.

22

revising it for another reason anyway, you'll make your

23

tweaks of various things like the HHI standards.

24
25

It's hard on the agencies.

It's

You've got to be

If you're

But the 1982 Guidelines, what those were all about
was how do we take into account what the new kind of
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Chicago school thinking about antitrust in the context of

2

merger analysis?

3

in the courts and the agencies had to understand what

4

that meant for merger analysis.

5

perfectly good motive, for revising the Guidelines.

6

It was already transforming antitrust

That was the motive,

The 1984 Guidelines responded to a big fuss

7

about some steel mergers that was a very hot political

8

issue at the time about the role of global competition

9

where there was an unusual spat between members of the

10

cabinet in the Reagan Administration.

11
12
13

VOICE:

I thought it was about the role of Mac

Baldridge.
MR. BAKER:

Well, yes.

But it was -- but

14

that's a good reason to take another look at geographic

15

market definition the way that it had been.

16

The 1992 Guidelines essentially -- and Jim's

17

not going to like this -- but essentially took into

18

account the reworking of industrial organization of

19

microeconomics around game theory and oligopoly theory

20

and took what insights we could get from that and

21

imported those into the Guidelines, along with a host of

22

other good government improvements along the way.

23

The 1997 revisions were prompted by, in

24

significant part, by the hearings that the FTC did about

25

high tech and global competition and the efficiencies
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analyses that had become important in lots of ways and

2

were growing in importance in antitrust thinking, and it

3

was time to kind of address in Guidelines.

4

If there's a comparable motive for revising

5

Guidelines now, it seems to me, and I think it's

6

something that Bobby hinted at earlier, it has to do with

7

innovation competition.

8

about innovation competition, particularly the recent

9

hearings of the two agencies.

There's been a lot of discussion

There are disputes about

10

innovation markets that Dennis has been talking about

11

today.

12

them now, but we don't have good analytic frameworks

13

worked out.

14

the analysis well enough to do that.

15

We could talk in detail about how we think about

I'm not sure whether we really understand

But that's the area where if there's a good

16

reason to revise the Guidelines comparable to what we've

17

seen in the past, that would be the motive.

18

while you're doing that, you could think about Bill's HHI

19

tweaks and the like.

20

MR. PATE:

21

MR. COLLINS:

And then

Dale, you had a response?
I think this follows on what Jon

22

was saying, and it goes to Bill's point about the HHI

23

tweaks, and that is, to the extent that what you're

24

interested in doing is counseling your clients, okay.

25

think now we've got something that's more valuable, at
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least as far as the front section of the Guidelines, and

2

that's the release of the data.

3

I think the best way to look at the Guidelines,

4

the front end of the Guidelines, is that this is purely

5

just a screen.

6

unfortunate choice of words on safe harbors and things

7

like that, but it's really just, you know, are we going

8

to now make the decision to invest some significant

9

prosecutorial resources into investigating the

10

And maybe there was, in retrospect, an

transaction?

11

My personal view is, and it's not just because

12

I've got a couple of kids that are going to college, is

13

that, you know, you'd have a relatively low screen on

14

that.

15

that, if you don't come under what is colloquially called

16

the safe harbors, right, then you guys are dead.

17

that's malpractice, okay, because a lot of the deals

18

don't pass the safe harbors, and most of them get through

19

without any trouble.

But then you don't go to the clients and tell them

20

I mean,

But it's this new data that'll really help you

21

on that.

And if I could just ask you, Hew, to think

22

about one thing with respect to the release of the data.

23

The way the data is organized in part, it tells you, you

24

know, where there was an enforcement -- the number of

25

enforcement actions within a cell in a matrix and the
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number of things which were closed.

2

closed is probably pretty confidential.

3

MR. PATE:

4

MR. COLLINS:

The stuff that's

You mean the FTC data?
The FTC data.

Excuse me.

And

5

the real question, I think, what I would like to see is,

6

which should be a matter of public record, and it's just

7

a matter of matching it up, is on the enforcement actions

8

which were public, which of the things -- when I see a

9

number in a cell that there were three cases, okay, or

10

two or whatever it was, when there was a challenge when

11

it was the HHI, the post-merger HHI was like 1,800 or

12

1,900 and there was a change between zero and 99 and

13

there's actually some positive enforcement cases there, I

14

would love to know what they were.

15

matter of public record and I'd love to see it disclosed.

16

MR. PATE:

17

MR. CARLTON:

And that should be a

Dennis, I think you were next.
Let me just briefly address the

18

two issues.

19

Guidelines are pretty broad right now to encompass sort

20

of new theories and their implementation.

21

On the first, on the Guidelines, I think the

In terms of the numerical Guidelines, I

22

actually think they serve a very good purpose from the

23

point of view of good government in letting people know

24

what constraints are placed on government so that if

25

someone comes up with some crazy theory of
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anticompetitive harm that's purely theoretical, they have

2

some protection.

3

Assistant professors, even full professors, get paid to

4

think up complicated theories that get published.

5

the ratio of our theories to empirical testing is

6

probably too high.

7

someone doing that.

8
9

I think that's very important.

But

And you want some protection against

Having said that, I've always found it very
interesting, and I did work on the previous Guidelines in

10

'92, that the empirical support for these breakpoints is

11

surprisingly weak, and you'd think that everybody would

12

be wanting to write a dissertation on where are the real

13

breakpoints and where do they jump, and are there jumps?

14

But there is virtually no literature on that.

15

I've searched to try and find published articles that

16

people frequently cite for this, and it's pretty hard to

17

find any such evidence.

18
19

I mean,

On the other hand, I do think it's a protection
against unconstrained government action.

20

On transparency, the only thing I would say is

21

this.

Obviously the lawyers have a particular

22

perspective, but as an economist going in, one thing I'd

23

ask you to think about is the following.

24

noticed increased transparency over the last several

25

years.
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

I've certainly

184
1

One of the things that often makes my client

2

sometimes nervous, but also makes the DOJ or FTC nervous

3

is when I say, well, if you have any questions, just give

4

me a call.

5

client, and I'll say it's really in our interest.

6

really in our interest for the staff to know exactly what

7

we're doing.

You know, sometimes I often check it with my
It is

And I can answer questions to an economist.

8

But then if the FTC or DOJ says that's great,

9

we're going to have an army of lawyers on the call when

10

the economist calls you, my clients, say oh, no.

11

we're going to have our army of lawyers.

12

have an army of lawyers saying that's not a good

13

question, that is a good question.

14

interested in transparency, I'm always happy to speak

15

with the economists at the FTC and DOJ, and I think most

16

of them would be happy to speak to me.

17

sense they're very nervous.

18

how you want to deal with that.

19

MR. PATE:

No, no,

And then you

So if you're really

But sometimes I

And you might think about

Well, I think those of us who are

20

responsible for cases that go to court are all in favor

21

of economist-to-economist dialogue within reason.

22

(Laughter.)

23

MR. PATE:

24

MR. LOFTIS:

25

in the decision making process.

Jim, a couple of quick points.
Just a quick point on transparency
It is curious, and I'm
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not sure what it tells us, but it's curious that there is

2

an enormous amount of transparency into the decision

3

making process on both sides where the industry and the

4

clients that are proposing a transaction are repeat users

5

of the system.

6

If you've been a proponent of defense industry

7

mergers you've been going steady with the same folks at

8

your agency, Hew, you know, for the last half a dozen

9

years, and it almost becomes like the story of the

10

comedians who would exchange jokes by saying number two.

11

(Laughter.)

12

I guess what it tells me is that transparency

13

works.

There's no reason not to have that kind of

14

visibility.

15

MR. PATE:

Dan, did you want to make a comment?

16

MR. RUBINFELD:

A couple of comments.

On

17

transparency, I recently shared a very nice experience

18

with the FTC staff on a merger where they were very

19

transparent and so was I, but I have to say -- I hope my

20

client doesn't get upset at this -- that the hardest part

21

of the battle was convincing my client to let me be

22

transparent.

23

So once I had achieved that and I could talk

24

seriously with the staff, it was actually easier going.

25

So it's a problem on both sides.

And in this particular
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case, convincing the clients to let me talk without an

2

army of lawyers watching every word I said was the

3

hardest part of the case.

4

folks that before.

5

I probably didn't tell you

But going back to the Guidelines, having been

6

involved a bit in the joint venture Guidelines and having

7

watched the 1997 efficiency improvements close hand, I

8

actually don't think it's a good investment to try to

9

actually write new Guidelines.

10

I think they are great

structure for thinking about mergers.

11

But if I were going to change the Guidelines or

12

at least change some of the ways I thought about mergers,

13

here are a couple of quick thoughts that run through my

14

mind.

15

don't see any value of the 35 percent unilateral effects

16

harbor.

17

that are closest competitors are over 35 percent, you're

18

going to generate significant anticompetitive effects in

19

almost any merger simulation anyway.

20

number creates weird incentives for parties.

21

One is -- with apologies to Bobby and Jim -- I

I think if you're over 35 percent, the two firms

And the 35 percent

Secondly, I agree generally about the point

22

about the delta, but the states are not always on top of

23

the common law as we are here in Washington.

24

an example, with prejudice because I was involved, the

25

Kraft General Foods case brought by the State of New York
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where the delta by my calculation, was 96.

The state

2

thought it was 102, and that led to a huge battle.

3

(Laughter.)

4

And it just seemed weird to me because at the

5

same time I could point to 10 mergers with deltas of 500

6

which were going through the agencies very easily, and it

7

was like a strange world.

8
9

And finally -- this is really a separate point.
If I were sort of thinking about new areas other than

10

dynamic efficiencies and innovation, I would think a new

11

area to think about, you know, not really writing

12

Guidelines, but developing themes, is the area of

13

corporate governance.

14

that involve partial equity acquisitions, other kinds of

15

complex forms of governance relations.

16

We're seeing more and more deals

The staff in the agencies are trained as

17

attorneys or economists.

18

most of the economists in this business don't know a lot

19

about the economics of corporate governance.

20

huge literature on that that's relevant, and I know the

21

agencies, at least since I was there -- both agencies

22

have been thinking hard about it, and I really think it's

23

an important area to do more work in.

24
25

Most of the internal folks and

There's a

If I were advising hiring more staff, I'd say
think about hiring some finance professors or some
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lawyers who do corporate law and get them involved in

2

this.

3

that we use to think about governance, and I think the

4

rules are almost always wrong.

5

MR. PATE:

6
7

Because right now we have some very simple rules

Bobby, last word before a short

break.
MR. WILLING:

Thank you.

On numerical portions

8

of the Guidelines, it strikes me as healthy to have a

9

boundary to the safe harbor of 1,000, but the de facto

10

boundary be 1,200.

11

leeway there.

12

excessive transparency the explicit boundary were raised

13

to 1,200, the expectation would be naturally that the de

14

factor boundary would move up to 1,400 inappropriately.

15

I mean, it's nice to have a little

And I think if in some attempt at

So I think in that respect, the numbers that

16

have been published lately really are consistent with the

17

published Guidelines.

18

On transparency, and we can come back to this

19

after the break because this may be worth talking about

20

with counsel, the boundary to transparency that I and my

21

colleagues have repeatedly run into with the economists

22

with respect to data handling, econometrics and

23

simulation, has been the litigation needs of the agency.

24

It's the big bugaboo.

25

lawyers are always using as their hammer to alleviate

It's the big bear which the
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their own fears and concerns, which may or may not be

2

warranted from my point of view.

3

understand the litigation side from counsel's

4

perspective.

I don't really

5

But all this good talk about transparency runs

6

into litigation concerns quite routinely all the time on

7

the hot case list, which is where it matters the most.

8

So I would love to hear counsel with inside experience

9

speak to that after the break perhaps.

10

MR. PATE:

Okay.

We'll pick up on that, and

11

then shortly after the break, I also want to get to the

12

question of these grids, the data that's been released

13

and what surprises, if any, are in the data or what

14

conclusions do you think can be drawn from the data.

15

We'll talk about innovation markets, transparency, maybe

16

a little bit about customer complaints.

17
18

So let's take approximately 10 minutes and
reconvene at 3:20.

19

(A brief recess was taken.)

20

MR. PATE:

I want to follow up with something

21

that Dan and Bobby commented on -- Lawyers as an

22

impediment to good, honest economist-to-economist

23

communication.

24

(Laughter.)

25

And I guess the better question might be: would
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we be better off if we just handed antitrust over to the

2

economists and got the lawyers out of the room?

3

different way of asking that, though, is how realistic is

4

any of that, given the fact that we have a court system

5

which is ultimately where the agencies are going to have

6

to go either to enforce in the first instance or have an

7

enforcement decision upheld.

8

economist/lawyer balance of power in antitrust?

9
10
11

What is the future of the

And I know, Jonathan, you're both.
start with you on that.
MR. BAKER:

And a

Maybe I can

Others too.

Thank you.

My experience is that

12

when you're talking about individual cases and you ask

13

what's really important, sort of the economists or the

14

lawyers, and particularly in driving an agency decision,

15

that's really where the lawyers are important.

16

case, the lawyers are thinking about evidentiary

17

questions, about burdens of proof.

18

details of divestitures.

19

seems to me, using the economists to help shape thinking.

20

But a lot of the case-by-case work is really driven by

21

the lawyers.

22

Case by

They're negotiating

The lawyers are really, it

But if you think about how antitrust has

23

changed decade by decade, that's really all about

24

economists.

25

approaches, new tools, new perspectives that shape how

It's economic ideas, economic thinking, new
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2

antitrust changes in the long run.
So I think that in some sense antitrust lawyers

3

are ready to hand it over to the economists, you know,

4

from the long-term point of view.

5

you every day.

6

(Laughter.)

7

MR. PATE:

8
9

economist I guess.

Maybe.

But we give it back to

Lewis Powell wasn't an

Jim, were you first?

MR. LOFTIS:

Well, to tag onto that, what in

10

turn drives the lawyers are the clients.

11

clients are interested in is getting the deal done, which

12

means either through the agency process or through the

13

court process.

14

factor, then the lawyers are going to have the

15

predominant say.

16

And what the

And as long as that's the determining

But I certainly would agree with the

17

observation that we are increasingly being ruled or at

18

least influenced by economists.

19

MR. PATE:

Dale?

20

hands up on this one.

21

(Laughter.)

22

MR. COLLINS:

All the lawyers had their

I had a couple of things.

One, I

23

think that there should be ways for the economists to

24

talk to one another that don't give rise to a lot of

25

problems later on, particularly in light of what might
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happen in litigation and things.

2

stipulations or whatever.

3

You can use

I think the reason why the lawyers, if you

4

will, want to be present, at least the reason why I want

5

to be present on those phone calls, is not so much out of

6

a litigation concern.

7

have much of a litigation concern.

8

to go to litigation, although I'd love to get these

9

contingent consent decrees up so I could get some into

10
11

Because quite frankly, I don't
None of my cases seem

litigation.
But, you know, they tend not to go into

12

litigation, and if they were to go into litigation, I'm

13

using a different economist to litigate it anyway, and

14

that's not because I don't have a great deal of respect

15

for the ones I bring into the agencies.

16

is is just the opposite.

17

have a really free and open conversation with my

18

economist about all the various theories that could be in

19

the case, walk down lots of what will eventually end up

20

to be blind alleys with him or her, and I don't want to

21

be worried about what's going to come back to haunt me

22

with that economist in litigation later.

23

What it really

What I want to be able to do is

So the economist that I bring into the

24

agencies, you will never see, or almost never see as

25

testifying experts in a litigation.

And I think that
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solves a lot of the problems.

2

phone just to hear what's going on, because that helps

3

inform me.

4

is trying to figure out what are the operative theories

5

of anticompetitive harm that the agency is testing, and

6

I'll take every opportunity I can to try to figure that

7

out.

8
9

But I do want to be on the

My constant quest as defense counsel in this

Now just one last quick thing.

On what

Jonathan said, I think something very interesting has

10

happened at the agencies.

I think the cases dichotomize.

11

I think there are some cases where the economists are

12

very interested, particularly front office economists are

13

very interested, and you see basically a lot of economic

14

content in the investigation.

15

many investigations I've had in the last five years where

16

there has been essentially no real economic content in

17

the investigation.

But I cannot tell you how

18

And what's really happened is the lawyers have

19

internalized the basic economic paradigms that have been

20

developed, and now they think they no longer need the

21

economists to assist them.

22

economists, quite frankly, who aren't necessarily

23

interested in pushing themselves onto the legal staffs to

24

get really involved, and they just sort of go along for

25

the ride, and you never see them, at least from the

And, you know, you will find
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outside, making any contribution in the case.

2

And I think there is a lot of internalization

3

that's going on, and I think in a lot of cases, the

4

economists basically are not players.

5

MR. PATE:

Other comments?

6

MR. RUBINFELD:

Dan?

Well, in answering your

7

question I always look for a natural experiment that will

8

help me to tease out the answer to the question, and the

9

natural experiment is to compare the level of analysis

10

here in the U.S. to, say, the level at the European

11

Union.

12

As you know, the European Union really has, at

13

least as I see it, has lagged behind the U.S. because

14

they have not until relatively recently really fit the

15

role of economic analysis into a central place in their

16

decision making.

17

explanation for some of the problems the EU had in the

18

cases that were overturned at the CFI over the last year

19

or two.

20

And I think for me that's part of the

So I think generally among the players,

21

including folks around here, the economists and lawyers

22

really handle the sharing of decision making analysis

23

quite well.

24

think that's part of the difference.

25

incorporate much more rapidly our knowledge about

The EU is really in a starting plane, and I
We're able to
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industrial organization and about empirical methods here

2

just because we have economists as well as lawyers making

3

key decisions.

4

In the sharing of the decision making, at least

5

during my experience, was not a problem at all.

6

worked very well.

7

MR. PATE:

Jim Rill?

8

MR. RILL:

Yes.

9

It

Certainly I don't disagree

with Jonathan's premise that a large part, most of the

10

foundation theoretical work that's been done over the

11

last couple of decades, has been generated out of

12

economic discipline.

13

I think, though, the best and most effective

14

economists that I've worked with, and it would certainly

15

include everyone at this table, are the ones that

16

recognize that it's important not merely to talk econo

17

babble to the other economists who will speak that same

18

language in the same obscure dialect, but recognize that

19

at the end of the day, it is the lawyers who will be

20

making the decision in the front office, and it is the

21

lawyers down below the front office and throughout the

22

chain that need to understand and work jointly to develop

23

a comprehensive matrix of decision making process that

24

brings the economic thinking into terms that's

25

manageable, practicable to legal thinking, not only for
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litigation processing, but also for processing all up the

2

line.

3

That doesn't mean dumb down.

That means put

4

down into practical terms and realistic terms based on

5

empirical evidence rather than perhaps dancing around non

6

empirically-based fanciful simulation theories.

7

not talking about anyone in this room, of course.

8

MR. PATE:

9

MR. CARLTON:

And I'm

Dennis?
I guess I have two comments.

The

10

short answer to your question, should economists take

11

over is obviously no, because economists believe in

12

comparative advantage.

13

able to articulate theories of anticompetitive harm and

14

analyze evidence, they're not very good at process

15

necessarily.

16

And even though economists may be

We are not trained to go through a process that

17

respects certain rights and certain expectations.

18

that's why I think the lawyers will always remain

19

involved, and since it's ultimately the court that is the

20

final threat, I think the lawyers will continue to play a

21

large role.

22

And

What that suggests, though, is a great

23

responsibility on the part of the agencies, because they

24

are typically much more sophisticated because they have

25

more economic expertise than a court.
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find that the sophistication of the arguments you can use

2

before government agencies is much greater than you can

3

expect to use in a courtroom because the level of

4

understanding is so much greater.

5

And that means the great responsibility is when

6

if you're thinking forward, even if you can win a case

7

and you know you could win because the court's not going

8

to understand the sophisticated theory, you have to, and

9

obviously you do, exercise your discretion that you're

10

not going to bring a case just because you can win it if

11

the sophisticated theory that your economists sign off on

12

exonerates the transaction.

13

So I think that's why the lawyers will always

14

be involved in the process, because it ultimately ends or

15

could end in court, but that does mean there's this

16

heightened responsibility.

17

Now on the transparency issue, I am not sure I

18

agree -- well, I don't agree with what Dale said in that

19

when I'm an expert in a case, I like to know not just the

20

good pints in the case but the bad points.

21

makes me an effective expert.

22

I can be an expert unless I'm aware of all aspects of the

23

case.

24
25

I think that

In fact, I'm not sure how

So I actually think the best training for an
expert who's going to be in a case is not to be shielded
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from things.

2

saying, well, you can't see that, you can't see this.

3

say why not?

4

I want to find out all the facts.

5

I always get nervous if some lawyer is

I want to know everything about the case.

Now therefore, I'm much less concerned about

6

saying something that will be used against me in

7

litigation.

8

litigation, I should have thought that through.

9

Because presumably, as an expert, if I'm in

So I know there's this concern on both clients'

10

part and agencies' part to let economists talk, and it

11

certainly should be only reasonable discussion, not

12

shooting the baloney.

13

know, a lot of gains from trading can streamline

14

processes by eliminating misunderstandings.

15
16
17

MR. PATE:

But I think there can be, you

Dale, a quick follow-up on Dennis's

point?
MR. COLLINS:

Yes.

Just real quick.

I don't

18

disagree with anything Dennis has to say.

19

slightly different.

20

- you put them in sort of two camps, okay.

21

testifying economist and the strategic ones, the ones

22

that are helping you think through lots of things.

23

I

My point was

And that is that I view economists There's the

My only point really is that on the testifying

24

economist, absolutely.

You want to make sure that they,

25

you know, have all the facts, that they've thought
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through things.

2

things and there's thinking through things.

3

a strategic economist who has gone down a lot of blind

4

alleys with me, and we've figured out what works and what

5

doesn't work, you can sort of narrow the path, if you

6

will, in a perfectly legitimate way for the testifying

7

economist so that they just go down a much more efficient

8

path, if you will.

9

But, you know, there's thinking through
If I've got

And it's not that you've hidden anything from

10

them, but you don't also go say, well, let me tell you

11

about the 15 theories that we worked out that we decided

12

we're not going to run in this case.

13

shouldn't be part of the case.

14

You know, there's no reason to confuse people with them.

15

Those theories

We're not running them.

So, I like the economists to have lots of

16

knowledge about the case but, if you will, be very

17

efficient in the path they go down.

18

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Let's move to the data

19

release that the agencies made before this workshop got

20

underway, and I'd like to turn to the panel and ask were

21

there any surprising conclusions that you thought you

22

were able to draw from the data?

23

data release tell you anything about enforcement that you

24

think would be useful to share on the panel?

25

ahead.

More generally, did the
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MR. BAER:

I'll start.

Briefly, I've talked

2

about it a little bit before, I thought the things that

3

were -- the fact that the challenges were associated with

4

much higher HHIs and deltas than the Guidelines said, it

5

really surprises no one who has followed this.

6

really, I think, results from the discipline of the '92

7

Guidelines and the requirement that enforcers tell a

8

story upon, that it becomes more nuanced and not just a

9

numbers game.

10

And that

I was a little surprised to find that with

11

respect to the FTC data, that hot documents were

12

important in such a small percentage of the case.

13

think that may reflect better counseling going in,

14

because I think in the mid-'90s when I was there in fact,

15

I think a pretty high percentage of the cases we brought

16

at the FTC did have hot documents.

17

I

But I think Dennis or someone mentioned this

18

earlier, the results which suggested that at certain HHI

19

levels and increases in concentration, that if customers

20

provide serious, credible complaints, that your chances

21

of being challenged are about 100 percent, was really

22

quite remarkable.

23

better feel for what the standard of credible customer

24

complaint was.

25

And it would be interesting to have a

But the fact of the matter is, I think the
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process is increasingly, once you get the numbers out of

2

the way, if you have what documents you have, that if the

3

customers are telling a credible story of harm, the

4

agencies seem anecdotally now in connection with the FTC

5

data release, very, very much inclined to weigh that and

6

to bring the challenge.

7

interesting thing, I thought.

8

MR. PATE:

9

MR. BAKER:

10
11
12

That was really the most

Jon?
I read the numbers slightly

differently than you, Bill.
MR. BAER:

It's not the first time, Jon.

It's

just been a couple of years.

13

(Laugher.)

14

MR. BAKER:

This time the Commission is going

15

to be with me.

16

those, and I was particularly interested in the other

17

markets, not the industries where the repeated play was

18

the groceries and the oil and where you wonder whether

19

the standards are different in those industries.

20

I focused on the FTC data, and looking at

And the message that I got was that the hot

21

documents and the customer complaints mattered, but only

22

in the cases that were close.

23

(Interruption to the proceedings.)

24

MR. BAKER:

25

My problem was a lot of those cases

where the hot documents matter and the customer
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complaints matter were cases that would have been brought

2

anyway based on the concentration.

3

really trying to say.

4

That's what I'm

And what was interesting was where things

5

mattered in looking at those other markets, the four- to-

6

three mergers were the ones that could have come out

7

either way based on these numbers.

8

had hot documents and customer complaints, it made a

9

giant difference.

And there, when you

It was the ones that the concentration

10

put it in an iffy area for the agency where the documents

11

and customer complaints mattered.

12

MR. WILLIG:

As usual, with numbers like these,

13

there's the question of the exogeneity or endogeneity of

14

the characterizations of the fact of the case.

15

MR. PATE:

16

(Laughter.)

17

MR. WILLIG:

18

(Laughter.)

19

MR. WILLIG:

Isn't that what I said earlier?

Was it?

If there's a case there, all of a

20

sudden there's going to be a lot of very credible

21

customer complaints.

22

staff chooses not to bring the case; customer complaints,

23

no valid ones that I've seen.

24

the horse problem with data analysis.

25

MR. PATE:

But if there's reasons that the

So it's the cart before

Fair enough.
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2

VOICE:

That's why you should look at the BE

memo.

3

MR. PATE:

The admonition from the conference

4

call operator to please talk into the mike.

5

have a follow-up?

6

MR. COLLINS:

Yeah.

Dale, do you

Actually just to Bobby's

7

point, I think there are things you want to think about

8

with the data.

9

I see in negotiation of consent decrees is that sometimes

10

the way the staff has defined the markets, I really don't

11

care how they define the markets, right, once I've

12

negotiated the relief.

13

surprised at the way some of those markets may have been

14

defined.

15

I mean, one of the things that certainly

But sometimes you get sort of

But leaving that, I don't think that's a

16

problem that's sort of endemic through this.

17

that the most interesting thing is -- and I think a

18

number of counselors have been saying this for a while --

19

but there's a pretty good predictive test when you're

20

talking to the clients right in the beginning to figure

21

out what's likely going to happen with your transaction.

22

I think

And that is, you don't ask them questions about

23

market definition or anything like that.

24

you ask them let's talk about your significant

25

competitors, and you're presumably acquiring one of them.
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If you've got five significant competitors and you're

2

going down to four, the chances that that deal is going

3

through is probably pretty high.

4

always, but by and large, you can bet a lot that that

5

deal is likely to go through.

6

I mean, you know, not

If it's four to three, it's going to be a

7

battleground of sorts.

If it's three to two it's going

8

to be even more of a battleground, but if you've got good

9

efficiency arguments and you don't have any customer

10

complaints and your documents are under control, you've

11

got a fighting shot on that.

12

than a fighting shot if you're on four to three.

13

it's three to two, you've got to have a really, really

14

good story and you really can't count on it.

15

You've certainly got more
And if

And with that, that pretty much captures the

16

whole analysis.

You know, you don't need to discuss a

17

whole lot of things more with your clients.

18

data bears that out.

19

MR. PATE:

20

MR. LOFTIS:

And this

Jim Loftis?
And all of that is done, you know,

21

virtually in the wink of an eye without a simulation

22

analysis.

23

(Laughter.)

24

MR. LOFTIS:

25

And before the second request.

I've done very much the same thing Bill Baer was talking
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about, which is to look at the documents that I used for

2

the initial analysis that Dale has just described and

3

looked at the documents that were relevant after the

4

agency investigation, and by and large, they're the same.

5

MR. PATE:

Other comments on the data?

6

MR. WILLIG:

I look at the data and I'm happy

7

about the Guidelines, and I'm happy about enforcement

8

decision making.

9

concentration is taken seriously, and when we get up to

10

the ranges that we've all experienced theoretically and

11

experientially to be really dangerous ranges, there's a

12

lot of enforcement action.

13

followed slavishly.

14

that.

15

It shows by and large that

And yet the numbers are not

There's lots of variation around

The safe harbor seems to be taken very

16

seriously with I think the right measure of caution, so

17

it's not exactly 1,000.

18

the relatively safe harbor above that.

19

healthy picture alongside of the Guidelines, I think.

20

MR. PATE:

There's kind of an extension of
It's a very

Let me ask about customer

21

complaints.

We talked about that in the context of the

22

data, and I'll make the not very shocking revelation that

23

customer complaints do matter inside the agencies; that

24

if we're seeing customer, not competitor complaints,

25

where a substantial story is being told, particularly of
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specific instances where competition between the merging

2

parties has been of value in terms of price or quality,

3

that it does make a difference.

4

MR. PATE:

But the question I wanted to ask is,

5

are there areas in which the economists, the lawyers,

6

think the agencies are not taking customer complaints

7

into account properly ways in which you've seen that

8

factor being misapplied.

9

MR. RILL:

Jim Rill?

As one who opened the question, I

10

don't think there's any serious disagreement.

11

think there can be any disagreement with the notion that

12

serious, credible customer complaints are certainly

13

revealing as to the possible likely anticompetitive or

14

competitive dynamic of the transaction.

15

don't disagree with that.

16

I don't

I certainly

I'm concerned with the possibility at least of

17

the caveats -- of the conditions, the qualifications --

18

what are serious and credible customer complaints.

19

they complaints that are genuinely revealing of a

20

potential anticompetitive consequence of the transaction

21

based on the customer's independent look at the issue, or

22

are they -- and this is not a comment on agency lawyering

23

at all -- I'm sure none of us have ever done it -- but

24

those people out there who might be opposing the merger

25

often can generate paper, statements, declarations to
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provide to the agency from customers who are concerned

2

with the transaction, whose concern maybe they don't like

3

change.

They don't like one of the acquired companies.

4

Those concerns, however, can be phrased by

5

someone, by counsel opposing the transaction, into a

6

statement that sounds like a competitive-based customer

7

complaint.

8

this is preaching to the converted, but it's incumbent on

9

the agencies, I would think incumbent on good lawyering

It's incumbent on the agencies, and I'm sure

10

in opposition as well, to sift through the surface of

11

those complaints, to focus, in the words of the report,

12

on "serious and credible" concerns with anticompetitive

13

consequences of the transaction.

14

MR. PATE:

Dan, you had a comment?

15

MR. RUBINFELD:

I actually want to just take

16

what Bobby said about what he described as the

17

endogeneity of the customer complaints and sort of expand

18

on that.

19

Bobby was describing the fact that the study

20

itself may involve reinterpretation of what's an

21

important complaint or not, and beyond that -- it goes to

22

the strategy the customers might be using when the deal

23

is either announced or about to be announced.

24

think it just means we have to be careful about

25

interpreting complaints.
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The examples I have in mind are Customer A is

2

unhappy with the deal they have with the acquiring

3

parties, so they either complain directly or make it

4

clear they're going to complain, and lo and behold, they

5

have a five-year contract to get a lower price on their

6

product.

7

not valid at all.

And it fact, it may be that their complaint is

8

Now you can take that several ways.

It could

9

be that you hear a complaint that's not valid, it could

10

be there's a real complaint out there, but you're not

11

hearing about it because the customer has been, let's

12

say, compensated ahead of the time.

13

MR. RUBINFELD:

Exactly.

And I have to confess

14

that I've seen that happen in a couple of deals I've been

15

involved in.

16

So that means that for the agencies, the issue

17

of how to process these complaints is an important one,

18

and it has to be done with great care.

19

MR. CARLTON:

I think that's likely to become

20

an increasingly serious problem now that it's known how

21

important customer complaints are.

22

MR. RUBINFELD:

23

MR. CARLTON:

Right.
In other words, at the beginning,

24

I think it's absolutely right you want to be very

25

cognizant of customer complaints and then once it's
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known, that that can have an enormous impact, customers

2

realize how much power they have.

3

So it's really going to be a touchy issue going

4

forward, I think, to sort out the real ones from the ones

5

that are just strategically designed to get a better

6

deal.

7

MR. PATE:

8

MR. COLLINS:

9

Dale?
I think that, obviously, customer

complaints are important.

But even from a defense

10

counsel's perspective, I think we should recognize that

11

they are properly important to the decision making at the

12

agencies.

13

But having said that, I'm just really going to

14

repeat some things that have already been said.

15

it imposes an enormous obligation and responsibility on

16

the agencies to properly sift through those customer

17

complaints.

18

I think

And let me suggest that there are two problems

19

that you need to watch out for, those of you who are in

20

the agency.

21

MR. BAER:

Dale, can I interrupt?

Do you think

22

there is actually a problem historically?

23

looking back the last four or five years where the

24

agencies have not properly valued complaints?

25

there a systematic problem?
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MR. COLLINS:

No, I don't think it's a

2

systematic problem.

3

but given the importance that the complaints have in the

4

decision making process, I think the obligation on the

5

agencies is extremely high to make sure that the

6

complaints are properly vetted.

7

I think it is an occasional problem,

It's particularly true since the biggest

8

frustration I have as a defense counsel is I can't get to

9

the people who are complaining and cross-examine them.

10

mean, in a lot of these cases, I am convinced to a moral

11

certainty, probably wrongly, but still convinced to a

12

moral certainty: give me five minutes with the witness

13

and I can turn 'em.

14

MR. RUBINFELD:

15

the conversation?

16

client?

17

I

Can I interrupt just to liven

How about sending affidavits to your

Have you ever had that happen?
MR. COLLINS:

Oh, yeah.

Yeah.

Oftentimes what

18

will happen is that a complaining party, a customer, has

19

gone in, gotten an affidavit with the agency, and we

20

don't know about it, number one.

21

I've got specific examples of this, we sort of found out

22

after the investigations were over, that they're coming

23

to us and saying we really love the deal, and they've

24

already got a complaint in at the agency saying they hate

25

the deal, okay.

And moreover -- and

I would love to know about those cases,
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just in order to sort of explore those issues.

2

(Laughter.)

3

MR. COLLINS:

But let me go back to the

4

obligations on the agencies.

5

problems, one we talked about and one we haven't talked

6

about.

7

the part of some customers, and it's important for the

8

agency to find out about that strategic behavior.

9

And there's two kinds of

The one we talked about is strategic behavior on

The other one, I think, is far more pernicious

10

but thankfully it is extremely rare, but it is not

11

nonexistent.

12

I find this out by representing third parties who have

13

been interviewed, particularly third parties that have

14

been interviewed when I'm not on the phone.

15

affidavit comes across from the agency, and it says

16

please sign this affidavit.

17

affidavit and the witness looks at the affidavit and said

18

this isn't what I said.

19

elegant than anything I possibly said in the

20

conversation, and it lays out a theory of anticompetitive

21

harm that I didn't articulate in the conversation.

And that is, we will occasionally find, and

And then an

And you look at the

First of all, it's far more

22

And we've had one case, my sort of favorite on

23

this, but we've had one case where we took the affidavit

24

in, spent a lot of time with the witness -- we were a

25

third party, and we had no real interest in the deal, and
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rewrote the affidavit that was sent to us or sent to the

2

client to be signed, in a form that the witness was far

3

more comfortable with.

4

agency, and like three days later got hit with a CID to

5

go down and testify for a day on why we made the changes

6

to the affidavit.

7

We sent that down signed to the

I'm not saying that that shouldn't happen, but

8

I think the section chiefs should always be watchful that

9

the attorneys in their section when they're doing

10

affidavit work and they're talking to witnesses.

11

takes a lot of training.

12

doing good government work to do that right.

13

not to do it is to sit there and basically ask a series

14

of leading questions to the witness who just wants to get

15

off the phone, and then write up an affidavit that

16

basically is just the affirmative versions of your

17

questions.

18

It

If you're really, you know,
And one way

And like I said, it doesn't happen much, but it

19

happens enough so you've got to keep a watchful eye for

20

it.

21

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Let's turn to innovation

22

markets.

We've had a couple of comments, I think Bobby

23

making one that this might be one of the most important

24

topics to address going forward.

25

panelists, do you think that the agencies ought to bring

I'd like to ask the
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enforcement actions on the basis of innovation markets?

2

Would you be in favor of that/against it?

3

Secondly, in terms of the Guidelines, do you

4

think a future product or a potential competition

5

analysis suffices to deal with innovation market

6

situations, or do we need, as I think Bobby suggests,

7

some more explicit attention to how R&D and innovation

8

are handled in merger analysis?

9

MR. LOFTIS:

Jim?

I think the fundamental problem in

10

many situations is we don't understand what causes

11

innovation, and therefore, we don't understand very well

12

how it's going to be affected by a transaction.

13

any resources can be put towards studying, not just from

14

a legal or an economic point of view, but studying what

15

the foundations of innovation are, that would be

16

extremely helpful and maybe should be the threshold step

17

towards understanding how we go about dealing with it.

18

Because what happens if you put together two

19

firms that have fabulous brainpower in microbiology, I

20

mean, how do you know that that combination is going to

21

have anything at all to do with innovation?

22

do with the outlier, the fellow in the garage, who comes

23

up with the next brilliant idea?

24

into your analysis?

25

And if

What do you

How do you factor that

I guess my point is we just don't know enough
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2

at the threshold to go very far with this.
MR. BAER:

When I came to the government in

3

'95, this was the hot topic.

4

case had been brought.

5

to have this concept at all or you could rely on

6

potential competition.

7

The first innovation market

The question whether you needed

I think the way it's played out, there isn't

8

much debate.

The point Jim makes was a theoretical

9

concern a lot of people voiced, we're basically going to

10

be trying to handicap who has a better idea and whether

11

combining two bright guys is going to somehow basically

12

corner the market on good thoughts?

13

it's been used.

14

But that hasn't how

I mean, it's basically, in the hypothetical,

15

Jim, you posed, where you had two people thinking about

16

good things, the fact that they get together doesn't

17

trouble me.

18

patented the whole field and between the two of them have

19

the patents which, if kept separate, would allow the IP,

20

would allow them to compete, that they're going to be put

21

in one pool and nobody else can get in, so you may lose

22

different lines of innovation -- that sort of stuff.

23

The troubling fact would be that they

This was Ciba Geigy/Sandos merger analysis. We

24

had this issue with gene therapy where the two entities

25

controlled most of the IP necessary to pursue gene
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therapy.

2

So, for me, the concerns haven't really borne

3

out because it's largely been applied, innovation theory,

4

in the context of pharmaceuticals where you have a pretty

5

good idea what the pipeline is like, you can make some

6

judgments about how to handicap likelihood that there

7

will be other people in it, at least more informed than

8

in other non or unregulated markets, and whether at the

9

end of the day you could have used potential competition

10

theory to get to the same result doesn't bother me one

11

way or the other.

12

I mean, at the end of the day, the concept

13

analytically has some value, I think.

And as long as it

14

isn't applied in a way that is overbroad, I don't see

15

much to debate.

But I may be in a minority.

16

MR. PATE:

Dale?

17

MR. COLLINS:

I agree with Bill.

And I think

18

that a lot of the debate on, if you will, innovation

19

markets, starts off with the wrong foot by the use of the

20

term "markets" because most of the discussion really

21

isn't about markets.

22

you can locate an anticompetitive effect along an R&D

23

dimension.

24
25

It's really about whether or not

Is the R&D going to be slowed down as a result
of this transaction?

Or if you're using it on the
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defense side, will it be increased?

Will the pace of

2

innovation be increased by the transaction?

3

discussion you can have totally apart, if you will, from

4

questions of the metes and bounds of the marketplace.

That's a

5

I think the first thing that I would suggest on

6

this whole question of innovation is that the agency sort

7

of adopt an internal rule that says we're not going to

8

talk about innovation markets if there's any other way to

9

talk about the problem.

10

And that'll solve like 90

percent of the difficulties right there.

11

(Laughter.)

12

MR. COLLINS:

And that doesn't say that you

13

don't talk about innovation, because innovation could be

14

a perfectly legitimate dimension on which to assess the

15

competitiveness of a transaction.

16

term "market", you know, to talk about it.

17

whole thing, and Dennis has already mentioned this --

18

sort of started off in some ways on the wrong foot with

19

the ZF case.

20

they did was they defined both innovation market and then

21

they applied what amounted to a Herfindahl.

22

incorporated a Herfindahl allegation in order to presume

23

an anticompetitive effect in this innovation market based

24

on, if you will, the market shares.

25

You just don't use the
I think this

If I remember the complaint in ZF, what

They

And as I said, I think that that really got
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things off on the wrong foot.

2

complaint, it was completely unnecessary to do.

3

were other allegations in the complaint that could have

4

gotten you to the same result without any trouble at all.

5

MR. PATE:

6

MR. WILLIG:

And if you read the
There

Bobby?
What they presumed in part was

7

that a base of market share in the tangible product is an

8

important impetus to doing R&D.

9

you put the two major producers of the tangible product

And so the theory was if

10

together in the merger, then you're putting together the

11

two lead players in R&D space, leaving R&D with less

12

competition and therefore less force for moving the

13

frontier.

14

The trouble with that is that in economics and

15

common sense, and I think business experience, it's true

16

there may be a relationship to market position and

17

impetus to R&D, but that means that if you put together

18

two players and they become bigger, they've now got a

19

bigger base of motivation to invest in improvements.

20

And it's the old Schumpeterian effect which has

21

been a very real effect studied by economists that the

22

bigger players with more clout in the marketplace

23

actually have more incentive to do R&D as long as they've

24

got some spur, and that spur can come from competing

25

purveyors of R&D, or a competing product manufacturers.
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It's a complex melange of forces, and we don't have

2

Guidelines to help us sort them out.

3

MR. PATE:

Dennis?

4

MR. CARLTON:

I would say that the innovation

5

market concept is a bad idea because it does suggest

6

you're going to take market shares and you're going to do

7

HHIs.

8

using HHI's are crude, these are completely without any

9

theoretical foundation.

10

To whatever extent you think the usual Guidelines

I agree with Bill that in pharmaceuticals,

11

because there's a pipeline, you can predict what's coming

12

on line, and therefore you have better predictions about

13

future products.

14

exceptional case.

15

necessarily a time line, and it's actually very difficult

16

-- this is what I was alluding to earlier -- to predict

17

where innovations will come from.

18

But I think that is actually an
In most industries, there's not

Take the transmission case, the ZF case.

There

19

were people who made transmissions for other products,

20

other than large garbage trucks, which was one of the

21

issues, or buses.

22

trucks, medium size trucks, and innovations in those

23

technologies were thought to be able to spill over, I

24

don't think the premise that innovation is necessarily

25

going to come from people in that market, that product

And they were related.
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market, necessarily holds true.

2

But just to reassert something or confirm

3

something Bobby said, I think he's exactly right.

4

not sure.

5

quite ambivalent as to exactly the effect of

6

concentration on R&D if you do cross-sections.

7

We're

The evidence in industrial organization is

Now maybe in studying a particular industry,

8

that is, if there is a particular industry in which

9

there's a merger and you can say look, it got

10

concentrated.

11

You keep doing less R&D.

12

specific observations there.

13

dangerous to have a generic rubric of innovation markets.

14

R&D is a concern.

15

They did less R&D.

It got concentrated.

Well, maybe you can make
But I think it's very

We'd like to be able to say more -- I would

16

like to be able to say more about it.

17

it's an important area for study.

18

now about it, it seems to me, that we can give general

19

Guidelines, other than studying a specific industry

20

that's under analysis, I'm not sure what else to suggest.

21

And I'm worried if you did something that would create a

22

new rubric, and people would take advantage of it, and I

23

think it would just lead to confusion.

24
25

MR. PATE:

I agree with you,

We don't know a lot

Dan, I think you were first and then
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MR. RUBINFELD:

I feel like I should say I

2

still like innovation markets, although I will agree that

3

the word "market" itself isn't very important.

4

think the really important point is really the one Dennis

5

just made.

6

But I

It is true, and I think I agree with the

7

characterization that Bobby made, that if you look at the

8

empirical evidence in a typical cross-section, you're not

9

going to see a clear relationship between concentration

10

and innovation.

11

the numbers, I think in specific industries, in

12

particular types of situations, the data will tell you

13

and the economics will tell you a fairly coherent story

14

that links reduction in competition to less innovation.

15

But if you start looking deep down into

One example I happened to think of was some of

16

the work the Division did involving some of the defense

17

mergers where there's a very, very specific theory laid

18

out of the way in which innovation occurs, and I think a

19

very compelling story about why three to two, for

20

example, will significantly affect innovation and harm

21

consumers.

22

So let's not take away from this message about

23

the lack of consistency of the cross-section the idea

24

that we can't develop for specific industries and

25

specific kinds of innovation a compelling story based on
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the evidence.

2
3
4
5
6

MR. LOFTIS:
may I?

Let me just take issue with that,

Since you hit one of my favorite topics.
MR. RUBINFELD:

You represented one of the

parties probably.
MR. LOFTIS:

No, no, no.

I think you need to

7

make a distinction as to the viability of the theory that

8

you're referring to between innovation in the sense of

9

advancement and innovation in the sense of overcoming

10

technologies.

That really makes a huge difference in

11

what you're talking about.

12

MR. PATE:

13

MR. BAKER:

Jon?
Regardless of what the facts are in

14

the ZF case, I don't actually think we're disagreeing

15

over the principle there.

16

identifiable assets that the firms have that are

17

important to new process or product development, maybe

18

it's in the pipeline already.

19

Conceivably, it's current generation products or

20

expertise and distribution or obtaining regulatory

21

clearance, but you'll want to debate that on the facts.

22

But if there are only a handful of firms with

That is, if there's certain

Maybe it's patents.

23

the existing assets that you need to go forward and

24

you're having a merger among them, the agencies are right

25

to be concerned.

The dispute about ZF that I'm hearing
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is about whether the evidence that was pointed to by the

2

agency really falls in that category or not.

3

On the broader question that Dan and Bobby have

4

been on about -- and Dennis -- about the relationship

5

between R&D and concentration, the last time I looked at

6

the literature, and maybe it's been sufficiently long ago

7

that I'm not up to date, but when I looked through most

8

recently, what I thought I took from the literature, is

9

that, yes, if you look at these cross-sectional studies

10

it appears as though it's ambiguous as to whether

11

increased concentration is associated with more or less

12

R&D.

13

But if you control for appropriability, that

14

is, that there are some industries where it appears that

15

you need to have large shares of the existing products in

16

order to be confident that you're to be able to

17

appropriate the benefits of your innovation, the

18

intellectual property protections aren’t good enough

19

there to guarantee appropriability, and once you control

20

for that for industry type, then the relationship comes

21

back.

22

concentration is associated with less R&D, once you're

23

confident that the firms have some other way of

24

appropriating the benefits of their new ideas than merely

25

just being large.

And so that it looks as though that increased
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So I think there's a basis for antitrust

2

enforcement from that literature, but I agree that it

3

takes some teasing out to get to my interpretation of it,

4

and that, you know, people could disagree about that.

5

MR. PATE:

Other comments on innovation?

If

6

not, Jim Loftis mentioned monopsony as a question going

7

forward the agency should pay more attention to.

8
9

MR. COLLINS:

Could I just say something?

I'm

sorry for interrupting.

10

MR. PATE:

Sure.

11

MR. COLLINS:

There's something in the

12

literature recently on patents that I think does merit

13

antitrust concern, and that's the following.

14

been a finding that the number of patents has

15

skyrocketed, and that the way people are using patents

16

are as like a medium of exchange, a currency, in which

17

I'll give you my patent if you give me your patent, and

18

does not explore the reason.

19

share.

20

There's

It's just we agree to

And, therefore, someone who doesn't have this

21

currency of patents sometimes may have difficulty

22

participating in these cross-licenses.

23

interesting -- I just want to raise that.

24

an interesting phenomenon, and I think that's something

25

people should keep their eye on as to the antitrust
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

I think that's an
I think that's

224
1

consequences of those practices.

2

MR. PATE:

Well, it's a good point.

3

monopsony aside for a moment.

4

have been doing a lot of work on antitrust and

5

intellectual property, primarily focusing on patents.

6

Are there any issues that others on the panel would like

7

to comment on with respect to merger analysis and IP?

8

Any particular aspects of that that you think we ought to

9

be paying attention to?

10

(No response.)

11

MR. PATE:

12

(Laughter.)

13

MR. PATE:

I can put

The agencies obviously

No.

It's a topic that's been well enough

14

dealt with.

15

questions then.

16

field is that the agencies ought to be much more

17

concerned about monopsony at lower levels of

18

concentration than those about which we should be

19

concerned in the context of monopoly power.

20

All right.

Let me take up monopsony

A frequently heard contention in this

Marius was on a panel earlier in this series

21

where he suggested he didn't think that current learning

22

really supported that assertion, but it is one that's

23

pretty powerful, and I'd like to know if there are any

24

reactions from the panelists on that point.

25

MR. WILLIG:

I hadn't heard that strange idea
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myself.

2

(Laughter.)

3

MR. BAER:

Because if anything, the agency

4

guidance these days in health care, and other things

5

that, there is a threshold or a safe harbor in terms of a

6

buying cooperative.

7

cooperative activity that you wouldn't be allowed to do

8

if it were a seller-coordinated effort.

9

se unlawful on the seller's side.

10
11

This is not the merger analysis, but

It would be per

You actually have safe

harbors up to 25 or 30 percent on the buyer's side.
My own sense on whether we need to do more or

12

whether we're going about it right on monopsony analysis

13

in merger cases, is that you go back to the Guidelines

14

requirement.

15

time how increased power on the part of the buyer is

16

going to distort the market, you know, and looking to

17

some sort of effect that is anti-consumer is the right

18

way to look at it.

19

You tell a story and understanding over

I think just as in predatory pricing cases, you

20

want to be a little bit careful.

21

lower prices.

22

cautionary mode in mind is probably the right way to go

23

at look at monopsony, to my way of thinking.

24
25

You don't want to chill

And so having that kind of slightly more

MR. PATE:

Bobby, let me make sure.

Were you

incredulous at Marius's response or the theory to which
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he was responding?

2

MR. WILLIG:

No, at the idea that the agencies

3

had a different sense of concentration for those two

4

concerns.

But if I can follow up on Bill.

5

MR. PATE:

6

MR. WILLIG:

Sure.
Just to lay it out a little bit

7

more, we frequently encounter the idea that among merger

8

efficiencies is the ability to buy more effectively,

9

i.e., cheaper.

And of course that sounds a lot like

10

monopsony at the same time.

11

anticompetitive effect be indistinguishable from a theory

12

of efficiencies is really a challenge.

13

there's a very simple answer in economics. I wonder if

14

Marius agrees from his earlier work.

15

How could a theory of

And I think

But for me, it has to do with output, as usual.

16

But it's not downstream output, it's upstream output.

17

It's output in the market where the monopsony power is

18

said to be of concern.

19

So if the better clout from the merger on the

20

efficiency side enables more effective procurement, that

21

should also increase the output of the upstream supply.

22

But if it's an abuse of market power to get the lower

23

price upstream, that will be associated with fewer

24

purchases or less quality purchases of the upstream

25

supply.
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2

So we're back to output as the distinguishing
feature, but it's output upstream, not downstream.

3

MR. PATE:

I think I have the advantage of

4

knowing Marius does agree.

5

frame.

6

situation where there is a real efficiency in terms of

7

buying power that decreases price in the short term, if a

8

credible case were made that output would decrease in the

9

long term?

10
11

What would you suggest the agencies do with a

That's another aspect of this argument that

gets presented frequently.
MR. WILLIG:

12

upstream to invest?

13

MR. PATE:

14
15

But let me ask about the time

Oh, the low price denies ability

Right.

That production choices are

altered because there's not a sufficient return.
MR. WILLIG:

No, I worry about that, and I

16

would call that a possible exercise of monopsony power if

17

the investment base is removed from upstream supply

18

through procurement.

19

MR. CARLTON:

I think there's a confusion

20

between monopsony and bargaining power.

21

literature on the cases of monopsony and the

22

concentration levels of monopsony versus monopoly, as a

23

general rule, you can only have monopsony if you have an

24

upward sloping supply curve.

25

In terms of the

Now it's not clear that you have upward sloping
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supply curves for most industries in the long run.

2

the long run, a good first approximation for many

3

industries is the supply curve is pretty flat, so there's

4

nothing to monopsonize.

5

there's specific capital -- rents or human capital --

6

that we think that there can usually be monopsony power,

7

and that's the reason I think that explains the relative

8

paucity of studies documenting monopsony compared to

9

market power.

10

In

It's only in industries where

Now even in those cases in which there is an

11

upward sloping supply curve, sometimes it is upward

12

sloping and then it's flat.

13

supply of sports talent.

14

terrific, and then there are some people whose

15

alternative is, you know, doing nothing else but, you

16

know --

17

VOICE:

18

MR. CARLTON:

19

(Laughter.)

20

MR. CARLTON:

Take the case of sports, the

There are some people who are

Law school.
Yeah.

Law school.

Okay.

And what you've got to be careful

21

in those cases.

If there's differential pricing, suppose

22

you pay different sports figures different prices, there

23

need not be a restriction of output.

24

It's the restriction of output that matters, okay, so

25

that's often the case of monopsony, that people call

I agree with Bobby.
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monopsony.

2

doesn't lead to a supply restriction.

3

It's really differentiated pricing and

And in other cases, maybe in the short run

4

there's an upward sloping supply curve, but not in the

5

long run.

6

So there's no restriction of output.
Bargaining theory is usually what's going on

7

when someone's complaining that someone's going to obtain

8

more power.

9

better bargain.

That just means they're going to get a
And again, the issue is, in the long

10

run, is that going to alter investment?

11

then you should be concerned with the restriction of

12

output, but if it isn't, then it's just a reallocation of

13

the rents, from the transaction.

14

And if it does,

So I have always thought monopsony was less of

15

a problem than market power because of the shape of the

16

supply curves.

17

and that is that monopsony lowers price, that's true, but

18

it restricts output.

19

benefit.

20

actually a cost to society because it creates a dead

21

weight loss.

22

And there's one error that's often made,

And the lower price is not a

That shouldn't be counted as a benefit.

That's

So it really has to do with restriction of

23

output.

And anytime there's a restriction in the input

24

market, that generally is going to lead to a restriction

25

in some output market because the input was being used to
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produce some output.

2

MR. PATE:

Dan?

3

MR. RUBINFELD:

Just to follow up.

I actually

4

have more of a question than a statement.

5

but not quite the same point.

6

horizontal merger involving an output product, but the

7

merger happens to be in an industry where there is one or

8

two very significant buyers, very significant buyer

9

market power.

10

It's related

We were talking about a

I think one's natural reaction, but I'm

curious what you think.

11

We used to think of this as really a bargaining

12

issue and not a pure monopsony issue, but can you think

13

of situations in which you would think that the presence

14

of significant buyer power would be enough to counter any

15

possible adverse effects, price effects of the merger?

16

MR. WILLIG:

17

MR. RUBINFELD:

18

MR. WILLIG:

MR. RUBINFELD:

25

But there's still things to

Okay.

We can move.

Hew can

cut me off if he wants to.

23
24

Okay.

fight about on monopsony.

21
22

I'm just shifting over to a

slightly different question.

19
20

We're not doing monopsony now?

MR. PATE:

No.

Anybody want to take up Dan's

question?
MR. WILLIG:

For me, what buyer power is all
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about in a merger analysis is it's an important part of

2

the structure of the output market to understand, and

3

part of our obligation to do good analysis under the

4

Guidelines generally is to work through the consequences

5

for the way the firms are competing, and the remaining

6

competitors in the market in view of the nature of

7

demand, which include the big buyers.

8
9
10
11

So, for example, it may be tougher to imagine a
coordinated effects theory if there's big buyers who are
in control of their own procurement.
MR. CARLTON:

I think the big buyer can protect

12

himself, by vertical integration, for example, or by his

13

bargaining power to sign a contract for supply.

14

question is, how do the other buyers protect themselves?

15

And that then raises the question, is it one price for

16

the product or differential prices?

17

very important.

18

the agencies look at things.

19

The

And that seems to me

I think that's taken into account when

But as a general matter, I think heterogeneous

20

pricing in products and also whether it's services or a

21

durable good, are important considerations and have very

22

large impacts on competition.

23

MR. PATE:

24

MR. COLLINS:

25

Dale?
I think that in answer to Dan's

question, I've always thought that buyer power can play a
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role in the defense of a transaction, but what's critical

2

and I think what so many defense lawyers fail to do is

3

explain the mechanism by which the buyer power is being

4

exercised.

5

They just say there are big buyers out there.

6

You know, that by itself, quite frankly, should get you

7

nowhere on the defense side.

8

need to be explicit about the mechanism by which the

9

buyer, in the context of the industry and that particular

You need an explicit -- you

10

buyer's attributes, is actually going to be able to

11

effect a price change, if you will, in order to protect

12

itself.

13

And I think Dennis is absolutely right.

When

14

you get into all the characteristics, you know, the

15

nature of the products, whether or not there's price

16

discrimination, there's going be a huge problem in these

17

buyer power defenses.

18

MR. PATE:

Let me try to get some comments on

19

coordinated effects.

20

suggested that perhaps unilateral effects had driven out

21

coordinated effects, and that outside of stylized

22

maverick stories, coordinated effects wasn't getting

23

enough attention.

24
25

A couple of years ago Charles James

Jonathan, I was interested by your comment
leading off that coordinated effects has been so
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reinvigorated that you think it's driving out unilateral

2

effects.

3

where we are in terms of use of coordinated effects

4

theories in merger analysis and where should the agencies

5

be, and where should they say they are for the benefit of

6

outside parties.

7

So let me just use that to solicit comments on

Do you want the first shot?

MR. BAKER:

Sure.

I think what the agencies

8

have been doing the last few years in coordinated effects

9

has been very healthy and very interesting.

And what's

10

been clarified are a couple things.

11

are two different questions that you have to ask.

12

is, how do the firms in the industry solve their cartel

13

problems, reaching consensus, deterring deviation, by

14

detecting and policing cheating?

15

merger matter?

16

Guidelines aren't just some sort of checklist.

17

part of the way that integrated analysis that have to be

18

directed towards whether and how the firms solve their

19

cartel problems.

20

One is that there
One

And then how does the

And that the factors in the merger
They're

And there's a lot of empirical evidence that

21

could bear on that.

And there are interesting papers

22

coming out of both agencies, or people who worked in

23

them, with lots of little empirical tests that might be

24

relevant to understanding specific coordinated

25

interaction stories.

They all have to be tied to the
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story.

2

If you think the way coordination works is on

3

price, then issues about transparency might be important.

4

If you think it's a customer allocation, then it's a

5

transparency of customers, not the transparency of prices

6

that matters.

7

agencies have been very thoughtful and moving the ball

8

forward on doing empirics in the coordinated interaction

9

area.

10

But with that kind of a caveat, the

And then in analyzing whether and how the

11

merger matters, I think that's what mavericks are all

12

about; that there's always a constraint on coordination.

13

Coordination -- you would generally expect if it exists

14

to be imperfect and incomplete.

15

setting, the issue is, well, why is it imperfect and

16

incomplete?

17

be, of course, can't be paid off with side payments or

18

punished more vigorously to force it to go along, and

19

then how does that constraint get changed by merger?

20

In that kind of a

What firm doesn't want to go along or can't

And I would incorporate a presumption that if

21

the merger involved a maverick, it would be harmful.

22

if it didn't involve a maverick, then you need to analyze

23

how the merger affects the constraint, the mavericks.

24

And so that's how I think the agencies are evolving

25

towards understanding these coordinated effects cases,
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and it's healthy.

2

MR. PATE:

Jim Rill?

3

MR. RILL:

Yes.

I was with you up until the

4

presumption on the maverick.

5

enforcement procedure and the Guidelines really are quite

6

good on coordinated effects.

7

But, no, I think the agency

When we developed them in the 1992 Guidelines,

8

there was some sort of criticism that there was a large

9

number of criteria and a large number of considerations,

10

a large number of elements that were thrown into the pot

11

to identify situations where coordinated effect might be

12

the basis for a challenge to the merger.

13

I know the ABA was somewhat upset:

14

you doing?

15

what the principal ingredients are.

16

right thing, partly for the reason that Jonathan

17

suggested, that cases are so fact-specific, and in many

18

instances, so directionally pointed as to a particular

19

focus of analysis to say, well, the real issue here is

20

going to be heterogeneity.

21

not.

22

market.

23

You've given us a stew.

What are

You haven't told us
I think we did the

Well, in many instances, it's

The real issue may be conditions of the downstream

So it has to be weighed on a case basis.

And I

24

think the agencies have done quite a good job on that.

25

And I would not recommend, as some questions have
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suggested, I would not recommend something to assign

2

priorities to the elements of the competitive effects

3

section of the Guidelines.

4

Presumption of illegality based on maverick, I

5

have trouble sometimes identifying the difference between

6

a maverick and a thoroughbred.

7

of an equestrian, I'd have to say that to create such a

8

presumption, I think, would do considerably more harm

9

than good across the board, because the maverick may not

10
11

And not being that good

be so much of a maverick.
There may be a lot of considerations that makes

12

him or her not a maverick, but based on other factors

13

that make a somewhat difference from the basis of product

14

and the basis of cost, from the basis of position, from

15

the basis of influence in the market, that I think risks

16

severe damage by creating that -- well, how about

17

moderate damage, from establishing that kind of a

18

presumption.

19

MR. PATE:

Dennis?

20

MR. CARLTON:

One concern I've always had with

21

the quote, "maverick" theory is anytime you introduce new

22

terminology, it sounds like it's a new theory.

23

I've always preferred is to think of the maverick theory

24

not as, you know, this new word "maverick," but rather

25

the following.

And what

That the economic circumstances of a
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particular company are such that they have the incentive

2

to be particularly competitive.

3

And I want to distinguish that from they have

4

some CEO who's off on a power trip and he's going to

5

affect price for his ego or some other idiosyncratic

6

reason.

7

person running a company to be an issue in a merger case.

8

I think you want it to be the economic characteristics of

9

the company.

I don't think you want the identity of the

Otherwise, you're going to run into the

10

problem that companies are going to have an incentive not

11

to be a maverick because they know that will hurt them

12

under the Guidelines.

13

doing innovative things, if that's going to hurt them,

14

they won't have that type of CEO.

15

To have an innovative CEO who is

So I've always disliked the word "maverick"

16

because it suggests someone's off, he's kind of like a

17

wild man.

18

like that.

19

think it's quite disciplined, quite predictable based on

20

the economic situation that the firm faces.

21

think you're going to get into all sorts of puzzling

22

policy conundrums that, should it be an antitrust offense

23

if, you know, they fire Mr. X and hire Mr. Y?

24

just don't think you want to go in that direction.

25

And I don't like that.

A wild horse.

I don't

I don't think it should be wild at all.

MR. PATE:

Jim?
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MR. LOFTIS:

I would agree certainly with the

2

proposition that the agencies have gotten it about right

3

in what they're doing in practice and that the stew or

4

the checklist or whatever we wish to call it of the

5

coordinated effects section of the Guidelines has not

6

proved to be the gigantic problem that folks thought it

7

to be.

8
9

But it is interesting that to see how the
factors that are identified in the Guidelines under the

10

coordinated effects section, to see how they are playing

11

out in a slightly different arena.

12

that you take a look at the recent case law in private

13

treble damage actions, largely on summary judgment, and

14

just subtract out of that Sherman Act equation the

15

consideration of agreement, and look at what they say

16

about exchanging competitor price lists, trade

17

associations.

18

effects section of the Guidelines has been dealt with

19

more than once by the courts to evaluate its significance

20

in a specific industry.

21

I would recommend

Every factor that is in the coordinated

And it's not entirely unlike what the agencies

22

are doing in the merger setting.

23

MR. WILLIG:

I thought where you were going,

24

Jim, was that -- and this is my experience -- that the

25

agencies are quite expert and responsible in sewing
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together a complete story of coordinated effects, which

2

takes into account both the plus factors and the minus

3

factors and tries to sew them together to see if there is

4

a coherent story of how the merger will make coordination

5

more likely or worse for consumers.

6

But then in contrast, the courts are far less

7

expert, and they look at the checklist of factors, and

8

they treat it as a checklist instead of as a guideline

9

for how to tell a story or see if there is a valid story.

10

MR. LOFTIS:

Well, let's flip that around.

I

11

think you could also make the observation that if there

12

is a weakness in the agency merger analysis of

13

coordinated effects, it is a reluctance to conclude that

14

there will not be coordinated effects from a lack of

15

transparency, for example.

16

Take any significant factor that's necessary

17

for that cartel to be effective.

18

say maybe it's going to be effective.

19

subtract, if you can prove that there's no transparency,

20

and, therefore, it's not going to be effective, I think

21

there's a reluctance in the agencies to walk away for

22

that single reason from a coordinated effects theory,

23

which you don't see in the courts.

24
25

MR. PATE:

Okay.

You have red flags that
But if you

Well, there are any number of

other questions we could go into.

The time has about
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expired.

What I think I'd like to do is go through and

2

give each of the panelists an opportunity for a parting

3

shot, one brief comment they'd like to leave us with as

4

part of these proceedings and I

5

guess to follow on our alphabetical theme, maybe I'll

6

start in the middle and try to work out and give Jim

7

Loftis –-

8

(Laughter.)

9

MR. PATE:

And, see, my name begins with "P" so

10

it's always been my desire to run it this way.

11

Loftis, why don't you start?

12

MR. LOFTIS:

All right.

Jim

I just would observe

13

that Guidelines are so very hard to write that will work.

14

And what we have has gone through such a healthy process.

15

I would not suggest additional Guidelines or revising the

16

Guidelines, but I would suggest that resources be devoted

17

to understand better what the circumstances of innovation

18

are, both in the sense of improvement and in the sense of

19

superseding technologies.

20

MR. PATE:

Dale Collins?

21

MR. COLLINS:

Yeah, I agree with Jim.

I don't

22

think the Guidelines should be rewritten.

23

think that through speeches and discussions of

24

enforcement decisions and the like, what should happen is

25

that, in large part, the Guidelines should collapse, if
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2

you will, into Section II.
And as a particular example of that, I think

3

that the current structure of the Guidelines which I

4

think Baxter may have started, of isolating efficiencies

5

as a defense and suggesting that they are an affirmative

6

defense as opposed to a negative defense that should be

7

properly considered in Section II and not considered at

8

all as an affirmative defense, the Guidelines, you know,

9

the talk should be move it into Section II.

10

Don't

consider it separately.

11

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Jim Rill?

12

MR. RILL:

Very little to add to what's been

13

said by Jim and Dale.

I think the Guidelines should not

14

be revised at this time.

15

serving a very valid purpose in a progressive way.

16

would only advocate more transparency in the direction

17

the agencies are taking now.

18

of the DOJ and FTC and the current FTC study is

19

absolutely superb, and I think greater efforts to

20

identify the rationale for cases not brought and basis

21

for consent judgments would be very, very salutary.

22

MR. PATE:

23

MR. CARLTON:

I think the Guidelines are
I

I think the current release

Dennis?
Well, I echo everyone's

24

sentiments that I think the Guidelines are pretty good as

25

they stand.

They're broad enough to incorporate a
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variety of new approaches without having to rewrite the

2

Guidelines.

3

and dynamic efficiency is important.

4

I agree with Jim that more research on R&D

In terms of the way the Guidelines are actually

5

implemented, and as you develop techniques or improve

6

techniques such as merger simulation or whatever, I think

7

it's very important to do retrospective studies to see

8

what has worked and what has not worked.

9

that, it's very important not just to compare the mergers

And in doing

10

that you're blocking but also to see what happens to the

11

ones you've let go, to see whether your techniques are

12

able to distinguish between mergers that lead to price

13

increases and those that don't.

14

So I think retrospective studies are extremely

15

valuable for allowing us to assess where current practice

16

should go.

17

MR. PATE:

Dan?

18

MR. RUBINFELD:

We've done a lot, the agencies

19

and some of the folks out there, in developing empirical

20

techniques and applying them to help us better understand

21

how to distinguish mergers that are pro-competitive from

22

those that are not.

23

that, particularly actually in the area of coordinated

24

effects, which we're doing now, and that involves both

25

developing new techniques whenever possible, making data

And we need to keep doing more of
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public so that people can evaluate it, as well as doing

2

retrospective work.

3

And we should try to avoid trying to get too

4

simple rules of thumb that we think are going to apply

5

across the board to many industries, because it's just

6

not going to be the case.

7

MR. PATE:

8

MR. BAKER:

9

Jonathan?
I think Jim Rill's 1992 Guidelines

have been remarkably successful, and that they still are

10

what people on the inside and the outside rely on

11

routinely in understanding how to think about mergers.

12

And there's no real big reason to do much with them in

13

changing them.

14

If there's going to be a next round of

15

revisions, I think it's when we understand innovation

16

better than perhaps we do now and how to think about

17

mergers and innovation, but I'm not sure whether we've

18

gotten to that point yet.

19
20

So on the whole, I agree with everything that
everyone has said so far.

21

MR. PATE:

22

MR. WILLIG:

23

Bobby Willig?
Thank you.

I think the Guidelines

are actually terrific.

24

(Laughter.)

25

MR. WILLIG:

I would love to see the agency
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leadership send the message down the line on the lawyer

2

side to try to allow yet more transparency and mutual

3

interactivity among the economists, even in situations

4

where there may be some prospect of litigation.

5

know if that's appropriate.

6

really needs to be sent down the line.

7

I don't

But if it is, that message

On simulation, I think it would be great to

8

have an even more open process among the agencies’

9

economists and outside economists who I think, in our

10

case, would be delighted to see outsiders involved, not

11

in a case context, but pushing the technological envelope

12

and trying to share thoughts and coming to a better

13

standardized set of techniques that everybody understands

14

and gives some degree of approval to, not in a Guidelines

15

setting, but in the sense of mutual R&D.

16

And when it comes to technology issues and

17

mergers, I actually believe that even though we don't

18

know all that we would like to know as academics, we know

19

enough that if we put our heads together to try to write

20

some sort of a draft R&D merger enforcement Guidelines,

21

which will be an appendage to the convention Guidelines,

22

not a replacement of them, we might actually make some

23

progress.

24

some progress in that respect.

25

and trying.

We might know enough now to be able to get
It's worth thinking about
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MR. PATE:

Bill, the last word.

2

MR. BAER:

It's unusual.

I'll be brief.

And

3

that is, it's actually very rare to get the last word

4

over Bobby Willig.

5

MR. WILLIG:

6

MR. BAER:

I'm privileged.
Not yet, apparently.

The agencies

7

under the current administration have done a great job on

8

transparency in the broad sense.

9

earlier about working to improve disclosure in pending

10

The points we made

cases, I think, remains an important one.

11

The points I made earlier which -- on process -

12

- which didn't get discussed but don't necessarily need

13

it, about making sure we're paying attention to the

14

process, making the merger review process as efficient as

15

possible, I think remain an area where there's

16

opportunity for the agencies to improve.

17

MR. PATE:

Okay.

Well, it's really been a

18

privilege, by virtue of my position, to be able to share

19

the podium with such a distinguished panel of antitrust

20

thinkers.

21

today.

22

being here and those on the conference line as well.

I want to thank you for the time you spent

I want to thank all of you in the audience for

23

(Laughter.)

24

MR. PATE:

25

With that, again, thank you, even

more particularly to the staffs of both the Trade
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1

Commission and the Division who have done so much work to

2

put this conference together.

3

With that, we are adjourned.

4

(Applause.)

5

(Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the conference

6
7

adjourned.)
-

-

-

-

-
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